112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris1

Tedul 7. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. I discussed your Dulte 122 with the President this morning. He shares your apprehensions regarding the extreme eagerness of UK and France for the four power talks at heads of state level without, apparently, any substantive objectives, and especially their theory that a miracle can be brought about without any concrete ideas of how it can be done.

During the discussion I asked him if he thought it would not be desirable to obtain as firm commitments as possible from the British and French regarding procedure and substance of such a meeting, if it were held, before the US committed itself to attendance. This would be especially true if no agenda had been agreed upon in advance. One example, for instance, might be a commitment that nothing would be done which could be regarded as an indication of our approval of, or our readiness to approve, the status quo of Eastern Europe or our abandonment of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. I said that such commitments might prove even more necessary if UK election should result in a new Cabinet. The President agreed fully.

In this connection the President wondered what your reaction might be to his earlier suggestion that the Vice President could head the US delegation. He felt the latter might be more nearly on the same level with some of the Prime Ministers who would be attending. I offered no comment, as I was unaware that such a proposal [Page 178] had been considered, though on second thought I can see many reasons why it would be most difficult to sell the idea to the other participants.

While I found the President fully shared your concern about (a) the lack of constructive results that might ensue from such a meeting, (b) the liability to us of raising false hopes in many areas, and (c) the risk of having the other three powers combining, either deliberately or inadvertently, to place us in a series of difficult positions, he nevertheless gave me the impression that some sort of meeting would still probably be necessary. I feel sure that he would be greatly guided by your advice as a result of your meetings in Paris. In this regard, I think that his reference to the Vice President is significant.

(Due to delay your Dulte 133 has just been delivered (4 pm Washington time), subsequent to drafting above cable, and President has not yet seen.)

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–955. Top Secret; Niact
  2. Document 110.
  3. Supra.