36. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State1

2480. At meeting of West Ambassadors with Raab, Schaerf, Figl and Kreisky today following developed:

Austrians have in mind that no declaration on neutrality other than that by Raab’s general statement in Parliament today will be made until after all five powers have ratified treaty, at which time a constitutional law would be passed. Their idea of such law was that it would simply state that Austria intends to follow a policy of friendship and neutrality toward all powers and would join no military alliances and would allow no bases on Austrian territory. They appeared to assume that their invitation for a guarantee would follow the passage of this constitutional law. The fuzziness of their thinking was illustrated by the fact that they stated everybody would be welcome to guarantee them. The Austrians indicated that they did not contemplate applying for UN membership until after the treaty was in force, and they had constitutionally established their neutral status. We clearly pointed out the relationship between these various problems, and the difficulty for our governments in taking a position on any one of them until all were clear. The Austrians repeated information already given us that on the governmental level they had no thought of an automatic guarantee. When it was pointed out that the Soviets might object to the form of their neutrality declaration, and might also insist upon a four-power guarantee as a condition of signature of the treaty, they agreed to draw up and communicate to us next week a draft of the constitutional law establishing Austria’s neutral status. We pointed out some of the pitfalls and dangers which we foresaw in connection with both the question of neutrality as well as the request for a guarantee.

We pointed out we would have difficulty in pressing for revision in any of the treaty clauses unless such revisions were requested by the Austrians, and specifically asked their intention about Article 35. Austrians at first took the position that this should not be reopened. They did not believe the Russians would agree to any changes other than dropping obsolete Articles. Discussion brought out that Austrian Ministers had given little thought to their bilateral arrangements implementing the Moscow memorandum,2 and apparently had not considered it necessary to undertake this until after conclusion of treaty. After we had forcefully elaborated the dangers [Page 58] of this procedure, Austrians agreed to support an effort on our part to amend Article 35 to include their Moscow agreement, or to annex it to the treaty. Austrians made clear they would welcome insertion in Article 35 of a paragraph relating to non-return of German assets in West Zones and agreed that this might attract Russians to agree to amendment of Article 35. It was made clear that none of us were in a position to state that our governments would be able to do this. Austrians indicated they probably would not ask for revision of military clauses, but do have intention of creating the treaty army and, although they realize limitation is too low, they expect to rotate conscripts and thus develop reservoir of trained, if unarmed, personnel. Earlier in the discussion the Austrians said they expected to be free to obtain arms from any power as did the Swiss.

Chancellor agreed instruct appropriate officials to work out with us assurances covering continuation in force of present restitution legislation, arrangements for return of, or compensation for, properties of United Nations beneficial owners, and for oil concessions, and to consider “de jure” denationalization of British, American and Canadian oil firms within a specified period of time after entry into force of the treaty.

We were appalled by the lack of clarity in the Austrian thinking on these problems, and extent to which they have failed to foresee possible difficulties with the Soviets. We believe, however, they will be inclined to work with us in avoiding, insofar as possible, the dangers which we foresee and some of the pitfalls to which we drew their attention.3

Austrian Delegation will consist of Figl, Kreisky, Schoener and Verosta.

Thompson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.
  2. See Document 26.
  3. In telegram 2489, April 28, Thompson reported that at one point in this meeting Figl produced a draft text of a neutrality declaration, but that Raab and Schaerf had objected to it. Thompson transmitted the text in telegram 2489 despite its withdrawal. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2855)