384. Memorandum of the Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, November 21, 19551
[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of item 1, world developments affecting United States security.]
2. Report by the Secretary of State
After an introduction by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Secretary Dulles said that his forthcoming report to the Council would assume a knowledge of his report to the nation Friday night,2 on the part of all those present. He would accordingly confine himself to aspects of his activities at the Geneva Conference which were of particular interest to the National Security Council.
Initially, said Secretary Dulles, he would like to present his estimate of why the Soviet Delegation had acted as they had during the course of the Conference. In the first place, it was clear that the Soviets were extremely fearful of the impact of the so-called “spirit of Geneva” on the internal stability of the Soviet Union and of the Communist bloc. Whenever, in the course of the negotiations, any subject was discussed suggesting a course of action which would have substantial impact on the stability of the Soviet bloc, the Soviet negotiators not only shied away from the subject—they refused point-blank to discuss it. In part, thought Secretary Dulles, this conduct derived from the instinctive sentiments of officials who had been brought up under the harsh tenets of Stalinist Communism. On the other hand, it also reflected the sense of insecurity of the Soviet Delegation. They could have served themselves well if they could even have brought themselves to give lip service to some of the proposals put forward by the Western Foreign Ministers. Even so, they felt unable to make a single significant concession, for example, with respect to the unification of Germany. This resulted from their evident fear of the effect of such a concession on their hold over East Germany and their other satellites. While this course of action obviously exposed them to the charge of openly violating the agreements reached by the Heads of Government at the first Geneva Conference, they felt this preferable to risking any impairment of their hold on their satellites.
Secretary Dulles believed that a proper inference from the foregoing was that it was not only the United States which had suffered [Page 804] certain unfortunate effects; for example, the loss of the cement of fear in our alliances. The spirit of Geneva had also had a dangerous impact on the Soviet Union, which was accordingly erecting safeguards against it. In this respect at least Secretary Dulles said he regarded the Soviet position at Geneva as evidence of weakness rather than of strength.
Despite their intransigeance at the Foreign Ministers Conference, Secretary Dulles expressed confidence that the Soviet behavior at Geneva was no indication that they sought an open break with the West. In areas of negotiation where they were less worried over courses of action which might affect their internal stability, they did make certain very limited offers and concessions. This was true in the case of the disarmament item. Their objective here was to preserve the semblance of agreeable relations with the West, without making any substantial concessions. Secretary Dulles indicated that the Western Foreign Ministers were aware of the Soviet tactics.
Going on, Secretary Dulles said that talks with the Soviet Delegation had occurred in the course of which some very slight progress was recorded. For example, the Soviets had gone so far as to agree to a role for the President’s aerial inspection plan,3 though they placed it toward the end of the development of a disarmament program instead of placing it at the beginning, as President Eisenhower had indicated. However, the mere fact that they were willing to give any consideration to the President’s inspection proposal could perhaps be described as some advance over their earlier position on the general issue of disarmament.
Secretary Dulles then stated that he had had one quite frank talk on Saturday morning with Molotov4 which he believed perhaps advanced somewhat the possibilities which lay before the Disarmament Commission, although he deferred to Governor Stassen’s opinion in this area. Molotov had made it clear that he was quite willing to go forward with a disarmament program provided this program contained no real provision for inspection and control. Obviously, thought Secretary Dulles, Molotov figured that we would live up to our obligations under an agreed disarmament proposal, whereas the Soviet Union need not. Molotov, in reply to our insistence on the importance of inspection and control, had cited the fact that neither side used poison gas during the Second World War, although there was of course no inspection or control. Molotov had urged that the weight of public opinion was sufficient to assure the compliance of each nation with its obligations under an agreed disarmament plan. Secretary Dulles had expressed to Molotov extreme skepticism as to [Page 805] the validity of this argument, pointing out that the fear that the other side would use gas had been the real deterrent on its use. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles came away with the feeling that the Soviets really wished to get a disarmament program under way. For one thing, they do not wish to continue spending so large a proportion of their resources on their military establishment. This was too great a burden on the people of the Soviet Union, and they wished to lower their defense budget if they were able to do so. It was quite possible that they would cut their military expenditures even in the absence of any disarmament agreement. Meanwhile, they are pressing us hard for such an agreement minus any features involving international inspection and control.
Secretary Dulles then said he would like to turn to the problems which faced the United States now that the Foreign Ministers Conference had concluded. The big problem, of course, was Germany. In the course of negotiations on that problem the Soviets had gone so far, or the Western Ministers had forced them to go so far, that they were driven to the point of being obliged to defend their negotiating position in the final terms of preserving the East German regime and the Communist system which they had created in East Germany. Of course, these tactics now deprived them of negotiating arguments which they could have used in any direct negotiations with the West Germans for reunification. For example, they could not agree with the Federal Republic to settle for a reunified neutral Germany outside NATO. Secretary Dulles went on to point out that Chancellor Adenauer’s fears had been allayed to a considerable extent by the lengths to which the Soviets had gone in order to prevent any genuine discussion of German reunification. So while the USSR had created great problems for itself with respect to the future of Germany, the problems of the Federal Republic had been somewhat reduced.
These thoughts led Secretary Dulles to the question of the future of Germany, and indicated what the United States must be prepared to do—namely, everything that it could do effectively to develop the integration of Europe. If there was to be no unification of Germany in the foreseeable future, it was incumbent on the United States to provide the Federal Republic and its people with the strongest possible sense of their future close relationship with Western Europe. In this connection Secretary Dulles said that he wished to touch on NATO. He said he believed that the most important thing that we could do was to give the Federal Republic some sort of vested interest in NATO through the development of a West German military establishment which was integrated with the West. Perhaps this military agency, NATO, was not the ideal way to reach this objective, but in point of fact NATO was the great magnet of free Europe. For over-all political rather than mere military objectives, [Page 806] we must make use of this military magnet to attract and retain the Federal Republic in integration with the free world. Accordingly, it was perhaps of very great importance that the United States provide more information to the NATO powers on our new weapons. This was one means of keeping alive the morale and spirit of NATO.
While NATO was thus, in Secretary Dulles’ opinion, the instrument which today is most effective in holding Western Europe together, we must also seek to develop alternatives to NATO in case the fear of overt aggression and general war continues to decline with the resulting effect of further lowering the sense of solidarity of NATO. Perhaps the Coal-Steel Community was an alternative which offered significant possibilities; but almost any instrumentality was desirable if its use could develop the European principle rather than the national principle. All these things would help keep West Germany a part of the Western community of nations and make more endurable for the Germans the continued division of their country. While they would not say so out loud, of course, the French would not be at all disturbed by the prospect of the continued division of Germany. At any rate, Secretary Dulles was confident that there was much that could be done to make the present impasse tolerable and to prevent the Federal Republic from falling under Soviet influence.
[Here follow reports of Dulles’ trips to Spain and Yugoslavia and discussion of the Middle East at Geneva, NATO buildup, and military assistance for Fiscal Year 1957.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on November 22.↩
- See supra.↩
- See Document 221.↩
- Document 359.↩