Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

72. Memorandum of a Conversation, Vienna, May 13, 1955¹

Vienna, May 13, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary of State Dulles²
• Chancellor Raab
• Vice Chancellor Schaerf
• Ambassador Thompson

During an exchange of opening remarks Chancellor Raab expressed the hope that the Austrian settlement might be beneficial with respect to the solution of other international problems as well. “Maybe the Russians will be more humane in the future,” he said.

Secretary Dulles then remarked that he thought one point of the Austrian settlement required particularly close watching, i.e. Austrian neutrality. He recalled that the U.S. had been the primary sponsor of the collective security principle while the Soviet Union tried to block the U.S. efforts and to isolate the non-Communist nations from one another. He reported that at the NATO Council meeting he just attended in Paris several of the smaller nations had expressed their concern to him that the Austrian example might have a disintegrating effect on the Western defense efforts. Chancellor Raab injected that none of these small countries were neighbors of the Soviets. Mr. Dulles replied by mentioning Norway. Chancellor Raab in turn pointed to the positive aspect of the Austrian settlement, i.e. the Russians withdrawing eastward both in a military and an economic sense.

Mr. Dulles then remarked that if the Austrian conception of neutrality were to be one where no further need for their own defensive efforts were seen, this would have a very negative effect. Chancellor Raab replied there was no danger of that, if for no other reason than that the Austrians had long borders facing two Communist states, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and that protection was needed against any invasion by illegal gangs from there. He appealed to the U.S. to leave as much of its military equipment in Austria behind as possible since this would greatly facilitate and speed up the creation of Austrian forces.

Mr. Dulles then mentioned that it seemed to him that in the latest Austrian draft of a neutrality declaration³ the language expressing the Austrians’ determination to defend their neutrality had been weakened as against an earlier draft. A former draft had spoken of Austria’s being resolved to defend her neutrality while the latest one spoke only of Austria’s being willing. The interpreter having translated these words as “entschlossen” and “gewillt” respectively, Chancellor Raab insisted that in German they both meant the same thing. Mr. Dulles then jokingly expressed the hope that the English text he would receive would use the translation resolved since this would make matters much easier for him in the U.S. Senate.

Reverting to the matter of U.S. military equipment, Mr. Dulles expressed the willingness of the U.S. in principle to turn such equipment over to the Austrians, provided, of course, that the latter were determined really to use it for their own defense. Chancellor Raab injected that the Austrian parties did not differ in this determination. Mr. Dulles continued that there were some technical and legal complications in the way of turning over much equipment at one time and asked whether the Austrians would want a special law passed by Congress to facilitate such a quick and massive turn-over. Chancellor Raab was rather non-committal; when Mr. Dulles pointed out that in a Congressional debate of such a law the whole matter of Austrian neutrality might be aired, Chancellor Raab remarked that that didn’t seem very desirable to him.

Asked by Vice Chancellor Schaerf what intervals would be involved without such a special law, Mr. Dulles pointed out that under the law presently in operation about $20 million worth of equipment could be turned over provided the Austrian treaty came into force before the authorization under this law lapses with the end of the current fiscal year on June 30. Ambassador Thompson then mentioned that some more equipment of the Gendarmérie kind of small arms might be turned over on a loan basis before the State treaty takes effect, as had been done previously since such equipment, involving for instance rifles but not tanks, was within the limitations of existing Allied Council regulations. Asked by Mr. Dulles whether such a further turn-over before the treaty is in effect might cause the Austrians trouble with the Russians, Chancellor Raab answered, no, quite the contrary. Ambassador Thompson further explained that General Arnold would store some of his forces’ military equipment centrally in barracks so it could be conveniently left behind and turned over at the time of the withdrawal of American forces. Mr. Dulles concluded this point by saying the U.S. would do its best and that he thought a way could be found.

Mr. Dulles then expressed his gratification that both Austrian coalition parties support the principle of an armed, defensive neutrality and hoped that in view of the many dangers and problems still ahead and the suspiciousness of Soviet motives the existing policy of national unity would continue. Chancellor Raab and Vice Chancellor Schaerf nodded, the Chancellor again referring to Austria’s first hand observations of the neighboring Communist states.

Mr. Dulles expressed the hope that the ratification process could be pushed rapidly and concluded before Congress adjourns in July. He saw only two potential difficulties: a. Austrian neutrality. He was confident Congress would accept it if it was coupled with the determination of the Austrians to defend themselves. b. Settlement of Jewish claims. Chancellor Raab replied that negotiations with the Jewish representatives were proceeding very satisfactorily and that after the meeting of the Council of Ministers next Tuesday he hoped to be able to communicate to the U.S. the reaching of a final settlement. There had already been rough agreement on the total sum involved, about $20 million, and that only the distribution remained to be ironed out. They had reached virtual agreement with the representatives of American Jewish groups and only had some difficulties with baptised Austrian ex-Jews.

As for the Austrian defense effort, Vice Chancellor Schaerf reported that it was Austria’s intention to send parliamentary groups to both Switzerland and Sweden to study their set-up and see how the Austrians can benefit by their experience. Mr. Dulles reiterated that it would be most useful to him if he could go back with the assurance of both the Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor as spokesmen of their parties that Austria was aiming at an armed neutrality and would not just trust the promises of others. Chancellor Raab again mentioned that the Soviets could well withdraw and still send in gangs from Hungary and that Austria must and will protect herself against any such dangers. Vice Chancellor Schaerf added jokingly that he and the Chancellor both having been army officers at one time he thought they had a particular appreciation of the problem.

Mr. Dulles concluded the conversation by saying that many people wonder how it came about that the Austrians suddenly are getting their independence and the withdrawal of foreign troops; that in his opinion the explanation was to be found right here in Austria. Austria’s freedom and independence are not received as a gift but are what the Austrian people and their government have earned through their love of freedom and their steadfastness. He was sure that the free world could continue in the future to count on these same qualities. Chancellor Raab answered smilingly that Austria would remain faithful to Western culture.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.63/5–1755. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1317 from Vienna, May 17.
2. Secretary Dulles arrived at Vienna from Paris early on the afternoon of May 13. This meeting with the Austrians was apparently his first discussion after arrival at the Embassy.
3. The two drafts mentioned in this paragraph have not been identified further.