Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

289. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Richards) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Taiwan

Pursuant to your instructions, I conducted certain investigations in Taiwan during the course of the recent Herter–Richards Mission to the Far East. The following is a brief summary of impressions gained and conclusions arrived at there. (No attempt is made here to go into the details of conversations with individuals.)

The Mission arrived in Taiwan on September 12, 1957. The Under-Secretary and I paid courtesy calls on the President, the Vice President, and the Foreign Minister. We attended and enjoyed the formal military, political, and economic briefings by Ambassador Rankin, the Embassy Staff Officers, and other U.S. representatives on Taiwan, civilian and military.

We also had dinner with the President and his wife, and on the next day, visited the President to say good-bye and engaged in a general discussion of the problems of Taiwan. The President indicated to us that he was gravely concerned about the problem of keeping up morale on the Island. He informed us that he had presented to the President of the United States, through channels, a plan to train several thousand paratroopers in order to promote better morale and to have them ready when the opportunity comes to invade the Mainland. We made no suggestions to the President nor did we criticize either his plans or conditions on the Island.

Our entire party had planned to remain in Taipei from September 12 to 15. The Under-Secretary and I agreed that I would stay over a few days longer, in line with your suggestions. Since a typhoon was approaching, the Commander of our aircraft felt that for the safety of the plane, and to assure that engagements in Okinawa and Korea could be met, the plane should leave the Island on September 14 instead of the 15th. Accordingly, Mr. Herter and the rest of the party left on September 14. I remained in Taipei until September 17 and joined the party later in Tokyo.

During my prolonged stay on Taiwan, I primarily sought information on two general subjects:

1. The nature, cause, and results of the so-called Taiwan riot in May, 1957, when the U.S. Embassy and USIS Buildings were wrecked and the U.S. Flag torn down.

2. The general situation on Taiwan from a morale and defense standpoint.

I did not consult further with Ambassador Rankin or his Staff as we had been more or less fully briefed by them on both subjects in a formal meeting. There had seemed to be a disposition on the part of the Ambassador to shrug off the riot as just “one of those things” that might happen anywhere. He seemed to agree with the position of the President no matter what it happened to be.

Among those I talked with on a confidential basis during my stay-over were:

• Vice Admiral Austin K. Doyle, USN
• Brig. Gen. F.M. Dean, USAF
• Maj. Gen. Harold H. Bassett, USAF
• Maj. Gen. Bowen, Chief of MAAG
• [Names deleted]

I also had prolonged conversations with George K. C. Yeh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who telephoned after the Under-Secretary had left, when he heard that I was staying over. He asked that I go to his office for an informal talk. Shortly thereafter, he telephoned to say that President Chiang Kai-shek had asked if I would go to the President’s home again that afternoon for an informal and frank talk. This I did. (Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Minister Yeh were also present during this discussion.)

The President and I had a very full and frank discussion which lasted about two hours. Then, Foreign Minister Yeh went back to my hotel with me where we had dinner together, and talked an additional three or four hours.

1. The Nature and Cause of he Taipei Riot

It is, of course, generally conceded that the immediate cause of the riot was the Reynolds Case. I shall not attempt to deal with the conduct of our Embassy Staff during the riot, since that was dealt with fully by State Department Inspectors, who filed voluminous reports on the subject. Ambassador Rankin was in Hong Kong at the time, without permission (although I understand that he had, at a much earlier date, requested blanket permission to visit Hong Kong).

It was evident from the inspection report² that no definite plan had been worked out in advance by our Embassy Staff to meet such an emergency. I am sure the inspectors’ report, which I have read, reveals where the fault lay. In my talks with different officials and individuals, I indicated that my chief concern was not what caused the riot, but why it was not stopped before reaching its destructive peak. As it happened, the President, Vice President, and the Minister of Defense were all out of the city when the trouble began. All informants agreed that immediately prior to the riots, a very bitter anti-American campaign had been conducted in the press of the city, even though, admittedly, the press is controlled by the State. The evidence revealed that there was no real determination exhibited by either the police or the military to stop the riot. On the day of the riot, the press even carried a very bitter denunciation of the verdict rendered in the Reynolds Case by the Minister of Justice.

I was informed that the CIA has pictures showing that the police made no real effort to control the mob either at the Embassy or at the USIS office. When I asked the Foreign Minister why someone was not instructed to shoot if necessary to break up the mob, he said there was no one with authority to issue the order, that all day he tried to get something like that done, but the reply always came back that there was no authority to shoot unless it came from the President himself. I was assured that such a riot could not happen again and that everything was fixed to prevent it, but could not find where the President had placed, even today, the authority to handle such situations in any individual in command of any body of police or troops.

The whole thing pointed up the fact that President Chiang Kai-shek delegates no authority to handle situations like the one mentioned. I do not think that this fault has been corrected even now. In my conversations with the President, I explained to him that he could readily understand that the Congress and the people of the United States were much concerned over the incident and, as yet, could not understand why strong steps had not been taken to prevent the incident.

The President’s only reply was that he took responsibility for the outrage and was sorry, and assured me that a similar outrage would not and could not happen again. He did not say that he had delegated any Officer or member of his Government to act in his stead, if he himself was not available, to meet such situations.

I informed the President that it was widely reported in the United States that members of the Youth Corps (which is commanded by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo) were active in inciting the riot and the destruction of our Embassy and the USIS Office. He refused to comment on this.

Our military people seemed to feel that the riot was just “one of those things”, which could have been prevented by one company of troops with orders to shoot.

I also had talks with a number of Chinese civilians, who were naturally hesitant to express definite opinions. They indicated, however, that frustration was making inroads on morale. They further indicated that the police could have easily stopped the riot had they received proper instructions from above. There seemed to be a feeling that Chiang Ching-kuo and his Youth Corps knew, beforehand, about an organized protest before our Embassy on the date mentioned. There was no feeling, however, that Chiang Ching-kuo anticipated that the Embassy would actually be attacked.

2. The General Situation on Taiwan from a Morale and Defense Standpoint

It is evident that the general morale of Government officials, soldiers, and the people of the Island, generally, is not as high as it was when I was there about three years ago. At that time, training plans were at their peak and there was more zip to all activities. Now there seems to be a mild sense of frustration growing out of the doubts of many Chinese that there is any real chance of returning to the Mainland. I do not feel, however, that this “sense” has reached anything like a danger point internally. The President still has his hands firmly on the reins of Government—a “one-man” Government.

The President spoke feelingly of his problems and admitted his concern over the possible growth of the spirit of frustration. The President said that there are many evidences of dissatisfaction on the Mainland and that he must be ready to seize the opportunity to return to the Mainland when it comes. To this end, he informed me that he had presented a plan to the United States for the organization of a paratrooper corps for this purpose. He said that this group could be used either for infiltration and propaganda purposes, or as a spearhead military group for invasion when the time comes.

He said that in case of attack on the off-shore islands, he would move his entire military force there. It was evident that, if such a situation arises, he expects the United States to defend Taiwan itself.

He felt that such an organization would be worthwhile from two standpoints: (a) to strengthen his military forces; and (b) from the standpoint of building morale of the troops and the people generally on the Island. The President indicated that he had his doubts that our military representatives there were enthusiastic about the plan and expressed the hope that I would convey his proposal to the Secretary of State and the President of the United States, which I promised to do.

Admiral Doyle, General Dean, Maj. Gen. Bassett and Maj. Gen. Bowen seemed to have their doubts about the President’s plan for a specially-trained paratrooper group because of the magnitude and cost of the effort. They did seem to think that the training of a smaller group, say 5,000 men, might be well worthwhile from the standpoint of military interests and Chinese morale.

Foreign Minister Yeh and other Chinese individuals with whom I talked seemed to feel that next to the President, the two strongest Government characters in Taiwan are the Vice President, Chen Cheng, and the President’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo. In reply to my question as to who would take charge in the event of the President’s death, the predominant impression was that the Vice President would win even though there is contest with Chiang Ching-kuo. One or two felt that Chiang Ching-kuo would have the advantage due to the fact that he has a close grip on the Chinese army officers, plus the Youth Corps which he organized. There seemed to be some doubt about the loyalty of Chiang Ching-kuo but no one said to me that he was an indoctrinated Communist and would lean to the Communist cause in the event of his father’s death. However, both the Foreign Minister and the Chinese individuals with whom I talked felt that it would be good for both Chiang Ching-kuo and the morale of the Island for him to be invited to the United States for studies covering as much as one year. One Chinese friend informed me that he should be brought to the U.S. and thoroughly “brain washed” while over here. By that he means that he should have a thorough course in democratic institutions.

There seems to be no serious trouble brewing between the Taiwanese and the Chinese who went there from the Mainland, though I did receive reports that the Taiwanese in the Army were dissatisfied because there was no opportunity for advancement in rank for them. I was informed that Chiang Ching-kuo, the President’s son, kept complete reign on the Officer appointment and promotion system and showed partiality to the Chinese. It was indicated to me that Chiang Ching-kuo did not feel that he could trust the Taiwanese completely in an emergency. I, myself, could gather no definite evidence that this was true.

Conclusions³

1. Generally, morale on Taiwan not too bad now, but slowly deteriorating.

2. Economy of the Island comparatively stable.

3. There is, naturally, latent anti-American feeling on the island, but not near the danger point.

4. The President is still virtually dictator on the island, health good, mind clear, and spirit undiminished.

5. Chiang Ching-kuo should be invited to the U.S. for a reasonable stay. (He wants to come.)

6. Serious consideration should be given the President’s plan for organization of a paratrooper group, even though it would entail cutting the numbers of his ground forces.

7. Rankin should be recalled as Ambassador.⁴

8. Vice President Chen Cheng, next to the President, is the best and strongest man in the Government. His health, however, does not appear to be good.

James P. Richards

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–957. Top Secret.
2. Not printed.

3. In a November 6 memorandum to the Secretary, Assistant Secretary Robertson commented on the conclusions drawn by Ambassador Richards from his visit to Taiwan:

   • “1. Morale has probably declined somewhat among mainland civilian and military officials in Taiwan as compared to three years ago, but there has been a definite improvement in morale over the past year, resulting from the encouragement derived from the Hungarian revolt, other signs of trouble within the Communist bloc, and evidences of deteriorating conditions on the China mainland. However, the longer the return to the mainland is deferred, the more morale will suffer among that rather large and important group whose morale is closely linked with the prospects for attainment of this objective.
   • “2. I agree.
   • “3. Anti-American feeling, while present, is probably less than in most other countries of the Far East. It is somewhat misleading to refer to the press treatment of the Reynolds case (page 3, last paragraph) as ‘a very bitter anti-American campaign’. While expressing strong dissent with the verdict in the Reynolds case, it was not a generalized anti-American campaign.
   • “4. The term Virtual dictator’ is too extreme, if Chiang Kai-shek is compared with a dictator of the totalitarian type. However, there is no question that he is the dominant personality on the island and that no other individual has personal power approaching his. I agree thoroughly with the description of his personal qualities.

   • “5. Chiang Ching-kuo was invited to the United States last spring…. the invitation was extended in the name of the Veterans’ Administration, … in view of his responsibility for veteran’s affairs in Taiwan. This trip was postponed because of the riot. The Veterans’ Administration has agreed to renew the invitation and it is expected that Chiang Ching-kuo will come in February and will spend a month and a half in this country….

     “With respect to the comments on Chiang Ching-kuo, he is, of course, a controversial individual, who has both strong supporters and bitter enemies among the Chinese. No one can say how much of his present power derives from his, father and would vanish with his father’s death. The consensus among most observers is, as reported by Ambassador Richards, that Ch’en Ch’eng would succeed to the Presidency. I do not believe that Chiang Ching-kuo has as much control over Army officers as stated in the third paragraph of page 6 and at the top of page 7. On the contrary, there is evidence that, as chief of the political officer corps in the armed forces, he incurred the resentment of a good many line officers, who, for this reason, might be more likely to rally to Ch’en Ch’eng’s support in a struggle for power.

   • “6. Serious consideration is being given to President Chiang’s paratrooper proposal. I expect to have a memorandum containing recommendations on this subject for Mr. Herter within a few days.
   • “7. I agree that Karl Rankin, who has been in Taiwan over seven years, should be replaced. This should not be taken as a reflection on his performance, as I consider that he has done an outstanding job.
   • “8. I agree.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–957)

4. In telegram 324 to Taipei, November 12, Ambassador Rankin was offered the post of Ambassador to Yugoslavia. (Ibid., 123–Rankin, Karl L.) He was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia on December 13, 1957 and took up his new post on February 19, 1958. Rankin was succeeded as Ambassador to the Republic of China by Everett F. Drumright, who was appointed on February 17, 1958 and presented his credentials on March 8.