Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

75. Telegram From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, at Geneva¹

Washington, October 12, 1955—7:37 p.m.

870. Guidance for 21st meeting October 14.

1. You should again place on record US dissatisfaction with continued Chinese Communist non-implementation Agreed Announcement. Recall that approximately five weeks have passed since Agreed Announcement issued, with no action on remaining detained Americans. The Americans have not been allowed exercise expeditiously their right to return, a right expressly recognized by PRC in Agreed Announcement. PRC has not carried out its publicly assumed obligation adopt measures necessary to enable Americans exercise their right. No detained American, so far as US Government can ascertain, has yet been allowed see British Chargé Peiping or any other British diplomatic or consular representative. British Chargé has been unable perform any function whatever under Agreed Announcement. British Chargé has been given no information other than statement that all Americans have been informed of Agreed Announcement. His request for particulars as to when, where and how imprisoned Americans were notified has not been answered.

October 12 news release attributed to Peoples’ Daily alleging that “the Chinese side is faithfully carrying out the Agreement” appears to represent attempt cover up PRC non-compliance by directing attention to 47 Americans who have not applied for exit permits “who can leave China at any time”. The Agreed Announcement deals with those who want to leave, not those who do not. Implication in later paragraph this news release that Agreed Announcement provides for examination case of Americans, one by one, is not supported by language of Announcement. US Government can only conclude that PRC is deliberately misleading public as to its obligations and actions under Agreed Announcement.

Record shows that PRC so far has evaded rather than implemented requirements of Agreed Announcement. US Government bound to take increasingly serious view PRC failure implement provisions Agreed Announcement if this failure should be further protracted.

2. Department will send you for possible introduction at later meeting text draft parallel declarations renouncing use of force particularly in Taiwan area. If Wang adopts anticipated line that Taiwan is domestic issue and only necessity is that US forces withdraw from Taiwan area you may wish reply along following general line:

“US and PRC views status Taiwan and US relationship to area differ sharply. Immediate and urgent problem is not attempt reconcile these views, but remove danger of resort to force which might provoke international conflict. It is impossible freely negotiate under threat of force. Only if this threat removed is there any hope of constructive solution of basic political problems.”

3. You are given discretion as to whether you should make presentation on unaccounted for military personnel at 21st meeting. Essential that this presentation be made at some point.

4. While Department does not insist on rigid adherence fixed order agenda items under Point 2, it is US position that there is no basis for constructive exchange views on trade embargo question while threat of use of military force by PRC remains. Hence, there is no point in discussing this issue in absence renunciation use force by PRC. It is believed postponement discussion this item should be put on this practical basis. In taking this position, however, you need not object to Wang presentation this item.

5. While it would be our purpose to avoid any discussion of the embargo item until after we have gotten some positive assurances about renunciation of force, you are authorized, if you deem it necessary to keep conversations going, to indicate that we recognize that the formulation of declaration on renunciation of force is a matter of delicacy which would require considerable thought and that while any positive conclusion on the matter of trade would inherently have to depend greatly on the Chicom response on renunciation of force, nevertheless while the Chicoms are considering the renunciation of force matter we would be willing to hear their views about trade, particularly:

(1) Are they referring to the US total ban on Chicom trade?

(2) Are they referring to restrictions on strategic materials as administered by CHINCOM?

(3) Are they proposing modification of UN resolution adopted during Korean War?²

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1255. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted byMcConaughy, cleared by Phleger and Sebald, and approved for transmission by Robertson.

2. McConaughy wrote to Johnson in letter No. 19, October 14, that numbered paragraph 5 was drafted by Secretary Dulles. McConaughy commented:

   “There seems to be a good chance that we can get some negotiating value from drawing the Chinese Communists out as to just what aspects of the so-called ‘embargo’ they are complaining about. We are troubled by the pressure from the British and the French, and to a much lesser extent the Japanese, for relaxing the COCOM controls and abolishing the differential altogether between CHINCOM and COCOM.… It is clear that it would be very poor tactics for us to throw away our China control cards now without getting anything in return.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)