Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

301. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State¹

Geneva, October 29, 1955—10 a.m.

Secto 70. At second session of Foreign Ministers this afternoon, Macmillan, in chair, opened discussion by speaking to Western proposals for reunification Germany and security tabled yesterday by Pinay.² In explaining Eden Plan, he emphasized need hold free elections soonest possible, thereby permitting participation German people in reunification. Emphasized freedom all-German Government assume or reject such international engagements its constituent parts as it considers wise. Said he was glad hear Molotov’s remarks yesterday that it is up to Germans themselves to organize their reunification. Only one way accomplish this, i.e., by free election representatives with genuine mandate from German people. Went on to say Soviets have argued creation reunified Germany free to ally itself with Western powers would create threat to Soviet security. We do not accept this view. NATO and WEU checks make impossible for Germany launch aggressive action. But since Soviets unable accept these assurances, agreed at summit to establish close link between European security and German reunification. Molotov yesterday asked for reliable guarantees German militarism will not again threaten Europe. If this all that stands between German people and their yearning for reunification and if this all that prevents ending of two Germanys, Macmillan believed West has devised plan bridge this gulf. Should be clear, however, West cannot dismantle its valuable arrangements for self-defense. In this connection, pointed out Soviets seemed to recognize own defensive arrangements necessary since nothing in Bulganin Plan³ to weaken comprehensive system bilateral military defense arrangements with Eastern European countries. Soviet proposal also deficient in failure provide for reunification Germany. Western powers have more satisfactory solution in mind, which Macmillan then proceeded explain. Urgently commended documents to serious consideration Soviet Government, emphasizing sincerity with which put forward.

Molotov spoke next,⁴ pointing out European security and Germany joined together, but conference should not forget directive places European security first, which also reflects substance of matter since problem has decisive importance all European nations. Said quadripartite agreements during and since war have emphasized need prevent revival German militarism. Any attempt minimize importance of this as principal problem cannot be justified. Must prevent Europe again being drawn into conflagration with resultant spread to other areas. Both world wars preceded by formation European military groupings. Way to peaceful life for Europe not through such groupings but through joint action all European nations in interest peace. Then recalled proposal tabled by Soviets at summit which had not been commented on by Western powers. He hoped this would be remedied at this meeting. In view apprehensions Western powers re liquidation existing military groupings, Soviets have proposed establishment collective security in two stages, during first of which groupings would remain in existence. Believe this should facilitate agreement. Also has advantage testing in action in first stage system based on joint efforts all European states to maintain peace. Idea of collective security widely supported not only in Europe but in other countries of the world. Ever-increasing number of countries are condemning policy of building up military blocs as they realize this increases danger of new war. This true of number of Asian, as well as European countries, which regard attempts draw them into military groupings as threat their security and national independence. Moreover, military groupings lead to armaments race. In ’48–’49 budget year, direct United States military expenditure amounted 33 percent Federal Budget but 69 percent for 1953/54. In same period, UK military expenditures rose from 24 to 38 percent. In France, military expenditures rose from 24 percent in 1949 to 33 percent in 1954. Paris agreements⁵ compelled Soviet Union make greater effort secure its defenses and in 1955 military expenditures therefor constituted about 20 percent all budget expenditure. Danger of armaments race emphasized by production and stockpiling nuclear weapons, despite increasing popular demands prohibit such weapons. Conclusion treaty along lines Soviet proposal would facilitate settlement other international problems through setting up effective system European security and through gradual rapprochement between two German states. Would serve create prerequisites for Germany’s development as peaceful country. Soviet Delegation will make appropriate proposals on German problem at appropriate stage of conference. At that time, should consider question of participation representatives both German states in conference discussion. Then addressed himself to Western proposals, welcoming fact that western powers thought it necessary propose not only German problem but also problem of European security. Some provisions of Western proposals require further discussion and Soviets would study them attentively. Nevertheless, certain observations seemed in order. Then maintained formulation of proposal does not correspond directive from Heads of Government which placed European security before German reunification. Said one gets impression that Western proposals would make situation in Europe even more acute and increase tension by strengthening existing military groupings in Europe. Proposals are inconsistent with provisions in Eden Plan for free elections,⁶ since they decide now, irrespective what German people may say at those elections, that United Germany must become member Western European military groupings. Restrictions on armament and controls do not under existing Western agreements represent brake on present unrestrained armaments race. All this shows that acceptance Western proposals would mean Soviet Union would contribute to revival German militarism in turning over to it all of Germany. No one can really expect that. Nor does Eden Plan correspond purpose of holding genuinely free all-German elections. Soviets do not refuse consideration any proposals really designed create genuine security in Europe and will do their best facilitate agreement that important problem. Then tabled again the paper entitled “General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe” which Bulganin tabled in Geneva last July 20.

After recess, Secretary spoke in support Western proposals and rebuttal of Molotov’s remarks. Full text carried by USIA.⁷

Pinay ended today’s debate by emphasizing urgency reunification Germany and addition to security which would result if Germany integrated in Western defensive alliances which bring security to all states and which, if they had existed in 1939, would have obviated Second World War.⁸ NATO and WEU not simply military alliances but provide for consultation and collaboration on all planes government activity. Western proposals would meet any legitimate concern Soviets may have and Pinay earnestly commended them Soviets careful consideration, emphasizing historic nature of commitments which US has indicated willingness undertake in Europe.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2955. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, and Bonn. Passed to Defense. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the second meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which took place at 4 p.m., USDEL/Verb/2 Corrected, October 28, and the record of decisions for the meeting, MFM/DOC/RD/2, October 28, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 568.
2. For text of Macmillan’s statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/12, and the Western proposal on German reunification and European security, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 27–37, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 10–13 and 99–103. Regarding the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers, see Document 298.
3. Document 251.
4. For text of Molotov’s statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/9, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 38–45, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 13–18.
5. For texts of the Paris Agreements, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.
6. For text of the original Eden Plan, see FPM(54)17, January 29, 1954, ibid., vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1177.
7. For text of Dulles’ statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/10, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 48–52, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 18–21.
8. For text of Pinay’s statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/11, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 52–55, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 21–23.