86. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 21, 19551
SUBJECT
- Conference with The Secretary—December 21, 1955 Re CHINCOM Controls
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Deputy Under Secretary—Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Robertson—FE
- Mr. Bowie—S/P
- Mr. Prochnow—E
- Mr. Jones—FE
- Mr. Elbrick—EUR
- Mr. Goodkind—ECD
The Secretary said that the Committee he had appointed, chaired by Mr. Prochnow, to consider the question of CHINCOM Controls was not with the idea that negotiations would start now. The purpose of the Committee was to prepare for negotiations and develop a consolidated American negotiating position. The job of the Committee, the Secretary indicated, was to find out where we can give without hurting our objectives, and particularly to give Japan some relief. He referred to G. I. sheets and indicated that if these were to be supplied to Red China, Japan, not Britain, should supply them.
Mr. Robertson asked the Secretary whether he had read his memorandum on the desirability of proceeding with negotiations with Japan immediately.2 He pointed out that the Japanese had been contacting us for some time now with reference to the 111 items they would like to see eliminated from CHINCOM controls. He emphasized that our objective was to maintain multilateral controls at the highest levels we could and that Japan of all the countries affected was closest to our position. After a short discussion, the Secretary approved our negotiating with the Japanese on CHINCOM controls on an exploratory basis. Mr. Merchant’s memorandum on [Page 285] this subject was called to the Secretary’s attention during the discussion and both he and Mr. Robertson indicated concurrence.3
Mr. Bowie pointed out the necessity for changing the NSC directive in order to give us permission to negotiate reduction in the level of CHINCOM controls as well as to provide negotiating latitude. The Secretary replied that the President has taken this over and that the NSC could not direct the President what to do. He said that the letter which he had written to Macmillan was in effect the President’s letter and expressed his view. The NSC directive, therefore, should be brought into conformity with the letter. He requested that this be done at the next meeting of the NSC.
The Secretary then observed that in our discussions with the British we would have to meet their point that all CHINCOM does is to let these embargoed commodities in at the back door instead of the front door. He said before the President meets with Prime Minister Eden, the President will want to know what items he can drop out of the CHINCOM list without interfering with our objectives too much; that this list on which we are prepared to yield should be buttressed by strong reasons against reductions in other items. As for the back door argument, the Committee should go into the question of delays in deliveries, the status of transportation and the difficulties this causes the Chinese, the extra costs involved, etc. He emphasized that we must have strong defensive arguments and these arguments must be based upon facts.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.009/12–2355. Confidential. Drafted by Howard Jones on December 23.↩
- The memorandum of December 21 reads in part as follows: “I believe that our best possibility for emerging from a Consultative Group meeting with a China differential maintained is to enter that meeting with agreed bilateral positions with as many CG members as is possible. The starting point for such bilaterals should be Japan because of its recognized prime interest in this problem and because its position is closer to ours than is that of any other major nation.” (Ibid., 493.009/12–2155)↩
- In this memorandum to Robertson, dated December 21, Merchant expressed apprehension about “reaching bilateral agreements with the Japanese for the deletion of specific items in advance of agreement within the U.S. Government on our tactics in COCOM”. He hoped Robertson could delay meeting with the Japanese. (Ibid., 611.94/12–2155)↩