Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

101. Telegram From the Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State¹

London, April 30, 1955—4 p.m.

4835. From Beam. Following report on trends in London working group may be useful in preparing Secretary for participation Ministerial meeting.

Recommendations will probably deal mainly with procedures and nature of approach to Soviets for conference. French and British stress three governments committed by last weekend agreement with French to alleged effect invitation will be addressed to Soviets immediately after Paris Ministerial meeting and probably before signature Austrian Treaty. We have agreed this might be desirable forestall Soviet initiative, but Ministers must be left free decision in light Austrian and other developments at time.

British wish give priority in invitation to four power talks at highest level, while not excluding preliminary FM meeting. French desire mention highest level in invitation but envisage prior FM Conference. We will insist on inclusion of alternative reversing order of priority, i.e., not excluding meeting at summit after FM Conference.

Chief difference arises over agenda to be proposed in invitation. All agreed first item should be “problems relating to Germany and European security”. Also agreed Far Eastern questions should not be included. British with French support suggest second item “study of ways and means of dealing with all other issues outstanding between East and West, including advancement current disarmament talks under United Nations auspices”. British argue Soviets likely propose basket item on relaxation world tensions and will undoubtedly raise atomic question. Also say public opinion expects discussion thermonuclear threat. British claim their proposal aimed at restricting discussion to procedures for breaking log jams on matters still at issue rather than at basic consideration such issues. We said we will have to present in report our arguments for alternative limiting agenda to European questions.

Regarding timing, report will simply state July earliest practical date for four power meeting.

While attention until now primarily devoted to procedures, the two subcommittees, which with German participation will respectively examine possible Soviet moves and Western counteraction, may produce interesting exchange of ideas.

We trust above positions generally accord with Department’s instructions just received in Department telegrams 5575² and 5580³ which we will implement further.

Attitudes revealed to date by various delegations here may be pertinent to positions they will take in Paris.

British disarmingly frank in acknowledging their proposals, particularly for meeting at summit, aimed at local electorate, also in assuming we and French prefer Conservative Government remain in office.

Electoral uncertainty may, however, be only partial excuse British reluctance reveal substantive positions. Kirkpatrick in talk yesterday said too early discuss such questions with French and Germans and that ideas should be closely held among ourselves until fully developed in order avoid risk revealing basic positions to Soviets. He envisaged general exchange by Western Ministers, who would then order intensive study by working groups. His own idea was that West in good position vis-à-vis Soviets, who are beset by fear of United States nuclear superiority, by internal difficulties and also perhaps differences with Red China. While he did not consider it immediately likely, he thought Soviets might be eventually prevailed upon abandon German East Zone and that we should seriously consider price we would be willing to pay for tremendous return of removing Berlin danger and extending Western influence to Polish border. He personally thought Soviets might be attracted by “neutralized” zone extending from Eastern Germany through a part of Czechoslovakia, through Austria, and making use of Yugoslav middle position. He had in mind including a united Germany in NATO, although Eastern portion would be demilitarized. He believed WEU voluntary acceptance force levels offered scope for security arrangements, although he had not thought out details.

French in working group extremely inquisitive and volubly uncertain. They wish as approach to Soviets stress improvement has already occurred and that further détente should be pursued. They have raised question whether security guarantees with Soviet Russia could not be based upon acceptance split-Germany and indirectly broached this suggestion to Germans in plenary meeting who gave flat rejection. Quite probable they will adopt strong co-existence line.

Germans have given good indication of confidence and loyalty to Western system. French question this as exaggeration Adenauer’s ability to control German situation, but Kirkpatrick inclined accept German professions at face value in belief Adenauer good for two more years and during that time will be able consolidate Germany firmly with the West, despite time lost through French recalcitrance.

In view our colleagues’ differences of approach, with British and German desire restrict discussion of substantive points before meeting of Ministers, we have tried actively participate in committee work without pushing for any particular new position, such as principles peace treaty or security arrangements.⁴ Believe these may be better reserved for subsequent working party when British and Germans will feel more free to talk.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–3055. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Berlin, and Vienna.
2. Telegram 5575 informed the delegation that the United States believed the four-power talks should be limited to European items and for this reason opposed the inclusion of disarmament on the agenda. (Ibid., 330.13/4–255)
3. Supra.
4. On May 3, the delegation was informed that the views outlined in this telegram were generally in accord with those of the Department of State. (Telegram 5629 to London; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–3055)
5. Following a recess for Sunday, May 1, the London Working Group met May 2–5 before completing its deliberations. The sessions were largely devoted to drafting a four-part final report for the Foreign Ministers. None of this activity is documented here. An extract from the final report is printed infra; a complete set of the telegrams to and from the U.S. Delegation dealing with the last 4 days is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 452; some of these telegrams are also ibid., Central File 396.1.