134. Letter From the Chairman of the Quantico Vulnerabilities
Panel (Rostow) to the President’s
Special Assistant (Rockefeller)1
Quantico
,
June 10,
1955
.
Dear Mr.
Rockefeller
: At your invitation, a group of
eleven persons knowledgeable in many fields important to the
American-Soviet struggle, have met as a Panel at Quantico, Virginia,
from 5–10 June, to explore methods of exploiting Communist bloc
vulnerabilities at this crucial state of world affairs. As your
designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I am herewith
transmitting the reports and recommendations of our group.
All of us appreciate the freedom of action you gave us to develop our
own guidelines of investigation. We soon discovered that several
significant vulnerabilities could be identified and that fruitful
courses of action could be developed only if we looked at the total
political and security problems facing the U.S. at this
juncture.
We have no expectation that we have produced either a magic formula
for positive U.S. action or a substitute for the staff
considerations currently under way in the responsible Government
Departments. We offer these recommendations and the papers that
underlie them as a supplement to those considerations. It is our
hope that responsible officials will find our efforts constructive
and that use can be made of the many concrete suggestions included
in the Panel results.
The over-all report of the Panel and its four appendices represent a
general group consensus.2 We had neither the time nor the data to
make, as individuals, definitive commitments of judgment on all the
recommendations and on every line of text. But we forwarded these
documents confident that they deserve serious consideration by the
Government. We are also submitting ten papers prepared by individual
Panel members. Many ideas from them have found their way into our
joint recommendations; but time did not permit the Panel to evaluate
the texts fully. I personally deem them an extremely interesting
product of the week’s work.
All of us appreciate the contributions made by governmental
representatives toward this Panel and, in particular, the willing
help of the responsible officials from your office, the Departments
of [Page 217] State and Defense, of
CIA, USIA, NSC, and OCB, who took of their precious time to
join us periodically in our discussions.
The one impression which stands out in my mind is the unanimous
belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now enjoys a significant
but transitory period of over-all strength vis-à-vis the Soviet
bloc. The next two or three years afford the United States the
opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine
concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of essential positions of
strength. Such negotiation, along with a vigorous and urgent
development of potential Free World strength, could create the
conditions for victory in the cold war.
May I express our appreciation for having had this opportunity to
serve.
- Dr. Frederick Dunn
- Director, Center of International Studies
- Mr. CD. Jackson
3
-
Time Life
- Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
- Director, Operations Research Office
- Dr. Paul Linebarger
- School of Advanced International Studies
- Dr. Max Millikan
- Center of International Studies, MIT
- Dr. Philip Mosely
- Director, Russian Institute
- Dr. George Pettee
- Deputy Director, Operations Research Office
- Dr. Stefan Possony
- Air Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Air
Force
- Dr. Hans Speier
- Rand Corporation
- Dr. Charles A.H. Thomson
- Brookings Institution
W.W.
Rostow
(Center of
International Studies, MIT)
[Page 218]
[Attachment]
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES
PANEL
Purpose. This report (1) makes
recommendations regarding operational positions and actions the
U.S. might take vis-à-vis the USSR (as for example at the coming
round of East-West conferences) that will permit the
exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) offers
suggestions for related actions advantageous to the U.S.
The Panel assessed the current strengths and weaknesses of the
Soviet Bloc and the Free World. It concluded that the next
several years afford the United States the opportunity to act
from a strong position and to exact from the enemy genuine
concessions without sacrifice of deterrent strength by us. A
full exploitation of the enemy’s transitory position of relative
weakness and the Free World’s actual and potential foundations
for strength requires a wide range of U.S. initiatives and
actions which transcend the area of negotiation with the Soviet
Union.
Recommendations
In the light of this assessment we develop in our submissions a
strategy and a broad tactical line for the forthcoming
conferences and we submit the following specific
recommendations:
A. Actions Prior to the
Conference.
- 1.
- The United States should insist that the Soviets lift the
Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.
- 2.
- Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK, and to
France, that they should be prepared to exchange
ratifications of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the
conference.
B. Actions During the
Conference.
- 1.
- The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments.
These include:
- a.
- Discussions of:
- (1)
- A proposed agreement for mutual inspection
of military installations, forces, and armaments,
without limitations provisions.
- (2)
- A convention insuring the right of aircraft
of any nationality to fly over the territory of
any country for peaceful purposes. (Proposed with
reservations noted in the text.)
- b.
- Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR; after
rejection of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort
to win the arms race as the safest way of forcing
the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms
convention.
- 2.
- The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals concerning exchange of persons, information and
goods, covering:
- a.
- An agreement for the expansion of East-West
trade.
- b.
- An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of
persons to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful
purposes.
- c.
- A convention providing for free and unhampered
international communications for the exchange of
information and ideas, conditioned on conclusion of
an anti-jamming agreement.
- d.
- Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic
energy and a world-wide fund for cooperative
economic development of the underdeveloped
areas.
- 3.
- The United States should pursue the following sequence in
dealing with German matters:
- a.
- Rapid implementation of rearmament
provisions.
- b.
- Proper conditions for free elections.
- c.
- Free elections.
- d.
- Unification of government.
- e.
- Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining
Germany’s international status.
- f.
- Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany
has reemerged as a strong military power and has
become an integral part of NATO. If Germany abstains from joining
NATO, she should
be permitted to rearm to a level sufficient to meet
her security needs.
- 4.
- The United States should take the following actions to
bring about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and
to worsen difficulties between the Soviet Union and Red
China:
- a.
- Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping
alliance.
- b.
- Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at
the conference.
- c.
- At least once during the conference, the
Department of State should obtain for the President
the advice of the Japanese Government on a specific
Far Eastern point at issue in the conference.
C. Actions Outside of the
Conference.
Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or
subsequent to it, the United States should take the following
actions:
- 1.
- General:
- a.
- Propose an international scientific conference
of all powers producing atomic weapons on the
problem of reducing the danger of radioactive
fallout.
- b.
- The United States should convene at an early
date an exploratory conference to discuss
implementation of the economic and other
non-military provisions of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
- c.
- Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great
power and treat her as a diplomatic equal in
developing Far Eastern policy.
- 2.
- In relation to Europe, the United States should:
- a.
- Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria,
Rumania, and Hungary, and the provisions of other
wartime and postwar agreements relating to the
limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding
inspection to determine compliance with the
limitations of these agreements.
- b.
- Take early and forceful steps to assure
improved air defense, passive and active, for our
European allies.
- c.
- Seek the establishment, organization and
support of research and development in the NATO countries on an
ambitious scale.
- d.
- Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing
the flow of necessary technical intelligence to
European scientists working in behalf of a Free
World.
- e.
- Request SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find
tactical solutions to NATO defense which minimize the
possibilities of civilian casualties.
- f.
- Explore seriously concrete recommendations
designed to reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning
atomic weapons.
- g.
- Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for
accelerated economic growth in the underdeveloped
countries of the Free World.
- 3.
- In relation to Asia, the United States should:
- a.
- Greatly increase the flow of investment
resources to the underdeveloped countries,
including Japan, South Asia and Southeast
Asia.
- b.
- Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that
its good relations in the South and Southeast Asia
are a matter of interest to the U.S. U.S.
diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should
openly sponsor informal news and cultural
connections there.
- c.
- Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and
willing to deal by means short of major war, with
Communist military aggression.
- d.
- Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern
Vietnam.
- e.
- In order to convert a major Free World problem
into an asset, launch a positive U.S. political
and economic program for Formosa.
