Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

320. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, November 3, 1955¹

Geneva, November 3, 1955.

USDel/MC/19

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Blankenhorn
• Dr. Grewe
• Mr. Boeker
• Mr. Kidd

SUBJECT

• German Reactions to Conference

After I had reported to the Germans on the Thursday Session,² Blankenhorn said that he would like to mention a few points arising out of a three hour visit with the Chancellor on Wednesday.

First, the Chancellor’s health continued to improve markedly, He was now recovering his strength and was looking forward to resuming a more active role again. He did not intend to leave his home for any period of convalescence.

Blankenhorn and the Chancellor discussed at length the foreign reactions to the successive events of the last couple of months (the Moscow visit, continued delay on German rearmament, and the Saar vote³), and were in agreement on the necessity of the German Government’s demonstrating more than ever its solidarity with the West in order to dispel the unfavorable reaction which these recent events had caused. The Chancellor was highly pleased with the Western Ministers’ handling of the Conference and of the German question. He supported it entirely, and thought that their presentation of the Western case had been effective.

However, with regard to the future, he continued to think of the necessity of some sort of European integration scheme in order to hold Germany firmly in its present path. His thinking had not yet crystalized into anything definite, but the idea of steps that might be taken towards some appropriate form of European union was still germinating. The Chancellor continued to believe that good Franco-German relations should be the keel of his policy. He wondered whether it would be possible for Pinay to meet him in Bonn, perhaps this week-end, to discuss the Conference, the most desirable way for the Conference to end, and plans for the future to enable the West to resume an initiative in the European field. (Blankenhorn said, for our entirely personal information, that the Chancellor had two things in mind in this: 1, that it would be good to discuss these matters with Pinay, and 2, that it would obviate any excuse for Brentano to go to Geneva. Brentano wishes to come to Geneva in order to demonstrate that the Germans were doing everything possible to keep the reunification alive. The Chancellor was not very keen about this, and thought it could only lead to confusion, especially if Brentano saw Molotov while in Geneva.) Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor had authorized him to contact Pinay directly about this, but he would not like to do it if it would meet with a refusal, and he thought Pinay might be much more susceptible to the idea if the Secretary should see a way of suggesting it.

Blankenhorn was very pleased at the appointment with the Secretary for 2:15 on Friday, and hoped that he might discuss the above matters with him.⁴

I took up with Blankenhorn the Handler article in the New York Times on November 3 (Tosecs 134 and 125⁵). He denied that there was any truth in this. He said that the German Delegation and the Chancellor had been more than pleased with the good liaison this time, which was incidentally going much more smoothly than at the first Geneva Conference. The Germans were most embarrassed about this article and greatly regretted it. Dr. Grewe had spoken over the impression of the close cooperation between the German Delegation and the other Western delegates, and Blankenhorn intended to do the same tonight. They also intend to speak with Handler and to do what they could do to correct the mischief of his article.

I mentioned to Blankenhorn the feelers which we had received about the desire of the socialists leaders, Ollenhauer and Wehner, to see the Secretary. I explained about the Secretary’s extremely heavy schedule, and said that Mr. Merchant would be prepared to see them if the appointment were made and they were accompanied by someone such as Dr. Grewe from the German Delegation. Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor would probably be upset, and would consider it no favor to him, if the Secretary saw these leaders of the opposition, particularly at Geneva, who would try to make political capital out of the fact that they were more energetic on behalf of German interests than the German Government. However, Blankenhorn said that he saw no harm at all, and that it might do some good, if Mr. Merchant would see them, particularly if he would do this with Dr. Grewe present. Moreover, this appeared to him in keeping with proper protocol, and would avoid any misimpression that the Socialists were working behind the Chancellor’s back.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret. Drafted by Kidd.
2. See supra.
3. On October 23, the inhabitants of the Saar voted against the Statute for the Saar, which had been agreed by France and the Federal Republic 1 year earlier. This vote defeated the Franco-German proposal for Europeanization of the Saar.
4. No other record of this appointment has been found in Department of State files.
5. Tosec 134 reported that the New York Times had carried a front-page story on November 2 stating that the West German Delegation at Geneva was dissatisfied with its relations with the Western powers, feeling that they were second-class allies. Tosec 125 reported that it was transmitting a summary of the article. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–255)