Office of the Historian

6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria1

Washington, March 5, 1955—1:52 p.m.

2472. Agree Vienna’s 19372 key point is clarification Soviet requirement of “security against Anschluss”. If as suspected this merely way disguising previous Soviet requirement for satisfaction re Germany in attempt promote Four-Power conference important Austrians not allow themselves be used as tool by Soviets in their effort precipitate conference. Even were conference ostensibly limited solely to Austria would be difficult prevent Soviets using Anschluss issue introduce entire German question.

Recommend you stress foregoing if possible with your colleagues in meeting with Figl Monday in attempt persuade Austrians stand firm. If they unwilling go back to Soviets with another request for clarification and feel must make public statement suggest they use publicly line employed first reply to Molotov (Vienna 18953) plus earlier Figl public comment that Molotov speech clearly tied Austrian treaty to German question and ratification Paris accords.

We feel tripartite notes to Soviets at this time would play into Soviet hands by appearing constitute formal Western initiative bring about conference. Believe they wish conference even if only concerning Austria. If Austrians insist on making public statement believe we could handle by publicizing substance your proposed notes by means such as reply to planted question in British Parliament with subsequent French and U.S. press statements in response planted inquiries.

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–455. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Freund and cleared in substance with EE. Also sent to London, Paris, and Moscow.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. See footnote 2, Document 4.↩