Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

140. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York November 4, 1955—10 p.m.

Delga 221. Department eyes only for Hoover and Wilcox. Re membership. I believe the views I have arrived at re membership as contained mytel 12 to Geneva repeated DeptDelga 217 (which crossed your Secto 148²) parallel your own. If you agree with statement I propose making, the answer to your two questions is that we should abstain both in SC and GA on satellites. I agree with you, moreover, that as a minimum we would have to express our views re non-representative character of satellite governments and recall President Eisenhower’s statements as you suggested. My proposed statement re satellites was intended accomplish this result and could be expanded.

In this connection, yesterday Kuznetsov raised with me membership problem and said it was not simply a matter of how people voted in SC, but also a question of how they voted in GA. I said that I viewed this as “an entire operation” and that it should all be worked out on paper in advance to avoid misunderstanding. I went on to say to Kuznetsov that we should be straightforward in dealing with this matter and not attempt any sharp practices such as calling the list of applicants in chronological or alphabetical order, etc., and thereby not reaching certain controversial countries. Kuznetsov agreed.

I feel that if we were to abstain in SC and vote against satellites in GA, our position would be more difficult for American public to understand than if we abstained throughout. We would, in fact, be saying in one forum that we were in effect willing to allow the satellites in and in the other forum by voting against them give the contrary impression. This would weaken our position with others in GA, would confuse our friends, and would not mollify those who are adamant on the satellite question. All of this is quite apart from fact that, as indicated above, Soviets are not likely to approve any arrangement that is not “entire operation”.

The Soviets have over the years been the object of much adverse criticism because of their abuse of the veto on the membership question. But world opinion seems to have moved on from there; it recognizes Soviet intransigence as an unpalatable fact—but a fact nevertheless, and will censure us and hold us responsible if new members do not get in.

I hope you will agree with me that timing of my proposed statement is important and that while you will of course wish to discuss matter with Macmillan and Pinay, I feel we should not delay unduly taking step I propose. UK FonOff has already, without awaiting our views, announced its support for Canadian proposal which includes Outer Mongolia. For this reason alone I feel our statement should be made promptly. At present I favor a US resolution thereafter which does not include Outer Mongolia, which would take precedence over other resolutions, and would thus require the supporters of Outer Mongolia to make an affirmative effort. I also favor proceeding first in SC.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–455. Secret; Niact. Sent to Vienna eyes only for Secretary as telegram 1 and repeated to the Department.
2. Document 136.