357. Intelligence Briefing Note1

IB No. 29

Informal Soviet Hints at Deal on German Reunification

2 two Communist journalists in Geneva— … —separately and independently hinted at Soviet willingness to make a deal on Germany despite Molotov’s uncompromising speech of 8 November.3

[Page 753]

The line of discussion taken by the … journalist on 10 November and echoed—though only in broad outline—by the … the same night, was as follows:

The heart of the matter at issue between the US and the USSR is Germany. Molotov has hinted at the terms of a deal, but the West has not touched on any realistic proposition.

The terms of a possible deal are clear: Germany must stay out of NATO and come within the framework of a general European security agreement; the quid pro quo would be Soviet agreement to so-called free elections.

Of course the Communists would lose free elections in a reunified Germany, but they might get about 15 percent of the vote, and that would be satisfactory to the USSR.

There would have to be some sort of advance agreement to protect the social gains of East Germany—simply some understanding that the government would not destroy the social experiments of the opposition, as the Conservatives in England did not destroy the nationalized industries set up under the Labor Government.

The Russians wonder if the United States might not suggest a realistic deal along these lines at some point, and are speculating on whether Secretary Dulles has the authority to make such a proposal. In particular they wonder if a deal is possible now or if it will have to wait until after the 1956 election.

The Russians also wonder if the US intends to propose another conference before the 1956 US elections. The USSR will not press for one.

Comment: The Soviet delegation has made it very clear that the USSR is unwilling to agree to reunification of Germany at any price less than the exclusion of Germany from NATO. This report is the first reliable evidence received during the Foreign Ministers Meeting that the USSR might wish to make a deal at this price.

Soviet intent to explore the chances of such a deal may in part explain Molotov’s unwillingness on 9 November to end the discussion of agenda item number one.

Ray S. Cline4
Adviser, U.S. Delegation
  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 608. Secret; Limited Distribution.
  2. One half line is omitted in the source text.
  3. See Document 340.
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.