Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

299. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, November 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Intelligence Note: Peiping’s Policy on “Two Chinas” Concept

Chou En-lai summoned the chiefs of foreign diplomatic missions in Peiping to an unprecedented two-hour conference on November 15, 1957 to make clear categorically that Peiping henceforth would attend no conferences at which the GRC was represented or to which it had been invited. Chou claimed that the US, recognizing the impasse of its present position, was pursuing a “two Chinas” policy in the hope of easing its ultimate recognition of Peiping and obtaining wider recognition for the GRC.

Peiping will never accept a “two Chinas” solution, Chou said, adding that Chiang Kai-shek’s opposition to this solution also constituted a snag for the US policy, and that US pressure on Chiang might force the GRC to attempt an attack on the mainland. Chou said that Peiping would not “lose patience” in the Geneva talks and was prepared to continue talking for 10 or 20 years, but that it would not fall into the “trap” of renouncing the use of force in regard to Taiwan while the US refused to withdraw its armed forces.

Peiping is apparently becoming increasingly concerned that the “two Chinas” concept may be gaining wider international support. A number of recent bloc actions can be interpreted as constituting at least a temporary acceptance of the present situation in other divided countries; Peiping may have wanted to make it clear that this acceptance by no means extends to the situation in China. By stating categorically its position on future conferences, Peiping may be hoping to force those countries that recognize it to take a more clear-cut stand whenever the issue arises in the future.

Less clear is the motivation for the argument that the US is adopting a “two Chinas” policy—a point never before brought out so categorically in a top-level Chinese Communist statement. Peiping may genuinely believe that the US is gradually coming around to such a policy; the Chinese Communists have often stated their belief that the US will ultimately recognize the Peiping regime and may now believe that the US plans not to abandon the GRC even when it recognizes Communist China. Propaganda exploitation of this thesis might serve to raise doubts regarding US constancy, particularly in the minds of Chinese Nationalists. At the same time, Peiping must recognize that widespread acceptance of its thesis might lead countries that regard the “two Chinas” formula as a reasonable solution to the China problem to place the onus for US-Communist China frictions more on Peiping and less on the US.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Secretary.

1. Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 62 D 170, Chinese Representation, 1957–58. Secret.