67. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 4, 19551
SUBJECT
- Formal call of Chinese Foreign Minister Yeh on the Secretary
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister
- Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA
After the initial pleasantries, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. George Yeh, said he had wanted to exchange ideas with the Secretary before the Foreign Ministers Meeting scheduled for late October. He said that the talk about the possibility of a meeting between the Secretary and Chou En-lai had had very bad repercussions in Taiwan and elsewhere. It was the view of the Chinese Government that it would be highly undesirable for the Secretary to enter any conference with Chou En-lai or to discuss any substantive matters with the Chinese Communists.
The Secretary agreed, and said that the possibility of a meeting with Chou En-lai was very remote. He had no such idea in mind. The matter had been brought up by persons outside the State Department. Senator George had become involved in the talk. The Secretary had been asked at a Press Conference about the prospects. He had minimized the possibility but had avoided a categorical “no” because he did not like to talk in terms of “never”. Peiping had picked up this press conference item. The President had then been asked [Page 108] about the matter. He had side-stepped the question but had likewise refrained from using a categorical “no”.2 Correspondents had read too much into the refusal to rule out the possibility altogether, and the speculation had snowballed. The Secretary said that such a conference was the last thing in the world he would plan. But he could not say flatly that no conference at that level would ever take place. It was just conceivable that the proposition might get out of control. However, it was his purpose to avoid a conference at that level if at all possible.
Foreign Minister Yeh mentioned the Chinese Communist desire to obtain a relaxation of the trade embargo. He asked if the pressures on the U.S. to agree to a lowering of trade controls were very great.
The Secretary said yes, there was great pressure, from European countries primarily and from Japan secondarily. There was a strong drive to make the strategic list for Communist China correspond more closely to that for the Soviet Union.3 It was just possible that the U.S. might have to make some slight concessions in order to hold the major position. We much prefer to hold the line where it is. But if we insist too rigidly on holding the higher level of China controls precisely where it is, then the whole structure of multilateral controls might collapse. It is better to make some minor concessions than to jeopardize the multilateral system of controls. We would rather write off 10% of the structure and save 90% than risk losing it all. Any concession the U.S. might agree to would be a minimum in any case.
Dr. Yeh said he understood that in any event there would be no discussion of the trade embargo at Geneva until Agenda Item One was completed.
The Secretary said that the U.S. would not carry on the talks if we were convinced that the Chinese Communists were acting in bad faith on the implementation of the Agreement under Item One. However the U.S. is not insisting that all Americans must be released before we touch Item Two. Already Ambassador Johnson and Wang Ping-nan are talking about agenda items under Point Two.
The Secretary said he was inclined to think that the Communists are guilty of bad faith. They are not carrying out their obligations under the Agreed Announcement. They are trying to show that the U.S. is guilty of bad faith on Item Two. They apparently figure that [Page 109] if the U.S. does not proceed with substantive discussions under Item Two they are entitled to renege on the release of the Americans.
Dr. Yeh asked if the U.S. was willing to let the matter slide. Would the discussions be allowed to drag on?
The Secretary said, “Maybe so”. He saw no harm in continuing to talk, although he supposed that it might make the Generalissimo and his advisors nervous.
Dr. Yeh said, “That is putting it mildly”. He said he was less nervous than many of his colleagues in the Government since he felt he had a better perspective on the talks. President Chiang had told him to express the alarm of the Chinese Government at the continuation of the talks. Any U.S. concessions would amount to giving the enemy moral comfort and material assistance which would add to his capability for seeking to destroy the Chinese Government.
The Secretary said, “You need to have some confidence that we are trying to play the game along with you”. We can not and do not try to dictate arbitrarily to our ally, the Chinese Government, although many people apparently assume that we can do so. We want our Chinese friends to accord us latitude to play the game as we think best. We are playing as tough and astute a game as we possibly can. We do not believe the Chinese could ask for more. The representatives of some Governments are slipping on the basic China issues. The U.S. Government is using all the pressure and influence possible to keep other Governments in line. When we try so hard to hold the line against a rising tide in favor of Communist China, we feel that we are entitled to your confidence. It is discouraging if confidence is lacking, when we are working our fingers to the bone in support of the Chinese Government. Some other Governments have been working on the U.S. for two years, doing everything possible to get us to weaken our position. We have used all sorts of devices and stratagems to retain the support of other countries in maintaining the international position of Nationalist China. It is not always appropriate to tell the Chinese officials all the means that we use. We have been surprisingly successful so far and we intend to keep trying. The Secretary asked Dr. Yeh to tell his President that he should have faith in us. Great efforts are being made to keep the pressures on the Chinese Communists.
Dr. Yeh said that he would like to think aloud a little about the principle of not resorting to force. He was not taking any position but exploring the subject. He thought the Communists were following two lines simultaneously. Peng Te-huai4 said at Peiping in July that the PRC must redouble its efforts to liberate Taiwan. This was after the Bandung Conference, where Chou En-lai had said he proposed [Page 110] to solve the Taiwan question by meeting the local authorities in Taiwan and treating the matter as an internal problem to be solved by political methods. Dr. Yeh said, “Suppose Wang agrees not to use force in solving the Taiwan question and asks Ambassador Johnson for U.S. assistance in solving the question by political means?” This was imaginary but it could happen. How would the Secretary handle that matter?
The Secretary said that we would maintain that the principles we advocate for other partitioned countries should be applied uniformly. We might propose free internationally supervised elections for China, including the Mainland, such as have been proposed for other divided countries.
Dr. Yeh said that the contest might be unequal after the Chinese people have been subjected to six years of Communist regimentation.
The Secretary asked Dr. Yeh if he thought for one moment the Communists would allow an outside international body to come in and supervise free elections on the Mainland? They would certainly throw the suggestion right out the window.
Dr. Yeh said he thought the Communists would come up with some sort of proposal for agreement that the Taiwan question should be solved by political means.
The Secretary and Mr. Robertson expressed serious skepticism. They thought it was entirely contrary to the Communist line as voiced in Moscow and Peiping. The Communists have been consistent in opposition to any sort of two-China proposition.
[Here follows general discussion concerning a variety of subjects]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–455. Secret. Drafted on October 7 by McConaughy. See also the memorandum, infra.↩
- Reference is apparently to the Secretary’s press conference of July 26 and the President’s press conference of July 27; see vol. ii, Document 319. The President also referred to this subject at his August 4 press conference; see Document 3.↩
- Reference is to the lists of items subject to export controls by the countries participating in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) and the China Committee (CHINCOM) of the Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control the export of strategic goods to Communist countries.↩
- Vice Premier and Defense Minister of the People’s Republic of China.↩