Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Economic Policy; Foreign Information Program, Volume IX

190. Report Prepared by the National Security Council¹

NSC 5525

Washington , August 31, 1955.

STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AS OF JUNE 30, 1955

Part 6—The USIA Program

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Introduction

The last report of the USIA covered the period from July 1, 1954 to December 31, 1954.² This report is an appraisal of the status as of June 30, 1955 of the key programs of the different areas in achieving the applicable NSC objectives.

In line with NSC 5501³ all key programs were intensified. Propaganda pressure on the Communists was increased, their vulnerabilities were exploited, their aims and policies were attacked. Efforts were increased to win the support of our allies and to sway the uncommitted. Other programs stressed the positive value of the Free World. Cultural activities and publicity on U.S. cultural events overseas were expanded. The Agency actively participated in international conferences containing informational possibilities.

I. Global Activities

A. Major Propaganda Problems

During the period under review, programs were systematically developed and implemented to give expression to USIA global themes. These themes stress U.S. aims of uniting and strengthening the Free World and reducing the communist threat without war; of exposing and combatting communist colonialism; of developing and broadening peaceful uses of atomic energy and of seeking to convince other peoples that the U.S. stands and works for peace. USIA makes persistent efforts to utilize these global themes in the context of each fresh news development to further objectives laid down in pertinent NSC directives and in accordance with OCB Outline Plans.

The first six months of 1955 were notably a period of fluid development in international affairs, which confronted the Agency with numerous and complicated problems of adjustment and adaptation of programs to a rapid succession of important events. The major trends which had to be dealt with were mounting neutralism, the relaxation of Soviet power tactics, and the rise and fall of tension in the Far East.

Concurrent with Western efforts to complete NATO defenses by bringing the German Federal Republic into a formal military alliance, neutralist sentiment in Western Europe and Japan mounted steadily, hampering buildup of Western military defenses and achievement of Free World unity on East-West problems. Widespread fear of nuclear warfare, the burden of taxes for armaments, the economic effect of the diversion and control of strategic materials, a general weariness with the tensions of the Cold War, and in the case of Germany a profound desire for reunification, appeared to be the major sources of dissatisfaction leading to neutralism. USIA made a major effort to counter this trend and to reduce the undesirable effects of neutralist statements and actions of Nehru, U Nu⁴ and other leaders of uncommitted countries.

Soviet relaxation of pressures during the first six months of 1955 has strengthened the neutralist trend. The conclusion of the Austrian Treaty,⁵ the rapprochement with Tito,⁶ acceptance of the proposed Summit meeting, and the May 10 disarmament proposals have clearly impressed many important groups of people in the non-Communist world. Combined with the new tone of conciliation and reasonableness emanating from Moscow, such actions have undoubtedly strengthened beliefs that either a new era has begun in the Soviet Union since Stalin’s death, or that the Soviets were never quite so evil as alleged.

The favorable impression created by the new Soviet tactics has increased the difficulties faced by USIA in persuading other peoples to accept American policies of building up Free World strength to counter the threat posed by the massive military power of the Communist bloc. As the Soviet posture appeared to grow less threatening, and the danger of war seemed less immediate, it became increasingly difficult to persuade Europeans that the necessary sacrifices demanded by our military counter-measures were a matter of immediate urgency.

Although tensions in Europe began to relax in the early Spring of 1955, they mounted sharply in the Far East, as a result of bellicose threats by Premier Chou En-lai and the overt buildup of Communist military power on the mainland opposite Formosa. A major war scare developed over the Formosa Straits issue, which confronted USIA operations with psychological problems differing from area to area. A common element in the varying reactions was the conviction that in a war with Communist China the U.S. would resort to the use of atomic weapons. In the Far East USIA was forced to deal with mixed emotions regarding the use of atomic weapons against Asiatic peoples, and to counter communist propaganda designed to stir up race hatred. To many Europeans friendly to the U.S. the question of Quemoy and Matsu seemed hardly worth launching an atomic war which might eventually involve them and the entire world. In this situation Communist propaganda was increasingly successful in conveying the impression that the U.S. was acting in an unnecessarily belligerent manner.

It seems probable that the current Soviet conciliatory approach in its relations with the Free World will continue for some time to come. We are likely to be faced with a long series of conferences designed to settle basic differences. Secretary Dulles has stated that the process of eliminating present differences with the Soviets may take a long time. Under these circumstances it will be necessary to continue to press for the maintenance of military strength in the Free World. As international tensions are relaxed, however, it will become increasingly difficult to persuade people abroad that current levels of effort are necessary. In the case of the Soviet satellites, increased friendly contacts between East and West will undoubtedly suggest abandonment of their interests by the Free World. Should U.S. relations with Red China develop along similar lines as those with the Soviet Union, we shall face difficulties in convincing strongly anti-communist countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines of the consistency of our policies, while neutralist countries like India and Burma will press us for further relaxation of tensions. It may be expected that such developments will pose even more difficult psychological problems than in the past.

B. Intra-Governmental Relations

By E.O. 10958 (February 28, 1955)⁷ the Director of USIA was made a full member of the Operations Coordinating Board. The Agency’s participation in the activities of the NSC was continued by attendance at NSC meetings by the Director of USIA and at Planning Board meetings by a high-ranking Policy Officer.

C. International Conferences

To provide policy direction to the Agency’s coverage of international conferences, and to contribute its points of view toward achieving U.S. purposes in the information field, agency policy officers were sent to several international conferences. These included the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Conference in Bangkok, the U.N. Disarmament Commission subcommittee meeting in London, the Austrian State Treaty Conference, the 4th Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Vienna, the International Labor Office Conference in Geneva, and the 10th Anniversary of the UN Charter signing in San Francisco. Appropriate speeches, statements and actions of the U.S. and foreign delegations to these and other international conferences were widely distributed by all USIA media.

From the psychological viewpoint, a major event of the period under review was the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia (April 18–24). The conference was of intense interest to the Near Eastern, African, and Asian peoples, particularly because many of the 29 young nations were sending delegations to their first international meeting. Despite the neutralist auspices under which the conference was organized, USIA early recognized the possibilities of encouraging and strengthening the pro-Western delegations which were invited to attend. Working closely with the State and other Agencies USIA helped to prepare special materials for use by friendly delegates. A few weeks before the conference it disseminated similar material among the newspapers of the area. In Libya the USIA Public Affairs Officer participated in the briefing of the Libyan delegation to the conference.

Instead of the Bandung Conference’s becoming a neutralist or pro-Communist vehicle for the condemnation of the Western powers, as many had feared, it provided a forum in which a number of champions of democracy fearlessly expressed their challenge to communism.

During the conference two USIA representatives helped to ensure that all pro-Western speeches received wide and immediate circulation throughout the world by radio and press. USIA posts in the Near East and Far East were alerted to give fast distribution to these reports.⁸

D. Cultural Activities

During the period under review the Agency’s efforts to reach foreign peoples through cultural means and to portray the cultural concerns and achievements of the American people were increased considerably.

Chief among these efforts was the implementation of the cultural performers part of the President’s Emergency Fund for International Affairs.⁹ By June 30 thirty-three cultural projects had been approved by the OCB Working Group on Cultural Activities, in which the Agency actively participates. The projects completed during the period included symphony orchestras, musical comedy groups, dramatic groups, athletic groups, and individual artists. These were received with enthusiasm by foreign audiences, who have given evidence of their recognition of the high cultural achievement of the American people. Critical response abroad has included references to the value of culture as a means of refuting Communist propaganda and of developing deep understanding between peoples. It is significant to note that several of the groups and some of the individual artists were of the Negro race. The cultural attainments of these Negroes were living proof to foreign audiences of the great progress achieved by the race under the American democratic system.

While the actual implementation of the projects approved by the OCB Working Group is the responsibility of the Department of State, operating through the American National Theater and Academy, USIA had responsibility for promoting and exploiting the projects abroad to achieve the maximum psychological impact. USIA conducted such activities as the production of special pamphlets, leaflets and posters, and special film, photo and radio coverage; the purchase of tickets for opinion-forming individuals and groups; and the travel of the artists to enable them to appear non-commercially before university students and labor and other groups. It was this promotion of Porgy and Bess by USIA in Athens which accounts, in part at least, for the success of the company in that city, since the local impresario was unwilling to undertake publicity because of the anti-American sentiment which had been aroused over Cyprus.

The period ending June 30 showed an upswing in the cultural output of the USIA media in picture stories, feature articles, news items, commentaries, exhibits, films and broadcasting. One activity of considerable import was the college and university participation program of the Office of Private Cooperation, designed to foster close relationships between American universities and colleges and institutions of higher learning abroad through the establishment of American reading rooms and exchange of student exhibits and publications.

The Agency made a special effort to improve the quality of its cultural representation abroad through the assignment to several posts of eminent American scholars to serve as Cultural Officers or as Consultants to the Public Affairs Officer.

The posts themselves responded to the new emphasis on cultural activities by originating cultural programs of various types. American “Cultural Weeks,” sponsorship of live concerts of American music, lecture programs, locally produced publications and radio shows were some of the activities originated by the posts which stressed the cultural values of the American people.

II. Geographic Area Activities

A. Soviet Orbit

In compliance with NSC directives, USIA attempted to counter the threat posed by the USSR, and aimed at reducing its influence and relative power position by exploiting Soviet Orbit vulnerabilities and encouraging the adoption, by communist governments, of policies more compatible with U.S. interests.

In its media output to the Soviet Union and in the treatment of internal and external developments during the reporting period, USIA was governed by NSC 5501, NSC 5505/1,¹⁰ and Recommendation No. 2 of the Jackson Committee,¹¹ which calls for a forceful and direct approach, avoiding a propagandistic or strident tone. The USSR audience was afforded objective presentations calculated to impress the listeners with the peaceful and constructive purposes of U.S. policy, as well as to convince them of our sincere concern for the welfare of the peoples of the USSR. The U.S. was portrayed as a nation interested in assisting other peoples in solving their problems. Thus, particular emphasis was given American leadership in promoting the peaceful uses of the atom. Wherever possible, in conjunction with NSC 5505/1, advantage was taken of Soviet vulnerabilities. Exploitation of such situations as the deposition of Malenkov, the about-face with regard to the “New Economic Course,” the stagnation of Soviet agriculture, and the reduction in the rate of productivity was for the most part effected through objective discussions.

In connection with the preparations for the meeting at the Summit, output placed great stress upon statements made by the President and other responsible Government officials assuring the USSR of American readiness to consider concrete proposals, which did not violate our basic principles, for the reduction of international tensions.

Information programs directed to the satellite countries continued to emphasize (a) that the U.S. cannot reconcile itself to continued Soviet domination of the nations of Eastern Europe, such domination being a cause of tension; (b) that the U.S. desires the restoration of true liberty to that area so that the captive satellite peoples may again enjoy governments and institutions of their own choosing; and (c) that increased Western strength as exemplified by the Paris agreements has significance for the future of Eastern Europe.

Soviet agreement to the Austrian State Treaty, which entailed abandonment of the Soviet position on several issues, was presented essentially as Soviet recognition of the position of strength developed by the Western powers. The Bulganin-Krushchev visit to Belgrade and the joint declaration which recognized the possibility of achieving “socialism” in diverse ways, was presented as a “Canossa”. The Kremlin’s respect for Yugoslavia’s independent course of action was underlined with the suggestion that this Soviet accommodation to Tito may have ramifications of significance to the peoples of the satellite states.

In compliance with NSC directives, and as opportunities permitted, American interest in the welfare of the satellite population was demonstrated. President Eisenhower’s humane offer to flood-striken Albania was made known to the peoples of Eastern Europe. The ouster of Malenkov, and Nagy¹² in Hungary, as well as the abandonment of the New Economic Course, were utilized to express concern over the inability of the communist regimes to meet consumer needs, and to solve the critical problem of adequate agricultural production.

Identification of the satellites issue as a basic cause of international tension was emphasized throughout the pre-Geneva period, together with the conviction that an enduring peace could not be achieved without a just solution to the satellites issue.

To carry out basic NSC directives aimed at weakening ties between individual communist governments and the USSR, Operation Discord was developed further with a view to promoting friction in Communist China–USSR relations. Output to the Chinese mainland was keyed toward creating distrust of the Soviet Union and toward encouraging a dislike for communist leadership and policies. An effort was made to build the belief that values embraced by the U.S. and other free nations offer a better way than communism to peace, progress and human welfare. To date VOA has been the sole medium for reaching Communist China.

Information programs continue to reflect U.S. concern for the welfare of escapees from behind the Iron Curtain… . In support of objectives outlined in NSC 86/1,¹³ guidances regulating the use of material obtained in interviews with escapees were issued. Media, notably the press and radio services, were enjoined to make use of escapee interviews, particularly with escapees successfully resettled to a constructive life in the Free World.

The Soviets and satellites launched a massive information campaign to discredit the escapee program and to induce escapees to return to their homeland. To counter the threat which this campaign poses, steps were taken to expose the true purposes of the Communists in this regard, by explaining the problems and the accomplishments of the West in dealing with East European refugees. Soviet bloc “redefection” efforts continue to grow in scope and intensity.

During the past six months USIA has been engaged in systematic efforts to strengthen and enlarge information penetration of the Soviet orbit. These efforts have expressed themselves in the form of more effective utilization of means currently at our disposal, and in the development of additional ways and means of penetrating both the USSR and the Soviet satellite states. The more noteworthy of these projects are:

A proposal has been developed for the resumption of an Amerika type, Russian-language magazine, designed for distribution in the USSR. This proposal has been discussed both with the Department and with our Embassy at Moscow. It is now agreed that on balance it would be of advantage to the U.S. to resume publication of a Russian-language magazine. Consultations with key congressmen have been held and agreement reached to take up the matter with the Soviet government.

A films plan has been worked up for missions behind the Iron Curtain. Under this plan cultural, documentary, industrial-technical and medical films will be made available to posts that can use them to good advantage. The agency has also arranged with the Motion Picture Association of America to furnish each year a limited number of quality entertainment films for the personal use of chiefs of mission.

A substantial volume of books, periodicals, pamphlets, recordings, photos and window display materials has been shipped to our missions in the curtain countries, to be used in expanding their information activities as opportunity permits.

Pursuant to a recommendation of the Jackson Committee, and with the approval of State, USIA has arranged assignment to Warsaw of an officer who devotes the major portion of his time to activities relating directly to information. We also have a full-time information officer in Budapest. Each of the remaining curtain missions has assigned an officer to devote part time to matters of direct interest and concern to USIA.

The Munich Radio Center has put into operation a special Russian-language program designed to reach Soviet occupation personnel in East Germany.

The music program begun New Year’s Eve and designed to reach the “golden youth” of the USSR, is now well established and appears to be meeting with considerable success.

USIA is consulting with State concerning the development of a limited program of selective cultural exchange with both the Soviet Union and the Satellite states.

During the reporting period, USIA began distribution of Under Scrutiny, … bi-monthly periodical, subjecting Soviet orbit developments to critical analysis. This publication, designed for serious readers and developed to promote a proper orientation in Soviet orbit affairs, is distributed to all principal posts. Circulation is now approximately 1500.

B. Western Europe

Popular support for NATO continued to be promoted by the USIA with a constant, systematic and daily effort, including cross-reporting of news regarding America’s role and contribution to mutual defense. Particular emphasis was placed on increasing public understanding and confidence in the importance of West Germany’s role in the mutual defense system of the Atlantic nations. Two officers and a team of reporters provided world-wide press, radio and newsreel coverage of the NATO Council meeting in May, highlighted by formal admission of the German Federal Republic as the fifteenth member nation. After this formal admission the Agency concentrated on developing plans for assisting the Federal Government in its efforts to inform and educate Germans regarding the necessity for a democratic army.

Cultural activities, often in conjunction with State Department’s Exchange of Persons Program, continued to increase as a counter-measure to the Soviet “cultural offensive.”

Highlight of the cultural program was a first-rate cultural “Salute to France” composed of French and American expositions, American theatrical, musical and ballet events. The “Salute” gave a substantial impetus to the Agency’s cultural program and was enthusiastically received by the French as new evidence of American cultural maturity. Portions of the “Salute” were later sent to other European and Near East countries under the President’s Emergency Fund for International Affairs.

In Italy the creation of a national Italian committee to take over sponsorship of the “cultural-political” seminars organized by USIA for the training of young leaders from democratic political parties, free labor unions and democratic organizations, assured the continuation of this successful activity by indigenous groups.

In Rome the Italian National Radio Network published the first of a series of volumes—“Contemporary American Thought”—based on scripts for the Voice of America Radio University program. Copies of the first volume have been distributed to Italian diplomatic missions, including those behind the Iron Curtain.

The Italian Government-sponsored information program in Southern Italy, stimulated and supported by the Agency, is now in operation. A main office has been set up in Rome, regular publication of a magazine has begun, a training course for regional and provincial directors has been held, and a series of pamphlets produced.

In Belgium, where the Soviets have particularly emphasized cultural propaganda, State and USIA countered with appearances of the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra and Porgy and Bess.

The “Atoms for Peace” program continued in high gear with exhibits being shown in seven countries, all of them used as a foundation upon which to build an across-the-board campaign designed to broaden the influence of the President’s atom-pool proposal.

An exhibit on peaceful uses of atomic energy in Helsinki was arranged to coincide with the Communist-organized World Peace Congress, announced for May 22–28. Advance publicity for the exhibit can be credited with contributing to the Communist decision to postpone the opening of the Peace Congress for one month.

A mobile “Atoms for Peace” exhibit completed a year-long tour in Italy after being seen by over three million persons from 25 cities. Over 100,000 saw another Agency exhibit in Vienna within a three-week period. This same exhibit is now on tour in Germany. In Spain a special exhibit was prepared for showing at the Valencia and Barcelona Trade Fairs. A mobile exhibit similar to the Italian model was inaugurated in The Hague and subsequently shown in six major Dutch cities. This exhibit was adapted for showing in England and opened in London. It will tour the U.K. for approximately eight weeks.

Taking advantage of the publicity generated by the exhibit, USIA-London began fortnightly publication of a new magazine, “Atoms for Peace Digest”, for distribution to opinion leaders throughout the U.K.

The assignment of a Special Information Officer to London resulted in increased use of U.S. materials by Far and Near East journalists and by British publications going to those areas. Reuter’s News Agency agreed to accept a large amount of USIA press output for weekly service to the Far and Near East.

With the signing of the Austrian state treaty May 15, the primary objective in Austria—to maintain pressure on the Soviets to agree to a treaty on just terms—was achieved. Following the treaty signing plans were made to adapt the program in Austria from one supporting occupation policies to one suited to information activities in a small neutral country on the Soviet periphery. The U.S. weekly newspaper Wiener Kurier was terminated at the end of the reporting period and arrangements were made for turning over the U.S. radio station in Vienna to the Austrian Broadcasting System once the treaty becomes effective.

The emphasis on pinpointing programs in Western Europe required some organizational changes. Two officers were assigned to a new branch post in Trieste as a result of increased communist activity in the area. The country post in Algiers was placed under jurisdiction of USIA–France in recognition of the increasing importance of Algeria’s role in current French affairs and the consequent necessity for a coordinated French and Algerian information program. Two new information centers near U.S. air bases in Zaragoza and Cadiz were opened in support of other U.S. Government agencies responsible for economic and military aid programs in Spain. The Agency also opened a new branch post in Tours, France, in order to further USIA objectives in the crucial areas of Normandy and Brittany.

In recognition of the continued influence and prestige of the Swiss press throughout the world, which includes circulation within several Iron Curtain countries, the Agency re-established the position of Public Affairs Officer in Berne. His primary assignment is to establish personal contact with key editors and publishers throughout Switzerland and to supply them with factual information concerning U.S. foreign policy and its motivation.

USIA agreed, in consultation with State and USRO, to assign a Public Affairs Adviser to Paris, as of August 1955, who will have the responsibility of coordinating all U.S. information support of governmental and non-governmental European organizations active in promoting the cause of European unification.

C. Near East South Asia and Africa

The period under review saw some increase in neutralist sentiment in the NEA area (partly due to Indian influence and partly due, in some Arab countries, to resentment over Iraq’s signing a mutual defense pact with Turkey, a NATO member); continued economic instability and political uncertainty in Pakistan and Iran; and a rise in popular concern over the colonial status of Goa, Cyprus and French dependencies in North Africa.

In support of objectives laid down in NSC policies on South Asia (5409),¹⁴ Iran (5504),¹⁵ Near East (5428)¹⁶ and French North Africa (5436/1)¹⁷ the Agency intensified its major programs in NEA countries.

In cooperation with the government of Pakistan, USIA launched a special … psychological program, directed mainly at East Pakistan, to increase awareness among the people of the dangers of communism and the positive contributions being made by the government, with U.S. aid, to the welfare of the people and the economic stability of the country. This expansion was made possible by the reprogramming of USIA funds and the transfer of $300,000 from FOA through OCB.

USIA faced a crisis when India requested the closing of all libraries and reading rooms other than in the four cities where we had diplomatic or consular posts. Reports that USIA was subsidizing newspapers hostile to the Indian government prompted this move. Our Ambassador’s emphatic denial of these reports was not contested, and the Indian government’s request was not further pressed. Meanwhile, the “Atoms for Peace” exhibit toured the main cities of India with marked success. Prime Minister Nehru visited the exhibit when it was in New Delhi and showed a genuine interest in details of the display.

Unsettled conditions arising from the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan caused the cancellation of the “Atoms for Peace” exhibit in Kabul. The program in Afghanistan moved ahead in another direction, however, with the opening of a reading and recreation room for youth through arrangements with the Afghanistan Olympics Association.

USIA personnel aided Nepal in setting up a parliamentary library with $10,000 worth of books presented to the Nepal government by USIA.

The visit of the Shah of Iran to the United States from December to February provided an opportunity to strengthen the concept of the Shah as a progressive monarch who understands the problems of his country. USIA established close contact with the Shah’s party and managed to arrange several events which emphasized the Shah’s role as a hard-working monarch. In Iran, USIA worked closely with the government in providing constructive publicity on the trip.

. . . . . . .

USIA supported foreign policy objectives regarding Middle East defense. In conditioning the people of the area to the “Northern Tier” concept of security arrangements against Soviet aggression, facts regarding the Communist record of aggression were brought to the attention of the people through press, radio and information center channels. In cooperation with the Iraqi Government, USIA Baghdad assisted in preparing radio scripts and pamphlets on the subject for wide dissemination.

USIA carried on a quiet public relations campaign in support of Ambassador Eric Johnston’s¹⁸ third mission to the Near East to discuss the plan for harnessing the waters of the Jordan Valley. Suitable materials extolling the benefits of water development projects were used, and unattributed stories favorable to the plan were placed in local newspapers. The Johnston mission succeeded in reaching tentative agreements with the Arab countries concerned.

In encouraging stability in the area and a favorable climate for negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis, support was given to General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Office, in his efforts to bring about agreements on practical proposals for easing border tensions, especially between Egypt and Israel. Through stories placed in the press, as well as regional publications, VOA broadcasts and personal contacts, a more sympathetic climate for considering General Burn’s plans was brought about.

USIA was especially concerned with the deteriorating political situation in Syria. Through closer association with the local press, expanded motion picture activities, especially prepared pamphlets, and information center activities, the Damascus post brought to the attention of the Syrian people and the weak government evidences and methods of Communist infiltration and subversion.

The conflict of nationalism with French determination to retain control has made of North Africa one of the world’s trouble spots. The USIA program is limited in scope by restrictions placed upon it by the French administration. USIA is confined to factual news reporting and publicizing American cultural activities by means of the information centers, libraries, radio and films. Implementing NSC 5436/1, the program is continued in order to advance those long-range U.S. objectives with which the French are not identified.

One-man sub-posts were established in each of the two British territories which are approaching self-government; at Ibadan, Nigeria (fourth largest city in all Africa), and at Kumasi, Gold Coast. The purpose is to enlarge U.S. contact and influence with the Africans in these territories who are assuming political responsibility and leadership.

D. Far East

In support of the objectives of NSC policies on Japan (NSC 5516/1)¹⁹, Korea (NSC 5514),²⁰ Philippines (NSC 5413/1),²¹ Formosa (NSC 5503),²² and Southeast Asia (NSC 5405),²³ and to cope with the changing situation in the Far East, where shifting Communist tactics ranged in extremes from naked force and truculence in the Formosa Straits to the reasonableness displayed at Bandung, USIA concentrated on activities to strengthen the resolution of U.S. allies, orient Asian neutralists toward the U.S., and counter Communist attempts to soften Asian resistance to varied forms of penetration.

In the face of growing neutralism and Communist-inspired anti-Americanism in Japan, USIA undertook special programs to develop Japanese confidence in U.S. policies, and to form firmer anti-Communist attitudes among the intellectual and labor leaders of the non-Communist left.

Editorial opinion favorable to U.S. policy was developed in important Japanese publications through personal contact. Although the national press remained generally unreceptive to explanatory material on U.S. policy and Communism, a remarkable placement of material on the peaceful uses of atomic energy was achieved. Construction of a major atomic energy exhibit was begun, and the program aimed at labor was expanded.

In the anti-Communist program … pamphlets were distributed through friendly labor and student groups. On May Day, Tokyo students for the first time distributed anti-Communist pamphlets produced with USIA assistance. USIA assisted the leading Japanese non-Communist labor federation in publishing to good effect the criticisms of Red China made by Indian trade unionists. Production was begun on two … anti-Communist feature films for early commercial release.

Unparalleled enthusiasm, admiration and good will were produced throughout Japan by the tour of the Symphony of the Air, made under joint USIA–State Department auspices.

Since the Republic of Korea continued to give only limited cooperation to the U.S. assistance program, USIA, without affronting the ROK Government, undertook heavy exploitation of the program through all media, but most affectively through locally produced documentary films. The USIA role in exploiting U.S. assistance was expanded with the absorption of the Korean Civil Assistance Command information program after its liquidation by the military command. The KCAC program functioned to publicize reconstruction and USIA assumed both its information responsibilities and most of its physical plant. Operations are conducted principally through mobile unit programs using pamphlets, posters and films.

The Philippine program concentrated on increasing Philippine understanding of U.S. policy, especially with regard to Formosa, Vietnam and Southeast Asian collective defense. Advice and material support continued to be extended to the government’s anti-Huk campaign and new emphasis was given to the dissemination of information to acquaint the Filipinos with the dangers of Communist infiltration. To increase recognition of the Philippines and enhance its reputation abroad, Philippine assistance to Vietnam in “Operation Brotherhood” was fully reported by film and press coverage, and two films were produced illustrating Philippine participation in the Manila Pact.

On Formosa, USIA undertook support of a morale-building program of troop information and education instituted by the MAAG and the Nationalist Government following signature of the defense treaty with the U.S.

U.S. support and assistance to the Republic of China continued to be the main theme of the Formosa program. Activities aimed at overseas Chinese included establishment of a magazine to publicize Nationalist accomplishments in Southeast Asia, material assistance to Taiwan University students in publication of a student newspaper to counter the attractions of mainland education, and participation with FOA and the Asia Foundation in an expansion of Taiwan University facilities to attract more overseas students.

Provinces in the north and south of Thailand were saturated during the period in separate operations of the anti-Communist indoctrination program. In June, a similar program was begun with the Thai armed forces. A newly developed positive approach, focusing on the benefits of democracy as an alternative to Communism and the concern of the Thai government for the national welfare, has been instituted. The effectiveness of the program is manifest in widespread mass meetings, parades, editorial comment and official pronouncements denouncing Communism. A particularly significant development has been the participation of hitherto apolitical Buddhist priests in the program.

While official Burmese neutralism continued, a relaxation of government attitudes and an improvement in internal security enabled USIA to disseminate large quantities of anti-Communist material in formerly inaccessible areas. Negotiations for establishment of a post of Moulmein were not completed during the period but favorable Foreign Office action is expected soon. A temporary book pavilion near the University of Rangoon is planned to counteract Communist influence among students.

Despite the recurring political crises that hindered rehabilitation and reconstruction in Vietnam, USIA exploited the dramatic refugee flight from North Vietnam as the chief means of focusing internal and international attention on the growing effectiveness of the Diem government, and terrorism and duplicity of the Communist Vietminh regime in North Vietnam. The refugee story, told by all Media and with particular impact by locally produced newsreels and documentary films, served to expose Communist violations of the Geneva truce, to present a picture of the rigors of life in North Vietnam under Communism, to draw attention to the accomplishments of the government in the South in terms of its ability to resettle hundreds of thousands of refugees, and to highlight the moral and material assistance given Vietnam by the U.S. and other free nations to help the Vietnamese maintain their freedom and achieve national aspirations.

Special efforts were made in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to stimulate increased activity by indigenous civil and military information agencies to provide auxiliaries to USIA operations. The most notable achievement was the Laotian Army’s active use of the advice and assistance provided as a corollary to the stimulus to form mobile military information teams that carry USIA material to areas beyond the reach or resources of USIA. The propaganda efforts of the 17 Laotian and USIA mobile teams are built around locally produced newsreels and documentaries promoting Laotian unity and popular support for the government. In the period before national elections, leading political figures accompany the mobile teams when possible, acting as government interlocutors.

Field centers were established in provincial capitals as central points for the dissemination of propaganda; traveling entertainers were used as propagandists; facilities for the distribution of films were increased. These new activities were designed to increase propaganda penetration in support of objectives, particularly in rural areas where poor communications and contact make it difficult to contest the propaganda of Communist agents effectively.

E. Latin America

In support of the objectives in the paper on Latin America (NSC 5432/1),²⁴ emphasis in the provision of services and materials continued to be centered on the priority countries of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, Guatemala and Argentina. At the same time, in order to develop new capabilities in all countries and to strengthen cultural activities, measured expansion of the binational center program was undertaken: to date, new centers have been founded in seven countries. Sub-posts, staffed by local employees, were established in British Guiana and Barbados, and plans were completed for a one-man post in Jamaica. A Portuguese version of the daily Wireless File was introduced as the core of an effort to increase U.S. influence on the Brazilian press.

The task of modifying the nationalistic and Marxist economic attitudes, which in many of the Latin American countries present a serious obstacle to U.S. objectives, became a part of the program, with the major share of attention devoted to exposition of the free enterprise system and the theme of inter-American economic interdependence. The “economic information” program, begun a year ago, was further developed with the publication in local-language versions of eight important books, production of numerous dramatic and commentary radio programs on economic themes, the release of a major film on hemisphere interdependence, and the distribution of a large volume of press material. Production began on a series of roundtable TV programs on which there will be frequent discussion of economic principles.

As an integral part of this effort, informational support of FOA programs were focussed upon self-help, community effort, and the concept of U.S.-Latin American “partners in progress”. Three color films on the achievements of U.S. technical cooperation in Peru were completed. Also four short films on FOA activities in Brazil. Short sequences on FOA programs were inserted in Brazilian commercial newsreels.

The economic aspect of U.S.-Latin American relations, especially those related to policies enunciated at the Rio Economic Conference, received constant treatment in all media. The Private Investment Conference held at New Orleans was given heavy coverage and follow-up treatment.

The visit of Vice-President Nixon and Assistant Secretary Holland to ten Latin American countries was exploited by the Agency not only for its good will significance, but especially in an economic context.²⁵ A film on the visit was afterwards distributed in the countries concerned, a shorter sequence having previously been inserted in commercial newsreels; and a pamphlet entitled “The Americas”, stressing economic development, was issued in an edition of 115,750 copies. The Vice-President’s recommendations concerning the Inter-American Highway were repeatedly used to keynote informative comment on the economic potentialities of that enterprise.

As the offshore fishing rights issue, involving Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, assumed increasing importance, the Agency began a campaign to explain the U.S. position and to focus public attention as much as possible on the need for conservation of fisheries, rather than “defense of sovereignty.” Feature stories, technical background information, radio programs and taped interviews are being used to this end. Three issues of the monthly “Our Times” documentary newsreel carried footage on the Conservation Congress in Rome in which the U.S. viewpoint has expounded.

Special work to reduce resistance to U.S. economic policy was carried on in three of the priority countries. In Brazil, this took the form of carefully guarded activity to build opinion favoring foreign aid in the development of natural resources, notably petroleum. The project utilizes such open means as the recording of a discussion of U.S. technical assistance in Brazil’s petroleum development, held in this country by the director of Petrobas; but relies mainly on the placement of non-U.S… . material and the cross-reporting of useful matter from other countries. Data thus provided has strengthened the hand of the important Chateaubriand newspapers, which advocate repeal of Brazil’s present restrictive legislation. In Chile, where the main effort of the information program has been to overcome unreasonable resentment of the U.S. as the author of Chile’s economic ills, the very bad climate of last year has begun to yield to more responsible press treatment of economic problems. In Argentina, despite the unavailability of normal informational channels, a fairly steady flow of material arguing the relation of free enterprise and private investment to progress has been circulated to opinion-makers by means of mailing lists and the periodical press, including the Agency’s locally produced magazines.

In coordination with the Department of State and other interested agencies, effective work was accomplished in exposing the Communist direction of three congresses. The first, a youth “festival”, was denied authorization by the Governments of Chile and Brazil; the second, a teachers’ congress, was postponed, apparently indefinitely, after being denounced by several governments. Plans for the third, a “civil liberties” congress in Chile, were at least temporarily disrupted when non-Communist students federations withdrew as a direct result of U.S. informational efforts.

In Mexico, pamphlets, books, films, and personal contacts were used to accelerate the trend of the major Mexican labor federations towards aggressive anti-Communist action, and to further the impact of this highly important movement upon labor and liberal opinion throughout Central America. A project involving the cooperation of Mexican officials was instituted for the purpose of disseminating constructive ideological materials through the Mexican school system. Plans were also laid for using indigenous channels to expose the subversive influence of Communists in public posts.

In order to combat continuing liberal and leftist propaganda against the new Government of Guatemala, advantage was taken of all newsworthy events connected with that country as an excuse to recall the damage done there by the previous pro-Communist regime and to emphasize current progress towards democracy. Inside Guatemala, radio programs, traveling exhibits, press and pamphlets materials, and films were used to re-educate those sectors formerly most exposed to Communist propaganda and to encourage confidence in the present, middle-of-the-road government. Agency officers assisted the government in arranging the first national teachers’ conference ever held in Guatemala, aided the authorities in the work of eliminating Communist, textbooks, and launched a seminar for normal school teachers, designed to attract educators to the Binational Center. A film on Vice-President Nixon’s visit, “Guatemala Makes a Friend”, was produced and shown throughout the country, and a film illustrating a year of progress under freedom was made and released for commercial showing on the anniversary of the 1954 revolution; a shorter version of the latter will be distributed throughout Latin America.

Response in Latin America to materials circulated in support of the President’s “Atoms for Peace” program prompted the conclusion that this theme constitutes the most inspirational expression of U.S. leadership that has been formulated in many years. Press, radio, and motion picture materials available in the field were steadily augmented and increased publicity was built upon the visits of Latin American journalists and students to atomic installations in this country. The massive exhibit on “Atoms for the Benefit of Man-kind” displayed at the 400th Anniversary celebrations in Sao Paulo, Brazil, closed in February after being visited by more than 500,000 persons. In Honduras and in Guadalajara, Mexico, “atomic information weeks” were staged.

Following the Pan American Games in Mexico, to which heavy media-wide coverage was given as a means of dramatizing the solidarity and democratic values of the Western Hemisphere, U.S. track and swimming stars carried out an extremely effective tour of Central American countries, financed by the President’s Emergency Fund for International Affairs. Other enterprises thus supported were a tour by a ranking team of musicians, the visit of a girls’ swimming team to Guatemala, and the presentation of Porgy and Bess.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5525. Secret. This paper is a collection of reports prepared by various executive agencies. Part 6, dated August 11, was prepared by USIA.
2. Document 185.
3. Entitled “Basic National Security Policy,” January 6, 1955, not printed.
4. Prime Minister of Burma.
5. The Austrian State Treaty was signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955, by the Governments of Austria, the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. United States information policy on that treaty, which ended the four-power occupation of Austria, was transmitted in CA–9384, June 30, from the Department of State to 91 missions. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/6–3055)
6. Yugoslav President Tito met with Soviet Communist Party First Secretary Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin May 26-June 2 in Yugoslavia. U.S. information policy statements on those negotiations are in CA–8327, May 27, and CA–8538, June 6, from the Department of State to 27 missions. (Ibid., 511.00/5–2755 and 511.00/6–655)
7. Printed in the Federal Register, 1955, p.1237.
8. Streibert issued an information policy guide on the final Bandung Conference communiqué in Usito 392, April 25, sent to 20 missions and pouched to 33 USIS missions. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/4–2455)
9. The fund was initiated with a letter of July 27, 1954, from the President to the President of the Senate; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. ii, Part 2, p. 1776.
10. Entitled “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” January 31, 1955, not printed.
11. See footnote 9, Document 185.
12. Imre Nagy, Premier of Hungary.
13. Entitled “U.S. Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors,” April 3, 1951, not printed.
14. For text of NSC 5409, “United States Policy, Toward South Asia,” February 19, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xi, Part 2, p. 1089.
15. NSC 5504, “United States Policy Toward Iran,” January 15, 1955.
16. For text of NSC 5428, “United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East, July 23, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. ix, Part 1, p. 525.
17. For text of NSC 5436/1, “United States Policy on French North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria), October 18, 1954, see ibid., vol. XI, Part 1, p. 170.
18. Special Representative of the President in the Middle East with the personal rank of Ambassador.
19. “U.S. Policy Toward Japan,” April 9, 1955.
20. “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea,” February 25, 1955.
21. For text of NSC 5413/1, “U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines,” April 5, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xii, Part 2, Document 358.
22. “U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China,” January 15, 1955.
23. For text of NSC 5405, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia,” January 16, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 366.
24. For text of NSC 5432/1, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America,” September 3, 1954, see ibid., vol. iv, p. 81.
25. Vice President Nixon and Assistant Secretary of State Holland spent 30 days in Latin America returning to the United States on March 6. The Vice President’s report on the trip is in Department of State Bulletin, April 11, 1955, pp. 587-594.