97. Telegram From the Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State 1
4796. From Beam. Reference: Embtel 4786.2 Blankenhorn told Kidd that on Monday he had discussed with Chancellor subject working party and preparations conference with Soviets. Chancellor’s main point was that German representatives not authorized deal with any point of substance before he had opportunity personal discussion with Secretary at Paris. Blankenhorn welcomed possibility frank exchange views with British and ourselves, but preferred not go very far with French until after Ministers’ meeting. Indicated German impression that developments occurring in French Foreign Office and government of which difficult predict outcome. Germans felt easier about Pinay than about Faure. We said that German position seemed quite close to British and if Chancellor desired avoid questions substance until after meeting with Secretary we could not object.
Blankenhorn stressed Chancellor’s personal view that acceptance into West’s treaty system was Germany’s greatest asset. Traditional German defect had been to waver between East and West, and now that “for first time in 50 years” Germany had support of western allies, Chancellor determined to avoid at all costs giving any impression that Federal Republic would waver in its allegiance to WEU and NATO. Felt that if he could hold to this course until elections 1957 and win those elections, his policy would have time take root and could not be disturbed thereafter. In this respect, if we could understand, certain questions of internal politics more important than reunification immediately. Chancellor strongly against any Austrian treaty solution for Germany and could think of abundant dissimilarities in German case. (Raab had sent message saying that condition of [Page 154] Austria’s present policy was that Germany continue its present policy rearmament in western alliance.) Chancellor inclined to think German settlement might follow only in wake global US-Soviet détente. In any event, Germany would be in stronger position tackle reunification question two years hence. Necessity proceeding very cautiously now.
When conditions permit general détente, Chancellor saw certain elements or ideas in WEU which might possibly be extended or supply pattern for all-European arrangement. Principle was that Germany could accept any such restrictions as arms limitations, non-aggression assurances, withdrawal support of allies in case of violation, which other nations also accepted. Otherwise sovereignty including freedom of alliance was essential. Under no circumstances “neutralization”. Also under no circumstances could Germany give up claim to Oder-Neisse and eastern territories, although willing renounce use of force for solution such questions. This was type of idea Chancellor wished reserve for conversation with Secretary. Blankenhorn did not go into details, but indicated arrangement also intended apply for forces USSR, UK and US on European continent.
Blankenhorn’s personal opinion that something more than Berlin conference positions on free elections, if short of security plans reported above, would be needed to hold public opinion in light conclusion Austrian treaty and possible Soviet moves. He thought principles of an all-German peace treaty (mentioned to him merely as one possibility among others) based squarely on Berlin position of sovereignty including freedom of alliance but reserving question of frontiers for formal peace conference negotiations, might have possibilities as propaganda device to put Soviets on defensive. However, wished to consider matter further and would endeavor keep us informed.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–2855. Secret. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Kidd who was in London as part of the delegation. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 452) Repeated to Bonn and Paris.↩
- Telegram 4786 reported Kidd’s conversation with Blankenhorn on the Saar. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1/4–2755)↩