197. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all USIS Missions 1

CA–1985

INFOGUIDE

USIA output in 1956.

(Begin FYI)

I. The Present Situation

1. Stalin’s successors to leadership of the Soviet Union over the past year have progressively clarified their intentions and policies, by speeches and pronouncements on a variety of international and domestic questions. At the recent 20th Congress of the Communist Party2 of the Soviet Union the various elements of current Soviet policy were brought together as a systematic program, in the course of a full dress review of Soviet ideology and planning.

2. Meanwhile, United States leaders have made continuing analysis of the international situation as it has developed, particularly since the Summit Meeting last summer in Geneva. The President in various messages to Congress and in press conferences, and the Secretary of State and other high level U.S. officials in speeches and press conferences have focused attention on a number of problem areas and discussed U.S. policies with respect to them.

3. This guidance is not intended to present new statements of U.S. policy or a new analysis of the international situation, but rather to summarize U.S. views on major problems, and to provide some basic guidelines for USIA output, which should serve as a framework for our operations over the next several months.

a. Soviet Aims

4. There is as yet no evidence that the current Soviet leaders have abandoned the historic aims of Communism, or have in any way relaxed their efforts to: a) strengthen the security of their regime beyond all challenge; b) isolate, reduce or emasculate United States power, as a threat to their own; c) undermine, divide and weaken Free World nations, and d) generally extend Communist influence and control throughout the world.

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5. In fact, Soviet leaders reiterated in unmistakable terms at the 20th Party Congress their dedication to the aims of Communism, and elaborated a clear plan of action to facilitate the accomplishment of their objectives. Even the current program to downgrade Stalin is directed toward condemnation of his personal acts, rather than to aims and policies deriving from Communist theory itself.

b. Soviet Tactics

6. However, the present Soviet leaders appear to have shelved, at least temporarily, Stalin’s aggressive tactics. They appear to have recognized that these tactics, although resulting in enormous gains in the immediate post-war period, eventually became counter-productive, and tended increasingly to isolate the Soviet Union, and to stigmatize the Soviet regime as a brutal, inhuman dictatorship, bent on world conquest and hence a dangerous and immediate threat to world peace.

7. The most impressive of the consequences of this policy of Stalin have been the building up of U.S. defensive strength and the creation of regional defense pacts in the Free World, particularly NATO, as bulwarks against aggression, and the broadening and deepening of the political, economic and cultural interests among Free World nations.

8. Soviet leaders, as a result of their own nuclear tests, have also undoubtedly acquired direct knowledge of the immensely destructive power of nuclear weapons. It is reasonable to suppose that this knowledge has had a direct effect on their planning and strategy for pursuing their political objectives.

9. This may result in greater understanding of the nature of the Free World policy of deterrence, backed by the nuclear retaliatory power of the United States, and hence may make Soviet leaders wary of actions which are likely to lead to a general, nuclear war.

10. It is also possible that Soviet leaders consider that mutual recognition of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear devastation enables them to take calculated risks which will not be challenged by the Free World, out of fear of unleashing a general war. As a result of the clear demonstration at the Summit conference of the peaceful intentions of the United States, they may also have become convinced that the United States will not resort to preventive war, or provoke a situation which would lead to general war. They may therefore believe that they can play upon the apprehensions of other nations with respect to nuclear war, without themselves running serious risk of precipitating it.

11. In any event, Stalin’s successors appear to have turned from his tactics of force, intolerance and bad manners in international relations, to greater reliance on enticement, division, and duplicity in [Page 569] pursuit of their aims. Greater emphasis is now being placed on peaceful gestures, on economic and political penetration aimed at subversion, and on parliamentary maneuver as standard techniques for extending the influence and power of Communism.

12. The possibility of violent measures to achieve the goals of Communism has not, however, been entirely abandoned. At the 20th Party Congress, it was made specifically clear that force may be required in certain situations, where resistance is strong and the possibilities of Communist success are believed to be good. This undoubtedly is meant to cover situations such as local aggression and revolutionary seizure of power by local Communist groups, where intervention by outside powers is considered minimal, and where the risks of precipitating developments leading to nuclear war are considered slight.

13. The new tactics of the Soviets have expressed themselves in a series of moves over the past year, which have been aimed at impressing the world with the peaceful intent of the Soviet Union and removing the stigma of barbarism from the regime; in short, giving it a certain respectability abroad. These moves have included the negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty,3 the pilgrimage to Belgrade,4 the friendly although unyielding performance at the Summit Meeting,5 the return of the Porkalla naval base,6 the announcements of reductions in Soviet armed forces, return to active participation in international organs, and various Soviet proposals on disarmament, treaties of friendship and the like. Soviet leaders have also made offers of technical assistance to newly developing countries, such as India and Burma, or have offered loans as in the case of Afghanistan, and they have agreed to take surplus cotton from Egypt, surplus rice from Burma and, generally, to expand their trade with other countries, with the evident aim of intensifying and exploiting natural rivalries and conflicts of interest. One important aspect of this campaign has been the element of surprise or unexpectedness, which has insured maximum impact abroad.

c. Soviet Confidence

14. Recent Soviet activities, including the 20th Party Congress, have radiated a vast confidence in the ability of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc to achieve their aims by means of their new approach. Confidence, even arrogance, has been displayed at past Communist congresses, but the recent meeting and the boasts [Page 570] made there must be weighed in the light of a) the impressive technological advances achieved in recent years by the Soviet Union, b) the effective consolidation of Communist control over nearly a billion people, c) the highly favorable impact made upon newly-developing countries by the material achievements of the Soviet Union, and d) rising anti-colonialist, anti-Western nationalism in various Asian and African areas which have only recently achieved, or are still struggling for, national independence.

15. The Soviets have also introduced a significant factor into the situation by entering into special bi-lateral trade agreements with certain Asian countries, and by supporting one side against the other in area disputes (e.g., India against Pakistan on Kashmir; Afghanistan against Pakistan on Pushtunistan; the Arabs against Israel). In a sense the Soviets are now challenging the U.S. on a level which is quite removed from the central issue, i.e., Communism vs. Freedom. They are now in effect appealing to key Asian countries on the grounds that they have a better specific prescription for the nationalist and irridentist claims of these countries than we do. Thus the ideological and subversive hand is concealed under the glove of old-fashioned big power diplomacy. Although this may result in certain short-term political advantages for the USSR, it may also have the ultimate effect of undermining its posture in the UN as a great power ostensibly dedicated to the preservation of peace.

16. Because of their close control over the productive capacity of the entire Communist bloc, it may also be assumed that Communist leaders, if they so desire, can substantially fulfill any specific economic commitment they may wish to make to other countries. This may have to be done, however, at the expense of consumers in Communist bloc countries, or by slowing down performance on normal trade patterns.

17. The new Soviet tactics and their appeal to large numbers of people abroad pose new problems for the Free World, which can only be met by consistent pursuit of our own positive aims, while minimizing the effects of Soviet moves.

d. The New Soviet Image

18. The image of the Soviet Union, which its leaders are now attempting to project abroad, is that of a strong but peaceful regime, which has broken with the unsavory period of Stalin, providing adequately for its citizens’ welfare at home, with the governmental organs, particularly its police arm, operating under acceptable rules of law, a regime aligned with the aspirations of newly-developing areas, and tolerant of a variety of political faiths and methods.

19. This image was bolstered at the 20th Party Congress by the elaboration of a number of basic principles, now clothed with the [Page 571] authority of Lenin, chief among which are: a) collective leadership, guaranteeing against the return of one-man dictatorship; b) concentration upon the problems of underdeveloped areas as representing the effective balance of future world power; c) the recognition of roads to socialism other than that traveled by the Soviet Union, and d) the possibility of “peaceful coexistence,” i.e., the achievement of a Communist world without major war.

e. United States Aims

20. The aims of U.S. foreign policy may be summarized as a) the maintenance of peace by the deterrence of war and aggression; b) the political and economic strengthening of the Free World nations and of their will to resist aggression and subversion; c) the encouragement of developments in the Communist bloc which will bring about greater internal liberalization of the system and lead to policies and actions less dangerous to world peace; d) exposing and frustrating the aims of international Communism, and reducing and destroying its influence, and e) promoting peaceful change generally, by which progress can be made toward a more secure, stable and productive future for the world.

21. These are not aggressive aims; they are in the interest of the people of the United States, but they are also in the interest of peoples all over the globe. We are not striving for military domination over other countries nor conspiring to force our pattern of life upon them. The kind of future world the United States seeks to bring about is one of peace and progress, of security and freedom for all mankind, achieved by joint effort and common agreement, a world in which the liberty, the dignity and the well-being of the individual, and not his enslavement and regimentation, are the true concern of governments.

22. The accomplishment of these aims requires imaginative planning and a flexible program of constructive measures, which are aimed at continuing, substantive progress, and not at mere propaganda victories. As the President said in his State of the Union Message: “We must be prepared to meet the current tactics which pose a dangerous, though less obvious threat. At the same time, our policy must be dynamic as well as flexible, designed primarily to forward the achievement of our objectives rather than to meet each shift and change on the Communist front.”7

23. The considerations sketched in the foregoing paragraphs place a special responsibility on USIA for persevering and skillful presentation to foreign audiences of the positive nature of U.S. [Page 572] policies and actions, and the focusing of attention on the continuity and the achievements of our policies, with the aim of obtaining maximum continuing impact. We should seek to dramatize in every possible way the past and continuing U.S. and Free World record of accomplishment.

24. Guidance on many specific aspects of U.S. policies have already been sent to the field, and new guidances will be issued as developments warrant. The information lines they set forth should be used to support each other, and keyed into the present paper, which is intended primarily to provide a basic frame of reference for the continuing treatment of major problem areas. (End FYI)

II. Guidelines for USIA

a. Basic Tasks of USIA

25. In interpreting United States policies and actions to foreign audiences, the United States Information Agency should, in general, seek to: a) project an image of the United States which reflects the fundamentally peaceful intent of U.S. policies, while making clear our determination to resist aggression; b) delineate those important aspects of U.S. life, culture and institutions which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the U.S.; c) expose Communist aims and adequately counter Soviet and Communist propaganda; d) persuade foreign peoples that U.S. policies will actually aid the achievement of their legitimate national objectives and aspirations; e) encourage evolutionary change in the Soviet system, along lines consistent with U.S. security objectives and the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the USSR; and f) assure the satellite peoples of the continuing interest of the U.S. in the peaceful restoration of their independence and political freedom.8

b. General Tone and Approach

26. The general tone in USIA output should be objective, calm and confident. President Eisenhower has said: “We should act in the general assurance that the fruits of freedom are more attractive and desirable to mankind in the pursuit of happiness than the record of [Page 573] Communism.”9 The general stress of our output should therefore be on our confidence that the “wave of the future” will be the solid, substantial progress of free people, making their decisions freely, and not the Communist program of material change systematically brought about by force, terror and spiritual regimentation of human beings on a vast, unprecedented scale. We should not give the impression of worry or panic at Communist moves, however new or unexpected they may be. At the same time, we should not treat serious developments lightly, or downgrade their importance by “slick” propagandistic interpretations. We should not give the impression of sacrificing moral principles to expediency, and should pursue vigorously our attack on international communism, without however engaging in invective or polemics. Wherever feasible and useful, we should use the indirect approach and allow our friends abroad to make our points for us. The specific stress on each of the foregoing elements may be modified, as appropriate, on a regional basis, within the overall limits set forth above.

c. Free World Defensive Strength

27. In utilizing announced policies and actions of the United States and its Free World Allies, and other appropriate newspegs for our output, we should present our materials within a basic frame of reference which brings out as appropriate, that: a) the military strength we seek to build and maintain in the Free World is not aggressive, but defensive in nature; b) we do not intend to provoke violence or war, but to deter resort to force by others; c) the policy of collective military strength sufficient to deter aggression is not merely in the interest of the United States, but provides a shield of security for all free nations; d) the mutual defense agreements we have entered into are not merely pro forma arrangements, but have been made with the most profound determination to honor commitments; e) should the Communist powers resort to overt aggression, we are confident that the collective strength of the Free World will prevail.

d. Political Freedom and Cohesion of The Free World

28. Similarly, with respect to the political freedom and cohesion of the Free World, we should use a frame of reference which brings out that the U.S.: a) is a responsible and considerate partner in Free World cooperation; b) supports and encourages the extension of political participation by all classes of people, and in particular, the [Page 574] peaceful and orderly progress of colonial peoples toward governments based on democratic self-determination, seeking to strengthen the forces of moderation on both sides of colonial disputes; c) supports and encourages the development of European unity, including supranational cooperation of the sort achieved in the European Steel and Coal Community, and works for closer cooperation under other regional arrangements; d) is vitally interested in helping maintain the independence of those free nations which have declared themselves “neutral” in the present world struggle; e) considers the activities of such organizations, as social democratic parties, labor unions, youth, women’s and professional groups, which are dedicated to freedom and orderly progress and to preventing the spread of Communist influence as important elements in the strength and cohesion of the Free World; f) gives its full support to the UN as a forum for discussion and settlement of international problems, and g) will continue to oppose the efforts of international communism to penetrate and subvert the nations of the Free World, and to instigate and inflame differences of opinion and interest between them or within them, with the aim of creating disorder and delaying peaceful change and effective progress.

e. Economic Progress in the Free World

29. One of our major tasks is to make widely known all useful evidences of orderly progress, of “peaceful change” toward increasing well-being of the peoples of the Free World, and to counter the attraction which the material advances made in the Soviet Union and in Communist China and the exaggerated Communist propaganda about these advances have upon certain newly developing nations. Our frame of reference should bring out that: a) free people, dedicated to increasing their economic level of production and well-being, can accomplish these ends without resort to the restrictions on personal liberty, to the system of terror, force and regimentation upon which Communist achievements are based, and without dependence on the Communist bloc; b) the U.S. has built a record of assisting and encouraging free peoples to help themselves, as in the European Recovery (Marshall) Plan, in our Technical Aid program, in support of the Colombo Plan10 and of IBRD and Import-Export Bank credits for long-range economic programs, and plans to continue this aid; c) greater trade among free nations is possible and desirable; the United States has been in the forefront of efforts to expand peaceful international trade, and will continue to cooperate in removing obstacles to such trade.

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f. The Aims of Communism

30. In our output we should bring out, as appropriate, the fact that fundamental Communist aims have not changed under the post-Stalinist leadership. This fact was repeatedly reaffirmed at the 20th Congress by Soviet leaders themselves. However, they appear to have shelved the discredited and counter-productive Stalin tactics of threat, intimidation, overt aggression, and intolerance of other ideologies and systems of government and are making great efforts to convince other peoples of the respectability of their regime. As Secretary Dulles said on April 3, 1956:

“The Soviet rulers know that the brutal and arbitrary rule of the Stalin era led to a great yearning by the subject peoples for legality and for personal security; for tolerance of differences of opinion, and for government genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the governed. Also the Soviet rulers must now see that their foreign policies encounter effective resistance when they are identified with the use of violence.”11

31. Soviet leaders have also specifically recognized that the hitherto sacred dogma of the “inevitability of war” between the communist and the non-Communist systems must be abandoned in the face of their growing knowledge of the power of nuclear weapons, and of the obvious conflict of this dogma with their propaganda for peaceful coexistence. They confess to mistakes in past assessments of political and economic developments abroad, and now grudgingly admit that significant economic progress to which they now want access is being made under systems other than their own. But there has been no public wavering in their devotion to the basic aims of Communism.

g. Flexible Tactics

32. We may point out that in pursuance of these basic aims, the Soviet leaders have over the past year adopted increasingly flexible tactics, which they believe more likely today to result in success than would the discredited Stalinist approach. More emphasis is being placed on a) cultural presentations; b) economic and political penetration; c) instigation and exploitation of divisions and rivalries among Free World nations; c) [sic] the use of parliamentary maneuver and “popular front” activities as general techniques; d) the extension of their long-standing “peace” campaign to include special gestures, such as their disarmament proposals, the announced reduction [Page 576] of Soviet armed forces,12 and the release of the Porkalla base, which are tailored to appeal to the profound desire for peace among the peoples of the world but do not represent any real contribution to peace; e) overtures to countries with neutralist leanings aimed at preventing their active association or collaboration with the Western Powers, and f) blatant resort to anti-colonial propaganda. These tactics clearly pose new problems to the Free World, which admittedly may be more difficult to meet than many of the aggressive Cold War actions of the Soviets, because they are less likely to give rise to clearly identifiable crises between the Communist bloc and the Free World, and are deliberately tailored to achieve maximum impact upon a variety of dissatisfied groups abroad. We should make every effort to expose the real nature of such Soviet activities and contrast them with the actions required to reach genuine solutions to world problems.

h. Meeting New Soviet Tactics

33. We do not however reject the possibility of genuine change coming about in Communist actions and policies which will lead to greater internal liberalization, and to more normal conduct in international relations. As Secretary Dulles, in his speech of February 26, 1956, said: “We do not assume fatalistically that there can be no evolution within Russia, or that Russia’s rulers will always be predatory. Some day Russia will be governed by men who will put the welfare of the Russian people above world conquest. It is our basic policy to advance the coming of that day.”13

34. As to current Soviet conduct and policy, we should take as basic guidance the statement by Secretary Dulles on April 3, 1956: “The essential question is this: Are the Soviet rulers now attacking the basic causes of this domestic discontent and foreign distrust, or is their purpose merely to allay this discontent and distrust by blaming them on the past? The down-grading of Stalin does not of itself demonstrate that the Soviet regime has basically changed its domestic or foreign policies. The present rulers have, to be sure, somewhat modified or masked the harshness of their policies. But a dictatorship is a dictatorship whether it be that of one man or several. And the new Five Year Plan shows a continuing purpose to magnify the might of the Soviet State at the expense of the well-being of most of the people who are ruled.

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35. “In the field of foreign policy, the Soviet rulers have taken a few forward steps, notably the belated liberation of Austria. But they continue other predatory policies. They forcibly hold East Germany detached from Germany as a whole. The East European nations are still subjugated by Soviet rule. They have not renounced their efforts to subvert free governments. In Asia the present Soviet rulers seek to stir up bitterness and, in the Near East, increase the danger of hostilities. In the Far East they are seeking to coerce Japan to accept a peace treaty on Soviet terms. These and other current actions fall far short of the accepted code of international conduct.

36. “Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet rulers now denounce much of the past gives cause for hope, because it demonstrates that liberalizing influences from within and without can bring about peaceful change. If the Free World retains its strength, its faith and unity, then subversion cannot win where force and brutality failed. And the yearnings of the subject peoples are not to be satisfied merely by a rewriting of past history. Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more fundamental than any that have so far been revealed. The United States, and indeed all the free nations, will eagerly welcome the coming of that day.”

37. We should continue to expose the conspiratorial nature of international communism, its widespread subversive network, and its insidious penetration of Free World organizations. We should make clear that the international communist movement is often made the vehicle of activities in a particular country with which the Soviet Government has exchanged solemn commitments to refrain from “interference in internal affairs.”

i. The Free World Posture

38. Even if the present leadership of the Soviet is sincere in its desire for genuine change in Communist policies, there is no assurance that it will not revert to a more dangerous course of policy. There have been many changes in the Communist line during the past forty years, and only time and experience will answer the question of the permanency of the present approach.

39. In any event, evolutionary change in Communist conduct and policies, which makes it less dangerous to the peace and liberties of the world, is not likely to be furthered by Free World policies which stem from relaxation and neutralism. Desirable changes are more likely to result if Soviet leadership is convinced that the Free World nations are a) steadfastly maintaining their defensive military strength against the possibility of a reversal of Communist tactics; b) determined to maintain their freedom against subversion while actively developing their capacity to provide political security and a high degree of economic wellbeing to their peoples; and c) steadily [Page 578] extending and deepening the political, economic, cultural and spiritual interests which hold them together, in a manner which does not threaten the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Soviet people.

Streibert
  1. Source: Department of State, USIA/IOP Files: Lot 64 D 535, 1956. Confidential. Drafted by Alfred V. Boerner, IOP. Also sent to the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army.
  2. The Congress was held February 24–25 in Moscow; see Document 199.
  3. See footnote 5, Document 190.
  4. See footnote 6, ibid.
  5. See Document 191.
  6. Porkalla naval base, seized by the Soviets during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940, was returned to Finland by the Soviet Government on January 26, 1956.
  7. The complete text is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 1–27.
  8. This paragraph transmitted to USIS missions the instructions issued to USIA in NSC 5602/1, the basic guide for the implementation of all other national security policies. Approved by the President on March 15, NSC 5602/1 also stated that foreign information, cultural and educational exchange, and comparable programs vital to implementation of U.S. policies “should be materially strengthened. U.S. policies and actions should be presented in a manner which will advance U.S. objectives, and their psychological implication should be carefully considered in advance.” (NSC 5602/1, pp. 15–16; Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Vault 215, 1956)
  9. This quotation came from the annual message to Congress on the State of the Union, January 5, 1956. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States; Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, p. 5)
  10. In 1951, the United States became a member of the Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South Asia and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan).
  11. The complete text of the Secretary’s remarks, made in a news conference statement, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1956, pp. 637–638.
  12. Premier Bulganin disclosed troop reductions to President Eisenhower in a letter of February 1, 1956. The Department of State quoted the Bulganin letter in press release 56 of February 2. (Ibid., March 26, 1956, pp. 515–518)
  13. The complete text of the address is ibid., March 5, 1956, pp. 363–367.