Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, April 7, 1955—7 p.m.

3576. Re Bonn’s 2877 and Paris Embtels 4307 and 4331.² FYI Our principal objective at this time is to bring Paris Agreements into force soon as possible. This means we must try get over hurdles of French and German deposit as early as possible in April so that there will be no further reason for delay by other countries involved. US instruments signed by President today and will be forwarded Bonn forthwith; we will be ready deposit by end of week. British and Germans now also ready, remaining problem is French Government willingness deposit in its turn.

We are seriously concerned by indication Paris reftels that French do not plan deposit until some time in May. French may have some genuine concern at danger German Constitutional Court might render adverse verdict on Saar agreement and thus throw into question what French have unilaterally insisted is an integral part of Paris Agreements. On this subject we understand German position is that Heuss’ signature on letter approving Saar Agreement binds Germany under international law and Constitutional Court issue is internal matter; this position appears reasonable to us and was apparently acceptable French FonOff last week (Paris Embtel 4217³). In any case, danger adverse Court decision appears greater and its repercussions on hard-won structure of unity in Paris Agreements far worse if Agreements not in force before Court acts.

On other hand, we fear Faure may wish hold up French deposit in order use timing as bargaining weapon in bilateral negotiations with Germans on Saar and Roechling matters⁴ which we would consider unjustified and which would create serious danger of prolonged delays.

For these reasons we are not prepared agree to date Working Group meeting until we know that ratifications of at least four major powers concerned will be deposited before working group meets. We are happy to note from London’s 4421 (rptd Bonn 393 Paris 622)⁵ that British FonOff supports this stand.

It is however clear from Paris reftel we face difficult bargaining situation with Faure. We feel best tactic under circumstances is not emphasize tie between deposit and Working Group but rather to press for rapid French action on deposit and hold off on agreement for Working Group date until we know when French will deposit. End FYI.

For Paris: On this basis Dillon should see Pinay and if necessary Faure and make following points:

1. US anxious bring Paris Agreements into force soon as possible and thus lay basis of strength and unity for negotiations with Soviet Union. All necessary parliamentary action will have been taken in all countries by first week May and we would hope bring Agreements into force by that time. This would permit holding NATO Ministerial meeting in second week May to mark fact that Atlantic Community has entered a new phase.

2. President has ratified Paris Agreements for US and instruments will be ready for deposit in a few days. We understand UK also ready to deposit at any time. We are however anxious speed up German deposit so that German action becomes irreversible before new road-blocks arise there. Rapid deposit by four major countries concerned would also encourage other NATO countries to expedite action. We understand Chancellor now ready deposit if US, UK, and France do. For this reason we would hope that deposit by all of us could be made within two weeks; Pinay’s visit to Bonn seems provide good occasion. (If Pinay or Faure raises Constitutional Court problem you may in your discretion use line of argument in second paragraph this tel.)

3. As concerns Working Group, meeting with Soviet Union should be solidly prepared, which means delegations must come to Working Group meeting well-briefed. Internal US preparations will require several weeks. Agree usefulness meeting of Ministers in May to discuss tactics and timing; however Secretary cannot take two trips to Europe so close together, so this meeting would best take place in connection NATO Ministerial meeting. Working Group could help lay groundwork for Ministers meeting and then complete preparations on basis instructions from Ministers.

4. We believe it important Germans should participate fully in German phase Working Group’s activities. Also feel continuing consultation NATO Council important because of NATO interest in European security arrangements and in order strengthen NATO political consultative machinery as we and French both desire. These arrangements will be greatly facilitated if any uncertainty removed about German deposit so that Chancellor will be free of internal pressure on this subject and if deposits other NATO countries well on way to completion by time Working Group meets.

Subsequent to drafting of foregoing, French Ambassador called and expressed concern re US position that Working Group should not begin work before deposit ratification agreements by principal powers.⁶ He said French Government felt this would mean in effect that Working Group could not start much, if any, before Ministerial meeting since French could not deposit until following problems had been resolved:

(1) Exchange of letters on Saar, which French understand Germans not willing effect until court pronouncement early May;

(2) Franco-Saar Convention concluded; and

(3) Roechling problem settled.

Secretary indicated our understanding Germans willing exchange Saar letters prior court determination, thereby making them binding internationally. Secretary also expressed concern at imposing extraneous matters such as (2) and (3) as conditions to deposit instruments of ratification. He emphasized we were proceeding on assumption we should get one thing done before starting another. So long as uncertainty prevailed by virtue failure deposit instruments of ratification there was always possibility other extraneous matters might be raised which would affect coming into force of treaties which we all have recognized must be effective before negotiations undertaken with Soviets. He thought all foregoing questions could be resolved by first of May provided Germans willing exchange Saar letters. He thought we should all concentrate on getting Working Group started before NATO Ministerial meeting. At same time he thought we should also try get instruments of ratification deposited before Working Group established.⁷

For Bonn: You should in your discretion support British suggestions reported Deptel 2698.⁸ We would also like your estimate prospects Constitutional Court action (including timing and danger of injunction) and what assurances Chancellor might be prepared give French on binding nature Saar Agreement.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.022/4–555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Stanley M. Cleveland (RA) and cleared with Tyler, Palmer, and Kidd. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London.
2. These telegrams reported various aspects of the problem of depositing ratifications and establishing a working group. (Ibid., 740.5/4–555, 396.1/4–555, and 762.022/4–555, respectively)
3. Not printed.
4. The control of the Roechling Works in the Saar was a continuing matter of contention between France and the Federal Republic.
5. Telegram 4421 reported that the Foreign Office was more concerned with the deposit of ratifications than with the establishment of the working group.
6. A memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Couve de Murville is in Department of State, Central File 396.1/4–755. For the French account, see Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1955, Tome 1, pp. 415–416.
7. On April 8, Dillon reported that he delivered an aide-mémoire to the French along the lines instructed. (Telegrams 4385 and 4386 from Paris; ibid., 740.5/4–855) On the following day he cabled further stating that if the United States continued to hold up the working group until after deposit of the ratifications, it might seriously jeopardize the timely deposit of the instruments. (Telegram 4388 from Paris; ibid., 740.5/4– 955)
8. Telegram 2698 reported that the British would accept the condition that no working group be established until after the deposit of the instruments of ratification provided no action was taken by the High Commissioners to terminate the occupation until ratification had been completed by all the other countries. (Ibid., 740.5/4–455)