Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

315. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 3, 1955—noon.

1. Fifth meeting November 2 with Pinay presiding commenced by statements Western Ministers in which they emphasized that encouraging progress toward achieving common position European security made it all more desirable that Soviet Government now present its reunification proposals.² Macmillan pointed to improvements in second Soviet security proposal³ and noted indefinite postponement dissolution of NATO in this connection. Macmillan repeated warning Western powers did not intend dismantle NATO nor accept European security on basis divided Germany. Secretary reviewed similarity in approach between current Soviet security proposal and Western security plan⁴ indicating that both seek to deal with (a) renunciation use of force, (b) denying aid aggressor, (c) establishment substantial zone for agreed limitations forces and reciprocal inspections, (d) concept of consultation, (e) recognition inherent right collective self-defense and (f) concept that there should be reaction against aggression. Concept in Western proposals that foreign forces should be withdrawn on demand might be implied in third point Molotov’s exposition October 31 re exercise of sovereignties. Thus despite important remaining differences, Secretary said Ministers had made sufficient progress in security discussions to hope for eventual agreement on European security under terms Heads of Government Directive. Secretary said no further progress possible until we know Soviet views re closely linked problem German reunification by means free elections. Pinay underscored foregoing points emphasizing significance Molotov statement that Western proposals concerning limitation and control of forces and armaments deserved serious attention.

2. Molotov associated himself with Secretary’s statement re progress made on European security despite failure agree all matters.⁵ He repeated argument that denial Federal Republic and GDR opportunity appear at conference tantamount closing door on fruitful discussion of German problem. German problem in any event subordinate European security since only German solution consistent with security was one which prevented recurrence militarist German state. In commenting on Western security draft Molotov again raised questions whether it was applicable states bordering Germany and whether it would enter into force only simultaneously with integration united Germany in NATO.

3. Molotov then took up discussion German reunification by referring to GDR appeal. He stressed development different social systems Federal Republic and GDR and argued political economic and social achievements latter could not be sacrificed by “mechanical” merger to two states. He said Soviet Government favors free all-German elections and confident time will come for them. First necessary find ways rapprochement between two states within European security framework. Unified Germany should be free of obligations assumed earlier by either part Germany under existing military and political agreements with other countries and should give undertaking not enter any coalition or military alliance directed against other states. So far only GDR has agreed to this.

4. Molotov then made following proposal (not tabled). “As one of the steps the Soviet Government proposes that foreign troops be withdrawn from the territory of Germany and within their own national frontiers within a three months’ period with the retention in Germany of only restricted contingents. Furthermore, in the interests of European security and in order to bring about conditions favoring rapprochement between the two parts of Germany it should be possible to come to an arrangement by agreement with the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic on limiting the strength of their armed units. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, it will be recalled, has already expressed its willingness to come to an agreement with the Government of the German Federal Republic on that point.”

5. Molotov then tabled proposal for creation of all-German Council along lines suggested in GDR appeal published November 1 (text Soviet proposal being transmitted separate cable⁶). He argued that such Council would play important role in bringing together two German states in their cooperation with other countries particularly insofar as European security concerned. Council would “contribute to creating both external and internal prerequisites for settlement German problem.”

6. Secretary answered Molotov’s questions re Western security proposals by stating treaty would enter into force with reunification of Germany and that all-Germany government could accept or reject NATO membership.⁷ However parts of treaty could come into effect progressively at stages to be agreed. West willing discuss this with Soviet Government at appropriate time. With respect applicability treaty to border countries, Secretary said intent and effect Western proposals was that they benefit all European countries. Article 8 refers “armed attack any party not NATO member” and treaty area would embrace parts Poland and Czechoslovakia. Secretary expressed discouragement with what he hoped were only initial Soviet proposals re Germany since they were impractical and ignored Ministers’ responsibility under directive for German reunification by means free elections. He rejected Soviet argument that GDR social progress should be preserved at expense delayed German reunification by pointing out this strictly matter to be decided by Germans during campaign for and as result of free elections. Secretary urged Soviet Delegation submit proposal on free elections.

7. Pinay said Molotov’s statement that different social structures two Germanies stand in way of reunification would if taken literally seem to exclude all hope of reunification.⁸ On premise that ten years during which Germany divided have created situation which constitutes obstacle to reunification, Soviets paradoxically conclude that agreement should be reached which would have effect of prolonging German division further. Now that Western security proposals have removed external obstacles to reunification, Soviet Government has taken step backward and created internal obstacles. Aim appears to be impose economic, social and political structures of predetermined nature on all Germany. In a word this would be imposition on Germans of minority Communist dictatorship. We want whole German people manage their affairs under freely elected government.

8. Macmillan supported statements of Secretary and Pinay. He urged agreement on goal of united independent Germany free to determine its foreign and home policies and brought about by free elections. Like an elephant free elections hard to define but recognizable on sight. They can be easily recognized by one who is candidate in them and much more exciting than other forms since results not known in advance. Macmillan expressed hope that Molotov would have second thoughts on reunification coming closer to Western proposals as did second Soviet security plan.

9. In concluding statement of meeting Molotov gave defensive and repetitious series of arguments in support of all-German Council proposal. He expressed hope that after full study Western Ministers could bring their position closer to that of Soviet Government on German question.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the fifth Foreign Ministers meeting, which took place at 3 p.m., USDel/Verb/5 Corrected, November 2, and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/5 Corr. 1, November 2, are Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 573.
2. For texts of the statements of the three Western Foreign Ministers, circulated as MFM/DOC/26, 27, and 30, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 82–89.
3. For text of the Soviet security proposal, see Ibid., pp. 79–80, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 106–107.
4. For text of the Western security plan, submitted at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers on October 27, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 27–33, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 99–103.
5. For text of Molotov’s statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/29, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 89–97, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 43–49.
6. Secto 142 from Geneva, November 3, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355) For text of the Soviet proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/25, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 98–99, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 107–108.
7. For text of Secretary Dulles’ statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/28, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 99–102, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 49–51.
8. For text of Pinay’s statement, circulated as an undated press release, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 102–105, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 51–54.