Office of the Historian

76. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1

Taipei, October 13, 1955—4 p.m.

325. President Chiang asked me to see him late yesterday and asked what I had learned in Washington that he should know.

[Page 127]

Replying I assumed he had heard from Minister Yeh and Ambassador Koo about talk with Admiral Radford October 3.2 He said no and I outlined once more scheme of 21 regular MDAP supported infantry divisions plus 9 reserve divisions, each of latter to receive one month’s training yearly using in turn “tailored” equipment of one division. I regretted matter had dragged along so many months without final settlement of points at issue. I asked that he press Defense Ministry to reach early agreement with MAAG soon as possible and he indicated he would do so. (I sincerely hope that delay in determining final Defense position as mentioned joint State-Defense message 080053Z3 will be resolved quickly without introducing further complications.)4

Re Geneva talks I told President I had been reassured by what I had learned in Washington, and then pursued same line as Under Secretary on October 10 in explaining once more why we were continuing these talks.

General discussion followed and President took issue with nothing I had said as outlined above.

Rankin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/10–1355. Secret. Passed to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC at the Embassy’s request.↩

  2. Reference is to a luncheon conversation at which Rankin was present; it was recorded in a memorandum by Radford’s Special Assistant, Rear Admiral Truman J. Hedding, which reads in part as follows:

    “Admiral Radford also stated that our objective is to equip the 21 regular divisions and to provide tailored training equipment for one division for the training of the 9 reserve divisions. Ambassador Koo asked that if equipment goes to the 21 regular divisions, how about equipment for the reserve divisions. Admiral Radford replied that this was a subject for negotiation. Dr. Yeh said he understood this thoroughly.” (JCS Records, CJCS 091 China (Apr.–Dec. 1955))

    ↩
  3. Transmitted in telegram DEF 990025 from OSD to the Embassy in Taipei, October 7, which stated that details concerning the reserve program were still under consideration. (Department of State, CA Files: Lot 59 D 110, US Aid to Nationalist China)↩

  4. A joint State–Defense–ICA message, transmitted in telegram DEF 990844 from OSD to the Embassy in Taipei, October 22, set forth the U.S. position: the Defense Department would assist in maintaining the nine-division reserve program, with material support limited to one “tailored” set of equipment which was to be drawn from that in the hands of nonsupported units. In return the Chinese should agree “to inactivate non-force basis units, to recover MDAP equipment from non-supported units, including equipment which may have been given to reserve divisions other than the base division, and to re-issue it to supported units, to maintain approved force basis units at full effective strength to include providing an adequate replacement system, to make proper use of inducted recruits, and to implement a sound program for the removal of ineffectives from ChiNat military rolls.” (Ibid., Central Files, 793.5–MSP/10–2255)

    A proposed agreement was prepared by representatives of the MAAG and the Chinese Defense Ministry; a joint State–Defense–ICA message, transmitted in telegram DEF 994350 from OSD to CINCPAC, December 23, authorized the signature of the agreement, despite, the fact that it did not fully comply with the principles laid down in telegram DEF 990844, and instructed CINCPAC to “exert every effort, during the detailed development of the reserve forces program, to obtain progressively increased acceptance by the GRC of these principles.” (Ibid.)

    ↩