68. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 4, 19551
SUBJECT
- Chinese Communist Intentions and the Continuation of the Geneva Ambassadorial Talks.
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister
- Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA
In the course of the conversation reported separately,2 Dr. Yeh said that he wished to speak off the record briefly.
According to reports received by him, Molotov had seen Harriman3 in New York and had told him that only two things were needed to restore peace in the Far East: (1) Recognition of Communist China, and (2) A political solution of the Taiwan question. Dr. Yeh said he understood that Molotov had intimated the Soviet Union might recognize Taiwan and deal with Chiang Kai-shek as head of a Government of Taiwan.
At a later point in the conversation, the Secretary recalled that the two Governments had various difficult problems in common At the moment the most critical common problem was Quemoy and Matsu. There was little doubt that the Chinese Communists could take these off-shore islands against the strongest Chinese Nationalist resistance, if the resistance were unaided. It was not at all certain that the United States could come to the help of the Chinese Government in that situation. In fact at the moment it seemed evident that the U.S. could not do so, because of the temporary disability of the President. The President was not in a position to exercise the judgment that would be required under the Joint Resolution of last January, and no one else in the world was authorized by Congress to exercise that judgment in his stead.
The Secretary said that the Geneva talks were designed to help the Chinese Government to keep Quemoy and Matsu. The U.S. Government does not have any independent interest of its own in these islands. “It does not give a hoot about them”. But we4 know how you feel about them. So we are trying desperately through diplomacy to enable you to hold these islands. We are aware of your objections to the Geneva talks. If you told us that you considered it more important to break off the talks than to retain Quemoy and Matsu, we would arrange to terminate the talks as soon as you were prepared to evacuate the islands. But you have 60,000 troops on those islands. Your prestige is committed there. You are convinced that the loss of these islands would be very bad.
The Secretary said he agreed that the loss of the islands would be bad. It was better to keep the islands without having to engage in [Page 112] a fight which would probably be a losing one. We can not determine the course independently, nor can you. It is a partnership with a common problem. The Generalissimo agreed when the Mutual Defense Treaty was negotiated last November to exclude the off-shore islands from the Treaty area. We have no Treaty obligation to help in the defense of the islands. But we know that you consider that the loss of these islands would have a very grave effect. So we are trying by diplomacy to create a situation where you can keep the islands. We can tell you in confidence that this aspect of the situation is very much in our minds in connection with the Geneva talks. We are trying to urge upon the Communists as to the Taiwan area a principle we firmly believe in: the renunciation of force. The same principle, we believe, should apply in other places, including the countries partly occupied by Communist regimes and in places such as Goa and Northern Ireland. We have said it to Nehru and to Rhee. Chancellor Adenauer of Germany has pledged not to use force to reunify his country. It is a sound principle. Fortunately, the principle now operates to the advantage of the Chinese Government in the Taiwan area.
Dr. Yeh remarked that “If we are to adhere to this principle, we must prepare for a long period of ‘political consultations’, to use the Communist term.”
The Secretary agreed. He said he had reminded Johnson that Panmunjom5 took two years. It is slow business, and we will have to get hardened to it.
Mr. Robertson recalled that it took six weeks to get the Agreed Announcement. Any conference with the Chinese Communists might well take at least six months.
Dr. Yeh said that his Government wanted to play the game astutely, too. The tactics should be to cause the Communists to reconsider their position from time to time—to push them back. The Secretary’s doctrine was difficult, because it was well-known that the Americans were not noted for patience. The general impression abroad was that the Americans would lose their patience in time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–455. Top Secret; Very Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and initialed by Dulles, indicating his approval. A note attached to the source text from Roderic O’Connor instructed McConaughy to distribute it to Hoover, Murphy, Phleger, Bowie, MacArthur, and Robertson on an eyes only basis.↩
- See the memorandum, supra.↩
- Governor of New York W. Averell Harriman, who had served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1943 to 1946.↩
- “We” as used in the Secretary’s remarks throughout this memorandum refers to the Department or the U.S. Government. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Reference is to the negotiations to bring about a truce in the Korean war, held at Kaesong and Panmunjom July 1951–July 1953.↩