Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Economic Policy; Foreign Information Program, Volume IX

198. Report by the OCB Special Working Group on Stalinism¹

Washington , May 17, 1956.

PART I

Summary of U.S. Policy Guidance and Actions Taken to Exploit the Campaign

A. U.S. Objectives to be Served by Exploitation of the Anti-Stalin Campaign.

In the Soviet Union.

1. Expansion of the official criticism of Stalin into pressure by the people of the USSR for the diversion of effort away from military production and expansion of communism abroad toward a higher standard of living and more representative government at home.

2. Extension of Soviet admission that one-man rule was undesirable into an eventual admission that one-party rule carries the seeds of dictatorship.

In the Satellites.

3. A loosening of the ties binding the satellites to Moscow and creation of conditions which will permit the satellites to evolve toward independence of Moscow.

In the Free World.

4. Exposure of communist claims to infallibility and Utopian pretensions.

5. Prevention of the use of the denigration of Stalin by Communist parties to come to power through parliaments in free countries where they are now represented.

General

6. Extension of Soviet admission of Stalin’s mistakes at home into an admission of Stalin’s mistakes abroad.

B. General Approach.

7. A distinction is being made between the U.S. official line and other U.S. means to exploit the campaign.

8. Publicly, U.S. media are adopting a note of cautious skepticism, calling upon the Soviet leaders to demonstrate their professed attachment to reform by correcting still outstanding major abuses in domestic and foreign politics. For the time being, an attitude of jubilation over communist embarrassment is being avoided in order to obviate a counter-productive reaction which might cause the communists to close their ranks. In order to stimulate and maintain the momentum of the effects of the campaign without directly involving the U.S., overt media are helping to keep in circulation the flow of material and comment, wherever generated, damaging to the communist cause.

9. In the non-attributable field the U.S. is employing its resources to sow confusion and doubt in the communist world, to undermine the objectives of the campaign through ridicule and questioning and to expose the attempt of the present leaders to dissociate themselves from unpopular communist tenets.

10. It is appreciated that an excellent opportunity is presented to exploit the contradictions of communism and this is being done wherever possible by direct statement, by implication or suggestion as appropriate to each particular form of media.

C. Guidance Issued.

11. Statements by U.S. officials. Agencies concerned are basing their official comment and line of questioning principally upon Secretary Dulles’ press statements of April 3 and April 24, his speech of April 23, and on pertinent portions of the President’s speech of April 21.²

12. Use of non-official comment. Agencies concerned have been advised to use foreign and U.S. non-official opinion and report local communist confusion to achieve our immediate goals rather than to give evidences of a major U.S. propaganda campaign. Such attributed non-official material is emphasizing the following main points.

a. Stalinism is the antithesis of democracy.

b. Stalin’s men are still ruling the country and Stalin’s policies, reiterated at the recent Party Congress, are still being pursued—collectivization, police state, domination of the satellites and Baltic States, control of foreign communist parties, etc.

c. Only a few of Stalin’s victims have been rehabilitated to date.

d. The Soviet Government has confirmed Western accusations of many years standing.

e. Communist claims to infallible leaders and doctrine have been shattered.

f. Communist leaders have admitted that Soviet policies under Stalin involved “excessive costs.”

g. On the basis of past experience and in view of continued Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and armaments, we are urging the Free World to remain on guard against a new turnabout by confronting the Soviet Union with the firm determination of a cohesive Free World to resist aggression.

13. Maximum reliance on indigenous sources. Wherever and whenever possible we are using local opinion and reaction, and confusion among communist parties, to achieve our objectives without publicly injecting widespread U.S. output.

14. Regional emphasis. Agencies are tailoring output to fit target areas, to wit:

a. The Soviet Union. The Soviet population is being encouraged to take advantage of the anti-Stalin campaign to obtain greater political relaxation and a higher standard of living.

b. The satellites. Hope for greater freedom is being strengthened, and pressure toward this goal is being encouraged. Intra-party dissension and differences with the Moscow line are being exploited.

c. The Free World. The continuity of basic Soviet policies from Lenin to the present is being emphasized. Agencies are seeking to counter trends toward the relaxation of vigilance, striving to prevent the assumption of respectability by the Soviet leaders, discrediting and promoting dissension among the local communist parties. Stress is given to the servile attitude of foreign communist parties and their leaders toward the USSR. Yugoslavia is being encouraged to remain independent, physically and ideologically.

d. The Far East. Questions are being raised whether “collective leadership” is to be the new fashion for Asia and it is being pointed out that the Far Eastern communist leaders are no more infallible than Stalin.

D. Implementation of Agreed Points of Guidance.³

15. Overt Media.

a. Radio. The U.S. International Broadcasting Service has emphasized the actual news of the denigration of Stalin with commentary based on various Free World editorial viewpoints. The output has been designed to raise questions in the minds of listeners. In the Bloc the need for actions to demonstrate the sincerity of recent communist pronouncements has been publicized. In the Free World the statements of foreign socialists, particularly those made at the British Trade Union meeting at Margate, have been used to warn against the Popular Front.

b. Press. The International Press Service has paralleled the line taken by the USIBS. It has also despatched cartoon roundups and comic strips using the guidance themes.

c. Film. USIA is providing some film for a film biography of Stalin being prepared by the American Broadcasting Company.

d. Research. All research agencies are examining old files for information on Stalin and also for information on Bulganin and Krushchev for possible future use in the event the ban against attacking the present leaders is lifted.

16. Unattributable Propaganda. Appropriate agencies, in close coordination with the Department of State, are engaged in unattributable propaganda in direct support of U.S. objectives as outlined in Section I above.

E. Coordination With the British and French.

17. The British and French have been informed regarding our approaches to the anti-Stalin campaign and suggestions have been solicited from them. As a result of cooperative arrangements, the French organization “Peace and Liberty” will shortly issue a new satirical poster series dealing with the anti-Stalin campaign.

PART II

Motivations of the Current Anti-Stalin Campaign

18. It was agreed that the Soviet leaders have probably not felt compelled by foreign developments to take the step of jettisoning the symbol of Stalin. Possible motivations include the following:

a. The desire of the present Soviet leaders to confirm their own position by a dramatic break with the past, thereby gaining popularity at home and respectability abroad.

b. The desire to gain greater freedom of action to pursue current emphasis on coexistence by eliminating a contradiction between the Stalinist symbols of the USSR and its present avowed intentions.

c. The desire of the current rulers to forestall the rise of a future Stalin (both in the Soviet and other orbit parties) by denouncing the “cult of personality.”

d. The desire to stimulate the lower administrative ranks to assume more initiative and responsibility instead of merely awaiting orders from above—by informing them that this is expected of them and by removing the source of fear of responsibility.

e. The aim of strengthening the role of the Soviet Party both at home and in its leadership of foreign communist parties, in order to make good the loss of Stalin’s dominating influence.

Attachments: ⁴

A. Excerpts from statements by President and Secretary of State.

B. Intelligence Brief No. 1912.2, dated 4/24/56.

C. Intelligence Brief No. 1912.3, dated May 5, 1956.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member Files, Miscellaneous, 1956–57. Secret. On May 25, Staats transmitted this report to NSC Executive Secretary Lay. The latter forwarded the paper to the National Security Council on May 28 and sent copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. For texts, see Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1956, pp. 637–638; ibid., May 7, 1956, pp. 747–753; ibid., April 30, 1956, pp. 706–710; and ibid., pp. 699–706.
3. The following USIA messages were sent to USIS missions on the Soviet anti-Stalin campaign: Circular priority Usito 408, March 22; CA–2005, April 12; CA–2098, April 24; circular priority Usito 549, June 7; and circular Usito 8, July 5. (Department of State, USIA/IOP Files: Lot 64 D 535, 1956)
4. None printed.