Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

85. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, December 12, 1955.

SUBJECT

• United Kingdom Proposals for Relaxation of Trade Controls with Communist China

1. Forwarded herewith is an advance copy of an Intelligence Estimate prepared and approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.² The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not yet acted upon this matter, but I am forwarding this paper together with my comments because I believe the indicated trend of events is of grave significance to the national security of the United States. This estimate concerns the effects to be expected if the recent United Kingdom proposals relative to relaxation of trade controls with Communist China are implemented. I fully concur with the thoughts expressed in this estimate.

2. As you know, the United Kingdom has informed the United States that, failing U.S. agreement in reducing the level of trade controls against Communist China to the much lower level now in force against the European Soviet Bloc, the United Kingdom intends a unilateral relaxation of controls commencing about 15 January, 1956. Specifically, a U.K. official has stated the intention of that nation to take unilateral action and “… by a gradual unobtrusive process, over a period, bring the United Kingdom list for China into conformity with the agreed list for the Soviet Bloc …”³ This proposed action allegedly results from the stated view that the United Kingdom can no longer see any strategic justification for continuing the present level of Communist China trade controls. I am deeply concerned with the military implications and the subsequent impact upon U.S. security which I believe would result from any relaxation of trade controls with Communist China at this time.

3. On balance, I consider that such stability as exists in the Far East today rests squarely upon the ability of the United States to convince both friend and enemy that we are determined and resolved to resist further Communist aggression in Asia, even by use of force if need be. We have built up and are supporting necessary indigenous military strength in order that certain free nations may be able to resist Communism with U.S. assistance. In the face of growing Communist strength in Asia, it will be increasingly clear to all that major aggression emanating from Communist China can only be countered and defeated through active use of U.S. military power. I believe that the greatest fear of our friends and allies in the Far East is the possibility of a change in U.S. policy which indicates a lack of resolution in this respect on the part of the United States. In the case of Korea, we gave tangible evidence of this resolution. Our continued support of some nations is further evidence. However, it is the Asian estimate of U.S. intentions in the future to deal with Communist aggression that will probably determine the continuation and caliber of collective strength in free Asia.

4. If the United States either adopts the course of action proposed by the United Kingdom or condones the unilateral action of that nation, I believe that our friends and allies of the Far East, together with the world as a whole, would view this as prima facie evidence that this government is retreating under Communist pressure. At a minimum, both the Communists and our allies would consider, with some validity, that this action represents a radical change in U.S. policy which clearly facilitates the eventual Communist domination of all Asia. The facts are that Communist China has been branded an aggressor by the United Nations; the present controls on trade with Communist China stem from that finding; Americans have been imprisoned and tortured in violation of International Law and human decency; Communist China has publicly identified the United States as its number one enemy; and as yet that nation has not seen fit to adopt international procedures and attitudes compatible with those recognized among the society of world nations. For the United States to relax trade controls with a nation which is still a technical enemy of the United States would be tacit forgiveness, if not approval, of that nation’s actions and, in my opinion, would result in a condition of hopelessness among those nations which depend primarily upon us for their own security. I consider that any benefits which might have been expected from SEATO would be nullified; the morale of strong anti-Communist forces in Asia would be seriously shaken; U.S. prestige in Asia would reach a new low; friendship with the United States could well become a dangerous commodity; and the stoic temperament of the peoples of Asia would cause them to seek an accommodation with the Communists—all to the detriment of United States security.

5. Militarily speaking, then, I believe that the summation of the foregoing could well result in a rapid deterioration of the active indigenous military strength we have constituted in the Far East. Sizable defections to Communism are a distinct possibility and would probably increase in tempo within a short time. This loss of friendly military strength in the Far East would, I believe, eventually require significant increases in our own military programs in order adequately to provide for U.S. security and to prevent a complete loss of the balance of power in favor of the Communists.

6. Some may think that eventual trade with and recognition of Communist China is a certainty. The answer to this argument is simply—maybe; however, the existing conditions in the world make it undesirable for this action to take place now. It is possible, although not probable, for changes to take place in the next few years in the imperialistic and belligerent attitude of Soviet Russia and Communist China. I do not believe that we can expect any improvement in this area if we now take action which contributes to the increased strength of the threat against us.

7. I consider that the British proposals require a timely decision on the part of the U.S. Government to adopt one of three possible courses of action. These are:

a. Concur in British Proposals; U.S. and U.K. Jointly Remove Trade Differentials.

This action would be interpreted worldwide as a complete reversal of our foreign policy. I believe the repercussions would be monumental, not the least of which could be a serious political upheaval within the United States. The strongest anti-Communist nations of Asia, namely, the South Koreans and Chinese Nationalists, would view this action as a slap in the face. The effects upon U.S. leadership among the free nations of the world could well be catastrophic.

b. United Kingdom Takes Unilateral Action to Remove Controls, and the United States Retains Trade Controls.

While a decision along this line would be better than the first course of action; nonetheless, this course would facilitate improvement in the economical, industrial, military and political position of Communist China. Further, it would ease the drain on Russian resources required by China. This course of action would notify the world, which unfortunately includes enemies of the United States, that the first major rift in Western solidarity had occurred. In face of the propaganda and speculation to be expected, it is possible that the rift would widen. Nevertheless, free nations and free people everywhere could take heart that the United States is willing to stand alone, if necessary, in the cause of justice and freedom.

c. United States Retains Trade Controls and Attempts to Persuade the United Kingdom to Abandon Their Announced Course of Action.

I believe that this is the only logical and sound course of action for the United States to adopt at this time. Once our government makes this decision, it must at the same time decide that solution b. above is preferable to a. Then and only then, the United States can:

(1) Inform the United Kingdom that if her proposal is implemented, it will, in fact, be unilateral because the United States has no intention of adopting a similar course of action.

(2) Point out to the British the detrimental effects upon U.S. national security which would result from U.S. agreement to relaxation of trade controls with Communist China together with the probable consequences of publishing United States–United Kingdom disagreement to the world.

(3) Emphasize the difficulty to be experienced by the Executive Branch of the government in explaining to the American people the logic of financial support for a nation which, in turn, is contributing materially to the economic recovery and military strength of an avowed enemy of the United States.

8. Finally, I believe the stated view of the United Kingdom, that it can no longer see any strategic justification for continuing the present levels of trade controls, is so significant as to require careful examination and analysis. Taken at face value, this statement implies a minimum of British recognition of the threat to United States security posed by the dynamic communist Sino-Soviet alliance in the Far East. Simply put, it means that the British desire for trade could be greater than their anxiety for collective security. It seems to me that there is also little recognition of the threat to Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya. I believe that the U.S.–U.K. alliance is of far greater importance to the United Kingdom than it is to the United States. It appears that we should make every effort to determine now the real strength of this alliance rather than at some later date when any faltering or signs of weakness would be an even greater blow to U.S. security. If the United Kingdom remains unconvinced and actually initiates the proposed unilateral action, I believe it will become necessary to re-examine completely the orientation of U.S. foreign policy or initiate appropriate U.S. actions which will have the effect of discouraging further British action in lowering controls. In this field we have possibilities in the field of trade which if imposed will have a great effect upon the British (for instance, reduction or cancellation of export licenses from Hong Kong).

9. I conclude that the United States should consider firm measures to deter the British from taking the course of action they propose. I therefore recommend that this government adopt a strong position against these British proposals and that this information be transmitted forthwith to the United Kingdom. As a concurrent step, I would suggest that the President request the British Prime Minister to delay any further action concerning these proposals until they can be mutually discussed during the Prime Minister’s forthcoming conference here in late January 1956.

1. Source: CJCS Records, 091 China, April–December, 1955. Top Secret. Radford forwarded copies of this memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations on December 12.
2. Not attached to the source text and not found in Department of State files or Joint Chiefs of Staff Records.
3. Ellipses in the source text.