Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

18. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State¹

Vienna, April 2, 1955—6 p.m.

2201. Gruber informs me that he believes Austrian Delegation is aware of the dangers of the Moscow visit and will take firm position.² He tells me that following my talk with Kreisky³ latter changed his position radically and strongly supported Gruber’s position. I am nevertheless worried by what I believe to be line of Raab’s thinking. I understand that he believes if Austria does not achieve treaty on this round she will probably end up by being partitioned. Soviets can hold out prospect of concessions, particularly in economic field which will be attractive to him. Raab also has ambitions to be the man who got the Russians out of Austria and believes that even if he has to pay too high a price, he can later renege on his agreements. Moreover there are good indications that he still distrusts Gruber and may not be convinced that he accurately reflects the US position. Unless the Department perceives objection I should like to see him alone subsequent to the tripartite approach⁴ and in addition endeavor probe his thinking, to make following points:

1. US position not crystallized and in any event must be concerted with British and French. Moreover we can not take firm position until extent Soviet demands are known. May be useful to him however for indication of our current line of thinking and preoccupations.

2. Would endeavor convince him that US genuinely interested in achieving Austrian Treaty now.

3. We are fully prepared to respect Austrian decision not participate in alliances or allow bases. Form in which such undertaking given and extent of Western underwriting is however tricky business and must be considered in relationship to rest of settlement Austrian question. Would explain we see important distinction between military neutrality and political and economic neutrality.

4. While we would probably be prepared to make clear we will continue to support Austrian efforts to defend herself against Soviet attempts at domination, he must not assume we could agree to anything approaching neutralization nor, in view of the terms the Soviet Union seeks to impose upon Austria, to a formal guarantee of her frontiers.

In discussing part 3 I could refer to our concern at his speech⁵ which he would take in better part if not made in front of other HICOMs. I have already expressed concern to Figl on this point on personal basis and Gruber tells me Raab realizes that he made a slip which was unintentional.

I could of course balance my talk with Kreisky by seeing Figl but believe he has little influence on Raab and is not certain to get the matter straight.⁶

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–255. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.
2. In telegram 2191 from Vienna, April 1, Thompson reported that Figl and Kreisky had made similar statements to the Western High Commissioners. (Ibid., 663.001/4–155)
3. See Document 16.
4. See Document 20.
5. Regarding Raab’s radio address of March 20, see footnote 4, Document 10.
6. On April 5 Thompson reported that in view of Raab’s “flat statement” on that day that Austria would make no commitments at Moscow, he would not make the approach outlined in this telegram. (Telegram 2226 from Vienna; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4-555)