Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

38. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State¹

Vienna, April 28, 1955—7 p.m.

2502. For the Secretary. While as indicated previous cables positions British, French and particularly Austrians on various matters far from clear, negotiating problems have emerged to point where further guidance possible.² I would appreciate before Monday your views on following:

As I see it, it will be extremely difficult meet objective paragraph 1(f) Deptel 2983³ which instructs me arrange for signing Austro-Soviet bilateral agreement and disposition Austrian neutrality declaration and four-power guarantee questions at time treaty itself agreed.

a. Austrian Government seems content allow bilateral regarding Soviet concessions under Article 35 to be negotiated later, but would support Western effort include in treaty pertinent economic provisions Moscow Austro-Soviet agreement.⁴ Believe we must make effort do so and if Soviets refuse, attempt have those provisions or a bilateral attached to treaty. Austrians only yesterday began to see risks allowing bilateral be left for later negotiation. Soviets have stated informally they prepared for no treaty revisions other than dropping obsolete articles, but that may be negotiating tactic.

b. Austrian Government only now preparing draft neutrality declaration. My thought that regard, however, is that it will not prove a serious problem. Indications from Austrians are that it will be general and cover only specific points in Moscow Austro-Soviet agreement. Soviets will probably insist accordingly that word “perpetual” be used and I can see little we can do to prevent it. In any event West ambassadors expect to be consulted informally on draft declaration which Austrians presently plan would not be made constitutional law until after all treaty ratifications completed. So long as declaration contains only those points mentioned in Moscow agreement would be extremely difficult for Soviets seriously to object or alter commitment re troop withdrawal. Therefore seems best not take initiative to bring neutrality question into Ambassadors’ Conference or otherwise make issue of it, saving our efforts for more serious questions of Austro-Soviet bilateral re Article 35 and four-power guarantee. Would, however, use authority granted me in paragraph I, 3, Deptel 2984⁵ if necessary.

c. Soviets have indicated informally four-power guarantee subject only for ministerial discussion. I still do not know whether they will make it a precondition for signing of the treaty, precisely what they have in mind, or whether their actual objective is to be in a position to make unilateral guarantee. Our position, of course, dependent on NSC decision expected today.⁶

As previously reported I am reluctant force issue on question guarantee at Ambassador’s Conference particularly in view lack of time to coordinate position with French, British and Austrians. Most likely Soviet position is that this could be discussed only by Foreign Ministers; we might persuade Austrians to advance proposals but would be difficult if not impossible for them to sponsor formula satisfactory to us. (They would not desire any limitation on duration of guarantee.) Also Austrians not fully alive to dangers of unilateral guarantee and we would be in difficult position if Soviets should propose guarantee by Austria’s neighbors in lieu of four-power guarantee. Before this question tackled with Russians would hope we could prepare Austrians to reject unilateral guarantee or be prepared make statement with object protecting themselves against possible consequences such guarantee and that we could have firm tripartite position with British and French including their attitude on position tripartite declaration such as that prepared for Berlin Conference (authorized in NSC 164/1) to be used now in event four-power guarantee not feasible.

On the other hand I am much worried by position in which you may be placed if we proceed to draft up final text of treaty (even if subject to reservations) and develop further public expectation that you are coming to Vienna simply to sign previously agreed treaty when there may be still outstanding important unsettled points. Most important is of course question of guarantee and our proceeding along present lines will increase expectation that we are prepared at least seriously to discuss participation in such guarantee. I believe therefore that, depending upon developments in negotiations (including Article 35 question as well as guarantee) and NSC decision that we may have to make our position clear in Ambassadors’ Conference and by public statement.

Believe we will have to be in position to fix firm date for Ministers’ meeting by end of Ambassadors’ Conference.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2855. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Working Groups from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France began discussions on April 25 with Austrian officials in an attempt to achieve agreed positions on the various questions outstanding in the draft treaty. Documentation on their work is ibid., 396.1–VI/4–2555 ff. A set of the position papers prepared by the U.S. Group for these discussions is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 449.
3. Telegram 2983 transmitted an outline of tactics for the Ambassadors meeting. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2355)
4. See Document 26.
5. Telegram 2984 transmitted a paper on the possible positions of the United States on the Austrian Treaty. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2355)
6. See the memorandum of discussion, supra.