Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

33. Memorandum of Discussion at the 245th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 21, 1955¹

Washington, April 21, 1955

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of items 1—4, a Central Intelligence Agency quarterly report, significant developments affecting United States security, the military situation in the Far East, and the military assistance program. For discussion of item 4, see volume IV, page 2.]

5. U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to Austria, (NSC 164/1;² Progress Report, dated April 11, 1955, by the OCB on NSC 164/1³)

Mr. Dillon Anderson briefed the Council on the contents of the Austrian policy paper (NSC 164/1), and read paragraph 16–d thereof, as being the crucial paragraph in this policy, as follows:

“Vigorously resist the neutralization of Austria as contrary to the U.S. interest. However, should the Austrians, British and French press strongly for accepting some degree of neutralization, the United States may be required to make some concession to avoid the onus of unilaterally blocking a treaty. Nevertheless the United States should refuse to sign a treaty which would preclude Austria’s association with the economic community of Western Europe, which would prejudice Austria’s capacity to preserve internal order, or which would restrict the Western Powers in giving aid to Austria in the establishment of adequate internal security forces.…”

Meanwhile, the Executive Secretary handed out to the members of the Council a revision⁴ of the State Department memorandum of April 20⁵ on the subject, together with a proposed action by the Council to meet the problem of negotiating an Austrian State Treaty. Secretary Hoover summarized this memorandum, and pointed out the acute importance of timing, since a working group was to leave for Vienna on Friday.⁶

At this point, Secretary Anderson handed to the Council a draft action on the Austrian Treaty negotiations which had been prepared in the Department of Defense.⁷ He stated that the Department of Defense did not disagree basically with the record of action proposed in the State Department memorandum. Nevertheless, he pointed out that the Austrian Treaty had been ten years in the making, and Defense felt that the step we were about to take was of the utmost significance. It was therefore regrettable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not had sufficient time to discuss thoroughly the military implications of the proposal for an Austrian Treaty made by the Soviet Union. Secretary Anderson went on to point out a number of military problems with which the Joint Chiefs were concerned: .…

Secretary Anderson concluded by suggesting the creation of a high-level State-Defense group to avoid any danger that the U.S. might be taken by surprise in the course of its negotiations for the Austrian Treaty. In summarizing the proposed action by the Department of Defense, Secretary Anderson said it called essentially for a reconsideration by the Council of the U.S. position on an Austrian Treaty one week from today. This interval would permit the Department of Defense to present the Council with its views on the military implications of the Treaty.

Secretary Hoover said that he must point out the speed with which the Secretary of State was obliged to move regarding this problem. This was unquestionably a crash area, and Secretary Dulles needed more authority to conduct negotiations than was permitted by the restrictions set forth in paragraph 16–d of NSC 164/1. After summarizing the State Department’s position with particular respect to the problem of timing, .…

. . . . . . .

As a final thought, the President indicated his belief that the Soviet gambit on Austria was definitely made with Germany in mind as the real target.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Noted and discussed the situation regarding the Austrian Treaty in the light of the memorandum submitted by the Department of State, dated April 21, 1955 and circulated at the meeting.⁸

c. Recognized that the United States could not afford to place itself in the position of alone blocking conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty.

d. Recommended that the Secretary of State be empowered to proceed with negotiation of an Austrian State Treaty on the general basis of the long draft Treaty and paragraph 16 of NSC 164/1; but with authority to depart therefrom as he deems necessary to avoid placing the U.S. in the position of blocking a treaty; and suggested that the Secretary of Defense make available to the Secretary of State his views regarding the defense aspects of the Treaty.

e. …

f. Recommended that the Secretary of State be authorized to explore with the British and the French possible methods of handling any request for a four-power guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of Austria.

g. Agreed that the Council should further consider the U.S. position regarding an Austrian State Treaty at its next meeting on April 28, 1955, including consideration at that time of the wisdom of the U.S. participating in a guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of Austria.⁹

Note: The actions in c, d, e, and f above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action.

[Here follows discussion of item 6, the status of NSC projects.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 22.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1914.
3. This Progress Report reviewed U.S. policy toward Austria for the period August 25, 1954–April 6, 1955. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 164 Series)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5603 Series)
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. Reference is to the U.S. Working Group on the Austrian Treaty which was to assist Thompson in preparing for the talks in Vienna.
7. Not found in Department of State files.
8. This memorandum reviewed the course of the discussions between the Soviet Union and Austria and proposed the several courses of actions approved by the Council under points c–g below. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5603 Series)
9. The texts of points c–g were transmitted to Thompson in telegram 2972, April 22. (Ibid., Central Files, 663.001/4–2255)