Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

339. Informal Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group on Disarmament, Geneva, November 8, 1955, 11 a.m.¹

Geneva, November 8, 1955, 11 a.m.

PEOPLE IN ATTENDANCE

• United States
  • Mr. Wainhouse
  • Mr. Donkin
  • Colonel Willis
  • Captain Blouin
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Pink
  • Mr. MacKenzie
  • Mr. Thring
• France
  • M. de Menthon
  • PM. Genevey
  • One other representative

1. M. de Menthon raised the question of when and with whom we should be prepared to discuss the specifics of an arms and inspection agreement in the event that our Ministers arrived at some agreed position in Geneva. Suggested disarmament Subcommittee as possible solution. Pink said that he liked Mr. Bowie’s previous comment in the Saturday meeting² to the effect that it might be desirable to have discussions between our military personnel. These discussions might even take place prior to the reconvening of the Subcommittee. Pink further observed that certainly the specifics should be discussed in the Subcommittee as well but that there might be some advantage in “getting on with it” earlier. He did not believe USSR would accept President’s proposal. Wainhouse noted that if Molotov did accept the Eisenhower proposal³ then presumably we would get to work immediately on discussions specifically on the subjects contained in paragraphs 6, a (i), and 6 a (ii) of the draft declaration.⁴ Pink asked Wainhouse how, where and in what forms these discussions would proceed. Wainhouse said that that would have to be mutually agreed to by the USSR and the US.

2. Pink then observed that any agreement must not be a bilateral one. Captain Blouin stated that it should be bilateral as a beginning. Pink said that this was impossible in view of the stated Russian position in the September 19 Bulganin letter.⁵ Donkin observed that this would not necessarily follow. Could it not be assumed for this discussion that USSR would accept? Pink stated that it was the British view that it was not to be bilateral and that “this was the first that they had heard of the idea.” Thring stated as an absolute minimum, from a military point of view, the British must be at least provided the results of the aerial reconnaissance. He went on to substantiate the requirement for a multilateral approach by noting other areas of the world which must become involved, i.e., New Zealand, SEATO countries, etc. Wainhouse said that he was glad to know the British views regarding their minimum position, de Menthon stated that the French “gave agreement to the Washington tripartite text⁶ on the basis that it would be multilateral.” And then very emphatically pointed out that it would be extremely embarrassing if the United States emphasized a bilateral approach at Geneva. Pink said that it was the British view that when ground control posts are mentioned it naturally indicated that more countries than just the U.S. and USSR would be involved; that the ground armies which are the real threat to peace are facing one another in Western Europe; therefore, it would be necessary to have inspection posts in Western European nations, since U.S. troops in U.S. were no threat to Soviet troops in USSR.

3. Wainhouse stated that from the beginning the Eisenhower proposal had been a bilateral approach to the USSR. First with the President’s informal conversation with Mr. Bulganin at Geneva⁷ (Pink said that he had not heard of this before) and then followed up by the interchange of letters.⁸ Any reference to acceptance of ground control posts would not necessarily include other countries because it was quite clear that the President could not be speaking for states other than the United States. He could not commit them, de Menthon re-emphasized that the French would be most embarrassed if we insisted on the bilateral approach unless the Soviets themselves indicated some acceptance on the bilateral basis but that we (the United States) should not in stating our position insist on bilateral approach. Pink reaffirmed that the British could not possibly have accepted a text (reference here again to the tripartite paper) that intended a bilateral approach. Thring followed this up by saying that the British could not even accept the plan multilaterally unless the “17 questions”⁹ were answered. MacKenzie stated that the United States should not “present their case” over the next few days on a bilateral basis. Donkin asked why UK and France raised this point at this time since paper was already agreed upon. Wainhouse replied that this was discussed in private talks in New York, and aired in the Tripartite talks in Washington.¹⁰

4. Wainhouse then asked that if the Soviets accepted the Eisenhower proposal on a bilateral basis, will the British and French object? de Menthon observed that the French would not object publicly. Pink stated that they were not prepared to answer that question. Blouin asked if they would agree to a bilateral arrangement under a multilateral agreement, de Menthon answered that they probably could agree to that if it were shown that the French would become involved through “progressive steps,” and added “by bilateral or any other means,” but did not want to commit the French Government. Further that the Secretary of State must not under any circumstances “highlight” bilateralism.

5. The subject was then changed and there was some discussion on what the Foreign Ministers should agree to on the question of specific subjects for the forthcoming Subcommittee meetings. Pink suggested an approach to the question of conventional arms regulation and to what extent we could commit ourselves to a more comprehensive arms regulation. Wainhouse asked if he were referring to force levels, because if that were the case, we were hopeful that we might be able to discuss this subject in the Subcommittee but we could not commit ourselves to do it here. It was at this point that both the French and the British alluded to the fact that they as well were uncertain as to what would be valid force requirements for each of their countries. Pink reiterated that in the British view, discussion of control of conventional weapons would be an area in which some progress might be made; that it was quite impossible to make any progress in the nuclear weapons field. And the subject was dropped.

6. The British and French submitted lists of possible Soviet questions with proposed answers.¹¹ Wainhouse said US was redrafting US questions and would have them available shortly.

7. There was general agreement that it was imperative that the 3 Foreign Ministers get together to work out tactics.

8. There was some discussion about the timing of the submission of the Western declaration. It was generally agreed that this should not be tabled early in the discussions on Item No. 2. Rather, we should wait until the Soviets had given some indication of their position. It was felt all around the table that this “should be played by ear” and the declaration brought out at such time as it would do the Western Powers the most good.

9. Thring said he had been advised by Sokolovsky in England that USSR would surely raise on Item 2:

a. Force levels (as previously)

b. “Disarmament before inspection” instead of “inspection before disarmament”

c. “Control posts must control something and the something is disarmament.”

10. UK was concerned that high level Congressional committee would hold public hearings on Disarmament while Security Council was considering problem. Pink wondered if Stassen documents would be made public. Donkin said no—documents had executive privilege, and would be discussed with no one. Wainhouse said Congress would not hold public hearings that would embarrass international negotiations being conducted.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–855. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.
2. See footnote 4, Document 318.
3. For text of President Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal, see Document 221.
4. Reference is to the draft declaration on disarmament which was included in the Report of the Tripartite Working Group on Disarmament; see Document 288. For text of this draft as submitted by the Western powers on November 10, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 199–201, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 132–133.
5. For text of Bulganin’s letter of September 19 on disarmament, see Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1955, pp. 644–647.
6. See Document 288.
7. Presumably Wainhouse is referring to the informal conversation on July 22; see Document 237.
8. For text of President Eisenhower’s reply to Bulganin’s letter, October 11, see Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1955, pp. 643–644.
9. Not further identified.
10. Regarding the tripartite and quadripartite meetings at New York, September 27 and 28, see Document 284. The tripartite talks in Washington were the meetings of the Working Group on Disarmament.
11. Neither list has been found in Department of State files.