28. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State1
2338. Must confess to strong feeling of resentment at Austrian action in Moscow. Figl’s protestations that delegation committed themselves as individuals is pure sophistry in view fact Raab and Schaerf leaders not only government but also coalition parties. Believe it would be impossible for us refuse to sign treaty which will be so much better than one we were prepared conclude at Berlin. Since Austrian declaration neutrality will be made after ratification we will scarcely be in position to object. We can of course refuse guarantee such neutral status but will have to respect it. Would seem that only point on which we have real freedom of choice is that of guarantee of Austrian integrity. Although Schaerf believes we can avoid this, Soviets will be on strong ground in pressing for at least guarantee against Anschluss and I would suspect Soviets would be capable of refusing conclude treaty unless we agree. Believe West German commitment would be minimum requirement to achieve treaty. I am inclined think however that in end we are likely have choice only between guarantee against Anschluss or guarantee Austrian integrity [Page 46] particularly as Ambassador Bohlen has pointed out there exists danger of unilateral Soviet guarantee. As between two I am now inclined favor guarantee against Anschluss in view of position Austrians have taken on neutrality. A guarantee of integrity would tend to reenforce Austria’s neutral position and it would be difficult if not impossible to limit it in time whereas a guarantee against Anschluss can certainly be limited. While on one hand our refusal to guarantee Austrian integrity might make Austrians more amenable to Soviet pressure, by same token they would have to consider effect their actions upon our willingness to assist them in resisting any threat their sovereignty. While guarantee against Anschluss might strengthen legal basis for Soviet intervention, such basis already exists by virtue Article IV and as already suggested believe we could lessen dangers of guarantee by reference to United Nations.
In event Department should consider we would in end be prepared give guarantee against Anschluss suggest we do so without first stirring up Germans by asking for commitment from them.
While believe to some extent Raab and some members of his party will be prepared yield to Soviet pressure in such matters as East-West trade controls do not believe Austrians will go far in this direction and think that Austrian sympathies and interests will continue to be closely linked to West. Soviet leaders indicated they did not care what action Austrian Government took against Austrian Communists (other than commitment against USIA employees) and this callous disregard of their supporters will doubtless further weaken their relatively insignificant Communist strength in Austria. Austrians have shown themselves to be assertive of their rights even in face of 40,000 occupation troops and I do not believe that Austrian Government will be less independent when occupying troops leave. Without base of large and active Communist Party do not believe Soviet subversion of Austria is possibility and would doubt that importance of Austria would ever justify overt Soviet intervention. Settlement as now shaping up is to my mind desirable alternative to breakdown of negotiations although regret that Austrians did not leave us more freedom to press for better solution.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1855. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.↩