259. Memorandum of Discussion at the 256th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 28, 19551
[Here follows a list of participants.]
1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Indonesia and the Philippines.]
. . . . . . .
The President then told what took place following his statement calling for the exchange of blueprints and mutual aerial reconnaissance. Bulganin, who was Chairman, indicated that the USSR would study the U.S. proposal. The meeting then adjourned and the delegates gathered in the buffet. Khrushchev approached the President and said he did not agree with the Chairman (i.e., Bulganin) because he believed the President’s proposal was impractical and primarily a propaganda move. Khrushchev asked the President to accept the Soviets’ inspection plan of May 10. The President replied that he was prepared to take the Soviet plan if the Soviets would take the U.S. proposal. Khrushchev made no reply, and “ran out”. The next day Khrushchev stated to a group, including the President, that there were always people at a conference who made proposals, in the full knowledge that such proposals would be turned down, only to gain a propaganda advantage. The President said he looked Khrushchev directly in the eye and said, “Take me up on my proposal.” Khrushchev’s response was to say that his generalization did not, of course, include the President or refer to the President’s proposal. [Page 530] These two incidents, in the President’s opinion, revealed a difference among the Soviet delegates, some of whom apparently accepted the U.S. suggestion as a serious proposal.
The Director of Central Intelligence called to the President’s attention the concern that he and Mr. Streibert shared regarding the effect of the Geneva Conference in the European satellites. He said that “run-away” hope before the Conference had been followed by a let-down in the Soviet-controlled satellites.
Mr. Streibert called attention to the informal Soviet statements alleging that there was no International Communist Movement and that the Communist parties were indigenous. He said our propaganda media would either have to reject these statements and continue attacks on the International Communist Movement as a conspiracy directed from Moscow, or halt this type of propaganda.
The President said this situation should be given careful study. After consideration of the study by the Secretary of State and by himself, any necessary policy changes could be made.
The National Security Council:
- a.
- Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence, with specific reference to political developments in Indonesia and the Philippines; the status of Soviet military assistance to the Chinese Communists; foreign reactions to the President’s Geneva proposals for exchange of blueprints and mutual aerial photography; and probably reactions in the satellites, particularly East Germany, to the Geneva Conference.
- b.
- Noted the President’s request that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, U.S. Information Agency, prepare, on an urgent basis for consideration by the Operations Coordinating Board, a study on the psychological implications arising out of the Geneva Conference as they affect U.S. information programs relating to the European satellites and the International Communist Movement.
Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director, U.S. Information Agency, and the Operations Coordinating Board.
2. Report on the Four-Power Conference
Mr. Dillon Anderson recalled to the President and to the Secretary of State expressed willingness to report to the Council on the Geneva Conference.
The President said he believed he had already stated everything that would be helpful or that had not already been heard by those present.
Secretary Dulles began his report by summarizing the Geneva developments relating to Germany and European security. He said the Soviet leaders were not eager to talk about German unification. [Page 531] They revealed they are prepared to see two sovereign German states continue indefinitely, both to be members along with other states, of an European security arrangement. He said the Russians tried to force the West to accept in the Directive2 the following order: (1) security, (2) disarmament, and (3) German unification. The Russians finally agreed on the following wording in the Directive: “… taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security.”3 Secretary Dulles added that Soviet policy positions will probably only become known at the October Foreign Ministers meeting.
Secretary Dulles said all members of the U.S. Delegation had tried to get the Soviet leaders to state why they feared the unification of Germany—did they fear the twelve German divisions now planned, or did they fear NATO armies on a Soviet frontier? The Russians were told that the West was prepared to reassure the Soviets if they were fearful of German aggression or the revival of German militarism. Our Delegation was unable to get any response from the Russians. Secretary Dulles concluded that the Russians did not really fear German rearmament or German military power, but were afraid that any course of action leading to the eventual liquidation of the East German Government would upset their satellite system. Secretary Dulles cited present uneasiness in the satellites as an indication that the liquidation of East Germany now would bring about the situation which the Russians feared.
Secretary Dulles said he would be greatly surprised if the Soviets presented Adenauer with a serious offer of German unification during the Chancellor’s trip to Moscow in September.
The Secretary said the West must keep pressing the German unification issue. He predicted, but did not wish to be held to his prediction, that we might get unification in the next two years.
Secretary Dulles said that prior to the October meeting in Geneva, the West should agree on a concrete plan for German unification, including precise provisions, dates, etc. This plan would be put on the table in order to keep pressing the Russians to accept German unification. At the same time, the West should present a European security plan containing the general terms of a security treaty which would become effective only when a united Germany had signed it. The Secretary recognized there would be major difficulties within our own Government and with our allies in arriving at the kind of specific proposals which he had in mind. He felt, however, that the West should keep the initiative which it now has on the [Page 532] German unification issue, and make it as difficult as possible for the Soviets to oppose unification.
Secretary Dulles then reviewed the developments in Geneva with regard to the control of armaments.
The first problem, he said, arose over our desire to avoid reference in the Directive to the Russian proposal to ban the bomb. Both the British and French stated they were not in a position to oppose inclusion of the bomb prohibition. Our Delegation, however, succeeded in keeping the bomb prohibition out without public notice, which could have been awkward for the U.S., particularly if we had been the only power among the four to have opposed its inclusion. Secretary Dulles indicated that we now had time to prepare public opinion so that our opposition to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be used to attack us as being opposed to disarmament.
Secretary Dulles then referred to the President’s proposal on exchange of blueprints and mutual aerial reconnaissance.4 He said the President convinced the Conference that the proposal was not a mere propaganda move. The Secretary added that although the proposal was dramatic, it was also a serious means of initiating a program of disarmament.
Secretary Dulles stated his belief that no state would initiate nuclear war unless it was certain that it would not be destroyed by a nuclear retaliatory blow. He said the President’s plan could prevent nuclear war by making a surprise attack impossible. Secretary Dulles stated that the number of reconnaissance planes involved might be relatively few. He made this point in rebutting an argument against the plan held by Senator Knowland, who envisages hundreds of Soviet planes over the United States dropping nuclear bombs simultaneously during their “peaceful” reconnaissance.
Secretary Dulles urged that we not follow up on the President’s plan as if it were a propaganda stunt. He urged that it be handled seriously, and suggested that a specific note, elaborating additional details of the plan, be sent to the USSR. He indicated that we should not belabor the Soviets for not accepting the plan at least for a month.
Governor Stassen interrupted to say that his task force was already at work developing the plan and drafting an appropriate note. He added that it should be made clear that the exchange of nuclear weapons design was not involved in the President’s plan.
The President commented that of course nuclear weapons designs were not involved. He said the purpose of the plan was to end the possibility of massive surprise attack. The President said Khrushchev [Page 533] attacked the U.S. proposal on the ground that it had nothing to do with the reduction of arms. The President said he replied that the U.S. plan would ease international tensions and, in the resulting improved political climate, reduction of arms.
Secretary Dulles stated that the Soviets may seriously want to reduce the economic burden of armaments in order to divert Soviet resources to consumer goods.
Secretary Wilson stated that the essence of any disarmament plan is inspection, adding that the President’s plan was a practical beginning of inspection. In addition, the plan would reduce fear, because states would know the location of potential enemy forces.
The President noted that we had wanted to include in the Geneva Directive a special directive to the UN to concentrate on the inspection problem but had given in to Soviet objections in order to get the statement in the Directive linking German unification to the problem of European security. The President said he had told Khrushchev that the Soviet plan covering inspection at ports and airports was impractical because of the large number of inspectors required. He said Khrushchev replied that the Soviet plan aimed at revealing any forward movement of national forces. The President pointed out that Khrushchev’s reply indicated that the Russians were preoccupied with land warfare and with the movement of large bodies of armed men. He suggested that we should keep pushing the U.S. proposal, even to the extent of accepting some of the Soviet inspection proposals if necessary.
Secretary Dulles stated that the magnitude of the issues discussed at the Conference was best revealed by the fact that the Soviet announcement of its intention to join the International Atomic Energy Agency was all but forgotten. He pointed out that the Russians had decided to join after nearly two years of efforts to persuade them to do so. The Soviet decision is important, even though it was buried by other Geneva issues. Although not publicly announced, the USSR has agreed to contribute to the International Agency 50 kilograms of fissionable material as “an appropriate amount”. The UK has agreed to contribute 20 kilograms, probably plutonium. The U.S. first offered 200 kilograms, and later doubled this amount. Secretary Dulles wondered whether any meaning could be attached to the USSR contribution of 50 kilograms as an “appropriate” amount, when they knew that the U.S. had contributed 200 kilograms.…
Secretary Dulles said the question of developing contacts between East and West was dealt with so briefly that it was not possible to discover how the Russians really felt about this issue. He said the language in the Directive was drafted by the U.S. and accepted on the last day of the meeting without debate, possibly as a Soviet gesture of good will to overcome impressions of intransigeance created [Page 534] dining the debate earlier that afternoon. He said our Delegation stressed the issue of free communications—information, books, etc.—but that the Russians, in their personal conversations with members of our Delegation, stressed the desirability of exchange of people.
Secretary Dulles said the reference to “peaceful trade” in the Directive was an attempt to deal with the trade problem while avoiding the subject of restrictions on trade in strategic items.
Secretary Dulles recalled that one of the serious differences between the West and the USSR involved Soviet insistence that further discussions on disarmament be handled by and controlled by the four Foreign Ministers. He said the Russians finally gave in to Western insistence that further discussions on disarmament be held within the UN framework.
With reference to Soviet control of the European satellites, Secretary Dulles said our Delegation made very clear to the Russians that Soviet treatment of the satellites would be to us a barometer indicating their real intentions. Our Delegation had numerous opportunities to tell the Russians that good relations between the USSR and the U.S. could never be achieved unless the Russians relaxed their control over the satellites.
With regard to the issue of international Communism, Secretary Dulles said the Russians maintained in their private conversations that Communism was an internal matter in each state and not internationally controlled, that there had been no meeting of the Cominform for years, and that the West was beating a dead horse when it continued to attack “international Communism”.
In summary, Secretary Dulles said the Geneva meeting was very much on the plus side for the West; that the USSR had been put on the defensive. This result, he added, was not achieved without cost. The cost was the breaking down or the blurring of the moral barrier between the Soviet bloc and the free world. As a result, he said, we must re-think our basic strategy in order to meet this new situation.
As evidence of the different situation which we will face in the post-Geneva period, Secretary Dulles referred to a statement by Tito to the effect that because the danger of war had practically disappeared, further U.S. military equipment was not essential to Yugoslavia, in effect inviting the U.S. to halt shipment of equipment to Yugoslavia. Secretary Dulles referred to the lessened sense of danger of global war and the new impetus given to neutralism. The effect on United States strategy would be that we would no longer be able to use the same policies and expect to get the same results—that there would be less dependence in other countries on U.S. military aid, that we could place less dependence on alliances.
Secretary Dulles urged that fundamental review of our policies be made so that we can deal with foreign countries in ways which [Page 535] are responsive to the new situation. He cited specifically our policy toward the satellites, Asia, and the Middle East.
Secretary Dulles concluded that the new situation was not brought about solely by the Geneva meeting, and would have taken place even if there had been no meeting. He added that we never wanted to go to Geneva, but that the pressure of people of the world forced us to do.
The President said he agreed with Secretary Dulles’ conclusions but not with his premise. The President said that Geneva was our recognition of the fact that a blurring of the distinction between the USSR and the free world was taking place. The purpose of the Geneva meeting was to correct the false picture of the U.S. which many people had come to accept in the months preceding the meeting.
Secretary Dulles said that this was exactly what he had meant to convey.
The National Security Council:
Noted oral reports by the President and the Secretary of State on developments at the recent Four-Power meeting, with particular reference to their relation to national security policies.
[Here follows discussion of item 3, “Report on the ICBM Program”.]
Senior Member NSC Special Staff
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith on July 29.↩
- Document 257.↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
- See Document 221.↩