161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Paris Working Group1

105. Embtel 1252 considered by Secretary at meeting today with Anderson and Radford participating.3 Following represents consensus meeting:

U.S. element Working Group able handling German presentation and subsequent discussion noted. Although we hope restrict Summit meeting to identification of issues and methods for dealing with them, we nevertheless face strong likelihood some more substantive discussion in deference views our allies, particularly Germans. Naturally we wish minimize such discussion. We particularly note in this connection Blankenhorn without instructions and would like to know whether his views accurately reflect those of Adenauer. Any further information this point will be appreciated.4

Following are Department’s specific comments and desired changes in French draft text taking into account Working Group’s comments:

Preamble deals essentially with tactics which can be left to FonMins in Paris.

  • Para 1. Insert “of Germany” after first mention of “reunification”.
  • Para 2. No change.
  • Para 3. Substitute following for present text: “A reunified Germany must have the inherent right to associate itself with others for collective self-defense”. Comment: Purpose change is to make clear necessity from Western point of view of German freedom to elect to retain present alliances.
  • Para 4. Substitute following for present text: “The existing collective security arrangements of the Western Powers will be continued. They are so framed as to render impossible their abuse by any member and thus provide security not only for the member powers but non-members as well.” Comment: U.S. does not desire recognize any requirement for Warsaw Pact nor any other Eastern security organization [Page 316]which does not constitute voluntary association of free states on basis of equality.
  • Para 5. Substitute following for present text: “These security arrangements are no obstacle to consideration of the legitimate needs of Soviet security, on a basis compatible with the security interests of all countries concerned.” Comment: We desire avoid implication in French text that present Western security strong while Soviet security deficient and hence West could afford permit increase in Soviet security to meet Western level.
  • Para 6. Substitute following for present text: “The security of the Soviets is already assured by the dispositions taken under the Paris Accords with respect to matters concerning the non-recourse to force, troop levels, and armaments.” Comment: Since substance para 6(a) present French text refers to present security arrangements not related to German reunification, we believe it should stand by itself and provide bridge for thoughts contained paras 5 and 7.
  • Para 7. New paragraph which would read as follows: “In achieving German reunification under conditions compatible with the security of all, the Western Powers would consider with the USSR the exchanging of supplementary assurances which might reinforce those of the Paris Accords and provide for the more effective implementation of the United Nations Charter with respect to non-recourse to force and withdrawal of assistance to an aggressor.” Comments: (a) For constitutional reasons, we wish avoid words “guarantees” and “juridical guarantees” in present French draft, (b) Since nature and extent of any assurances we could extend would obviously depend at least in part on how Germans opt with respect to continuation their present alliances, we attach importance to relating any additional assurances to the Soviets to the situation which obtains upon reunification. This does not mean that we could not discuss such assurances with the Soviets prior to the achievement of German reunification and exercise of its option. It does mean, however, that the formalization of any such assurances should not take place until their context is clear, (c) Any new assurances should clearly be within the framework of existing commitments, i.e., Paris Accords and UN Charter, (d) In particular, Department opposed to 6(c) of French draft for reasons stated in Comment on para 4 above.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–955. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Palmer, cleared with MacArthur, and signed for the Secretary of State by Merchant.
  2. Document 158.
  3. No further record of this conversation was found in Department of State files.
  4. Blankenhorn reported that at a restricted session on July 11 he discussed the German presentation with Adenauer and Hallstein who were both in accord with the ideas expressed in telegram 125. (Telegram 154 from Paris, July 12; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1255)