84. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1
Dear Herb: Your note requesting my comments on the cables concerning the recent decision of the United Kingdom Government on controls over trade to Communist China has raised many questions in my mind. It seems to me that the British threat to unilaterally drop China controls if the United States does not agree with them prior to January 15, 1956 cannot be considered solely as a trade control problem, but has much broader implications for the United States and for the other countries engaged in Mutual Security Programs.
The British action is extremely dangerous since it would undoubtedly weaken the entire Security Trade Control Program. Their attitude appears to be that, if they cannot achieve a relaxation of trade controls through multilateral negotiation, they will unilaterally subvert the multilateral control machinery in order to satisfy the commercial pressures which strongly influence their security trade policies. The United Kingdom, or any other major participating country, can achieve this purpose unilaterally. Other countries have even greater interest and need for China trade than the United Kingdom, but only the United Kingdom has threatened to act so arbitrarily. If we adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the United Kingdom’s threatened action, we can hardly expect the other participating countries to believe that the United States Government seriously desires to promote the security of the Free World through control of trade.
As you know, the controls over trade with Communist China are based on a broad list of items encompassing most of the major industrial categories. The Coordinating Committee (COCOM) controls consist of a few items from each of the major categories which are selected on the basis of very rigid criteria reflecting their relationship to current military production activities, advanced technology, or demonstrated deficiencies within the European Soviet bloc. Reducing the China Committee (CHINCOM) controls to the COCOM level would, therefore, release for direct shipment to the Communist Chinese a great many items of key industrial significance, such as electric-power equipment of small and medium sizes; machine tools, except the very largest types; copper wire; aluminum scrap; practically all types of transportation equipment, including [Page 279] cargo vessels; important types of communication equipment; crude petroleum; mining and petroleum refining machinery; construction machinery; general industrial equipment, including most of the components for the output of steel, aluminum, copper, chemicals, and other basic materials; and a host of other items. Making these available for direct import from the Free World would materially aid the Chinese Communists in their current efforts to expand military facilities for aggression against Asiatic areas, including Formosa, as well as ease their general economic situation.
With respect to the broader implications of the British proposal, I am sure that current negotiations with the Communist Chinese at Geneva would be jeopardized if it became known that trade was to be resumed by the Free World without the slightest indication that the Communist Chinese intend to modify their aggressive attitude. Surely, the political and economic impact of the United Nations embargo on strategic trade, the CHINCOM trade controls, the refusal to admit Communist China to the United Nations, combined together, represent effective pressure which the Communists strongly desire to have removed. If a major one of these pressures is released without a commitment of any kind by the Chinese Communists to alter their present aggressive courses of action, the entire position of the Free World is then weakened. In view of heavy United States military commitments in Asia and the need, in the event of further aggression, to increase these commitments, I cannot view the British action in this case as anything but detrimental to our security. I realize, of course, that a choice must be made between this loss of security, and possible injury to Anglo-United States cooperation which might result from clearly labeling the United Kingdom threat as irresponsible. It appears to me that the latter would be preferable in our present situation.
It occurs to me that there is real danger that knowledge of British lack of cooperation may cause Congress to restrict foreign aid appropriations and thus hamper the continuation of an effective mutual defense system. I do not suggest that this danger should be utilized as leverage with the United Kingdom Government, since they generally react negatively to such leverage. Nevertheless, this danger must be faced by the Administration.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.009/12–1255. Secret.↩