136. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State1
Secto 148. Eyes only Hoover from Secretary. After my visits to Rome and Madrid2 am deeply impressed by passionate desire of these countries to get into UN. I was surprised to find feeling in Spain seems fully as strong as in Italy. Spanish say they filed application at our suggestion and would never have done so had it not been taken for granted this meant we would get them in. To have applied and be rebuffed would be galling to Spanish pride and intolerable.
I recalled Franco’s urging to keep resistance movement hopefully active and said satellite admission would tend to damage will to resist. Reply was presence in UN of such vigorous anti-Communist [Page 318] Christian countries as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland would more than offset damage having satellites in. In any event they would be regarded as merely one more of several available Moscow mouthpieces and do no real harm.
After much pondering and in light of Tosec 43,3 I have come conclusion our relations with Spain, Italy and other countries would be so badly hurt by not making real effort to get them in that this damage could not be compensated for by using veto to keep European satellites out.
Two questions present themselves: (1) is it possible handle matters so we would abstain in SC and still vote against satellites GA, although we would not in GA campaign against satellites; (2) if in GA we had to abstain on satellites to get our friends in, we would as a minimum have to express our views re non-representative character of satellite governments and recall President Eisenhower’s statements at Geneva and Philadelphia4 as to US policy toward satellites.
Obviously ideal result would be in effect to carry out Vandenberg resolution whereby all permanent members of SC would avoid veto on membership and be free to vote as they like in GA. I had initially understood this was objective of conversation initiated between Lodge and Soviet delegates. However, I now have impression Soviets may interpret agreement to abstain in SC as also implying abstention in GA.
Would appreciate your views so I can discuss matter with Macmillan and Pinay.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–355. Secret. Repeated to USUN.↩
- Secretary Dulles’ memorandum of conversation with Franco at Madrid, November 1, is ibid., Secretary’s Memorandum of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, USDel/MC/ 22. Dulles elaborated on this conversation in Dulte 39 from Geneva, November 2, eyes only for Hoover and Robertson. The telegram reads: “In my conversation with Franco where he urged admission to UN and I objected to certain satellites he said in effect UN could have been a non-Communist organization but that a number of Communist states were already in and that a few more did not make any difference and once it was apparent Chiang Kai-shek could not recapture the mainland it would be necessary to admit Communist China. I was greatly struck by this observation coming from head of most anti-Communist state (hope this will not make Robertson’s ulcers worse.).” Acting Secretary of State Hoover replied in Tedul 48 as follows: “Robertson advises he thinks he is about to have a severe relapse.” (Both ibid., Central Files, 310.2/11–255)↩
- Printed as Delga 161, supra.↩
- Presumably a reference to Eisenhower’s July 18 statement at the opening of the Geneva Conference and his August 24 address at the annual convention of the American Bar Association, held in Philadelphia. For texts see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 707–712 and 802–809, respectively.↩