Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, January 8, 1955—2:47 p.m.

2459. Re Paris Embtel 2840 and Mendes-France’s letters to President and Secretary transmitted Embassy’s telegrams 2845, 2846 and 2847.² You should inform highest available French official that these communications are receiving serious consideration US Government and replies will be forthcoming at early date concerning questions raised.

At same time you should take occasion, after consultations with Jebb who has similar instructions, to outline in strong terms following US position re Mendes-France’s proposal that Western initiative be taken now to call for a Four-Power conference on European questions with the Soviet Union in May:

1. Such a Western approach made before final act of ratification in France would, as pointed out Moscow’s 1049,³ present Soviets with excellent opportunity to reinforce whatever effect their present attitude is having on French opinion and would also create impression of Western uncertainty and weakness, which would be interpreted by Soviet rulers as clear indication of correctness of their present line of intimidation. Soviet rejection of proposal for conference would, of course, be made contingent upon ratification question and thus tend to throw ball back to West, whereas in unlikely event Soviets would agree to proposed conference, this would certainly give every wavering parliamentarian pretext for further delay in ratification. Issue of ratification now versus negotiations now was squarely resolved in Western note of November 29 to Soviets,⁴ and backtracking by West would be interpreted by all peoples and governments concerned as reflecting indecision and weakness. Fundamental assumption on which Western Powers have proceeded in these past years has been that in last analysis Soviets will realistically accommodate themselves to such concrete manifestations of Western defensive determination and cohesion as embodied in Paris Accords. Out of such accommodations could emerge genuine settlements with the Soviets. To fail to demonstrate to Soviets such determination now will tend to defeat goal towards which we have been moving.

2. In referring to possibility Soviets could in this period gain initiative by means of declarations without any real import, Mendes-France appears to overlook fact that should Soviets so choose they can do so regardless of any Western stimulus.

3. If it is the thought of Mendes-France that such a Soviet offer would relate to Germany, we think it most improbable that the Soviets are in a position to make any real concessions on this subject since the latter would involve the yielding by Soviets of their position in East Germany. Neither at Berlin Conference⁵ nor later has Molotov given slightest indication Soviet Union is prepared to make such a move.

4. No matter what Western Powers would say regarding the impermissibility of a discussion of their security arrangements in any conference with the Soviets, we may be sure that the Soviets would utilize both negotiations preceding and a conference itself to attack Western arrangements, necessitating counter-argumentation on our part. A good deal of the Berlin Conference was taken up with this subject.

5. You should make very clear to French harm which would be done to Western alliance were France to make a unilateral démarche to Soviet Union. In our opinion, French démarche on Austria following Mendes-France’s UN speech created an unfortunate impression that at least Western tactics were no longer unified as they had been formerly. For France now to take another step by herself in approaching Soviet Union would greatly accentuate this impression and would encourage the Soviet Union to pursue its tactics of intimidation and to concentrate its efforts on France. You should not let the French feel that we would agree to such a separate démarche being made with language implying approval of the United States. We feel that Mendes-France must be left under no illusions as to our view that we could not prevent such a move on his part from having a very adverse influence on the future of the Western alliance and the role of France within it.

6. It is noted that Mendes-France refers in his letter to German interest in negotiations with the Soviets. Such interest is obvious. Presumably the subject matter of a conference would primarily be Germany, and also according to the timetable, the Federal Republic would then be a sovereign state and US, UK and France no longer occupying powers. Under these circumstances our status to deal with German affairs is drastically altered, and we assume that Mendes-France would want to give the most serious consideration as to whether he thought it opportune at this time to open up that vista and to conduct the negotiations with the Germans which would be indispensable if the three powers were not to be put in the position of interlopers.

FYI. In replies of President and Secretary to Mendes-France above referred to, we hope to strike a somewhat more positive note in the sense of suggesting that there now be set up with public knowledge a working party to prepare an invitation to Soviets to be transmitted immediately following WEU coming into force. However, we are not yet prepared to formulate this idea specifically for transmission.⁶

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–655. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and Thurston on January 7 and cleared with Elbrick. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.
2. All dated January 6. Telegram 2840 reported a discussion with Mendès-France regarding the ratification of the Paris Accords. (Ibid., 751.00/1–655) The notes to President Eisenhower in telegrams 2845 and 2847 discussed Germany and a Four-Power meeting. (Ibid. and ibid., 396.1/1–655) The note to Dulles in telegram 2846 discussed Germany and European unification. (Ibid., 751.00/1–655) Regarding these notes and similar exchanges with Eden and Churchill, see Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1955, Tome 1, p. 23, footnote 1, and Annexes, Tome 1, pp. 213–224.
3. Telegram 1049, January 6, concluded that it was difficult to see any advantage to the approach suggested by Mendès-France. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–655)
4. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1954, pp. 901–902.
5. For documentation on the Berlin Conference, January 25–February 18, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 601 ff.
6. On January 9, Dillon reported that he had called on Parodi that afternoon and left an aide-mémoire closely paraphrasing paragraphs 1–6 and that Jebb had made a similar approach. Copies of these aides-mémoire were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1387 from Paris, January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–1055) On January 10, Bohlen reported that he had discussed the proposal with the British and French Ambassadors who agreed that it would be preferable not to make it at that moment. (Telegram 1069 from Moscow; ibid.)