Office of the Historian
  1. Home
  2. Historical Documents
  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V
  4. Document 192

192. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State 1

Geneva , July 19, 1955—11 a.m.

Dulte 22. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Following is my impression based upon developments up to 10 a.m. Tuesday, [Page 382] including particularly Bulganin’s speech2 and President’s dinner for Soviet Delegation last night.3

1.
There seems overwhelming desire on part of Soviet Delegation to create atmosphere of friendliness and good will. There is fraternization all along the line from Bulganin down to the lowest security officer. Obviously this is not spontaneous but in accordance with a well disciplined plan. That, however, does not necessarily prove that it is without significance.
2.
I was particularly struck last night by the approaches made to me personally. It was to have been expected that there would be enthusiastic good will expressed toward President Eisenhower. However in addition Bulganin went out of his way to be friendly to me, recalling our brief meeting in Moscow in 1947 and his desire to get better acquainted and his statement that I was not nearly as bad as I had been represented. Also Molotov obviously through prearrangement spoke promptly after Bulganin’s toast, offering a toast to me and walking around the table to touch glasses with me.
3.
The Bulganin statement was clearly designed to be moderate in tone. Three matters which Molotov had indicated would be brought up were left out; namely (a) world economic conference (b) implementation of action against war propaganda and (c) six power Far Eastern conference. The treatment of Germany was very evasive and obviously designed to bury German unification under a mass of prerequisites. However, the statement avoided a direct collision.
4.
The common denominator of the speeches is as anticipated (a) German unification (b) European security (c) disarmament, although Soviets would reverse order of first two items.
5.
We are working in close cooperation with the UK but cooperation with French is difficult because of sharp rivalries between Faure and Pinay, and tendency of former to freewheel.
Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1955. Secret; Niact.↩
  2. See Document 184.↩
  3. See Documents 188–190.↩