189. Circular Letter From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn) to all USIS Posts 1
The new spirit of amity dramatically proclaimed at the Geneva “Summit” Conference will very likely induce questions to you and your staff by American and other visitors along the line of, “Now that East and West seem to have seen each other’s point of view, why is a U.S. information program necessary? Shouldn’t it be reduced or eliminated? Isn’t the anti-Communist aspect of your program now in direct conflict with current American foreign policy?”
- First, it must be clearly understood that the United States is not in the information business solely as a result of the Communist threat. The removal of the entire communist apparatus from the scene would still leave the information program a necessary instrument for the effective articulation of America’s voice in world affairs. The fact is that this country, willingly or not, is now and will continue to be involved in every world question of any magnitude. That involvement obliges us, in pursuance of the best interests of the American people to seek the support and understanding of other nations and peoples for the policies and actions which the United States pursues. As a recent British report on their own information program stated: “We have found it impossible to avoid the conclusion that a modern government has to concern itself with public opinion abroad and be properly equipped to deal with it.”
- Secondly, it is true that international communism, while not the exclusive justification for the information program, has in recent years posed the greatest challenge to the principles for which this country stands, while that challenge is buttressed by significant military force, its emphasis has tended to shift more and more into the psychological realm as outward tensions have relaxed. It is for this reason that we here are convinced that USIA’s role has taken on heightened significance and urgency. This letter seeks to suggest some of the more important aspects of that role as they relate to the kind of questions which you may be receiving as a result of the “Summit” meeting.
With matters so important as German reunification, European security, and disarmament still unresolved we certainly dare not relax our efforts solely because the Soviets have assumed a conciliatory [Page 527] posture.2 No evidence yet exists that the Soviet leaders have altered their basic long-range plans for world domination. At Geneva, in fact, Bulganin refused even to discuss either international communism or the status of the satellites, two of the issues which this country believes to be primary causes of world tension. Our program must continue to make this clear.
We must remember also that the questions which the Summit conference did discuss dealt only with Europe. There are thorny issues in the Far East and Near East that still challenge settlement. Communism remains an active and divisive force in Latin America. We must continue to make our government’s position clear on the problems of these other areas.
While Bulganin claimed at Geneva that international communism was not a proper subject for the conference, the threat of communist subversion and violence in many countries throughout the world is certainly no less since the meeting at the Summit. In our work, therefore, there is no less need to make clear the peril of organized international communism.
In the past our task was often rendered easier by the bellicose actions and statements of Stalin and his cohorts. Questions of international right and wrong were reasonably well defined. But the Soviet leaders’ recent dramatization of peaceful co-existence via “garden party diplomacy,” state visits to other countries, and the partial relaxation of press and travel restrictions are serving to blur the basic moral and political issues in many people’s minds. This makes our job both more difficult and more necessary.
While we follow the President’s lead in accepting at face value the Soviet leaders’ determination to work for peace, we must emphasize again and again that protestations alone won’t do the job. The President himself has stated that the real test of the “Geneva spirit” will come when the Foreign Ministers meet at Geneva starting October 27, to attack the fundamental issues. We need to state and restate what these issues are and to explain the importance of resolving them if true peace is to be achieved.
Over and over again we must explain what we mean by peace. It is distinctly not a status quo peace, sanctioning prolongation of a divided Germany; continued subjection of the satellites; further extension of international communism; liquidation of NATO and [Page 528] WEU accompanied by the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe; and elimination of U.S. bases in Europe and Africa. In resolving all these issues, the Soviets hope either to consolidate recent gains by retention of the status quo or to reverse U.S. policies which arose in response to continued Soviet aggression.
What the U.S. means by peace, on the other hand is a peace by change—a free Germany, reunified in the context of NATO and threatening neither East nor West; eventual liberation of the satellites; a world freed from the violence and subversion of international communism; and a free and expanding world economy. This is peace with justice and freedom, not between rival blocs but between nations acting in the true interest of all peoples. Our information program must clarify this distinction and make it stick.
The Geneva Conference gave us one great advantage: President Eisenhower, by the eloquence of his statements and the force of his personality, went far toward convincing most peoples of the deep desire for peace of the American people and their government. He thus to a large degree canceled out Soviet propaganda of the last five years designed to place the onus of warmongering on the United States. Our information program must help consolidate and extend this advantage which the President has given us.
We can foresee the danger that the spirit of Geneva will encourage our allies to relax and to question the need for sacrifice and high taxes in the service of NATO and WEU. We can anticipate, too, an upsurge of neutralism. Our information program must energetically combat these tendencies.
I hope that some of the above points will be of use to you in meeting the kind of questions you are likely to be receiving.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, USIA/IOP Files: Lot 59 D 260, Director 1953–56. Confidential.↩
- Information policy on European unity is the subject of CA–2375, September 21, from the Department of State to 44 missions (ibid., Central Files, 511.00/9–2155), and of CA–1168, December 27, from USIA to 30 USIS missions (ibid., USIA/IOP Files: Lot 62 D 239, Infoguides, Old Material). Information policy on disarmament is also in an October 18 memorandum from Dowsley Clark, USIA, through Robert E. Matteson, Foreign Operations Administration, to Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President. (Ibid.: Lot 63 D 224, Disarmament, Stephen Benedict, 1955–58)↩