Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

288. National Security Council Report¹

NSC 5723

Washington, October 4, 1957.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council²

REFERENCES

A.

NSC 5503

B.

NSC Actions Nos. 1312–e–(2), 1624–c, 1790 and 1794

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, at the 338th Council meeting on October 2, 1957, adopted the amendments to NSC 5503 set forth in NSC Action No. 1794–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5503 as amended, adopted, and enclosed herewith as NSC 5723; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

NSC 5723 supersedes NSC 5503 and NSC Action No. 1312–e–(2).

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Objectives

1. Maintenance of the security of Taiwan and the Penghus as a part of the Pacific off-shore island chain, which is an element essential to U.S. security.

2. An increasingly efficient Government of the Republic of China (GRC), evolving toward responsible representative government, capable of attracting growing support and allegiance from the people of mainland China and Taiwan, and serving as the focal point of the free Chinese alternative to Communism.

3. Continued development of the military potential of GRC armed forces: (a) to assist in the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, (b) to take action in defense of the GRC-held off-shore islands, (c) to take such other action as may be mutually agreed upon under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and (d) to contribute to collective non-Communist strength in the Far East. Action with respect to (c) and (d) should be directed primarily toward, and limited by, what is deemed necessary to maintain the position and morale of the GRC.

4. Use of GRC military potential, including the availability of Taiwan and the Penghus for the use of U.S. forces under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, in accordance with U.S. national security policies.

5. Development of a stronger Taiwan economy.

6. Improved relations between the GRC and other non-Communist nations.

7. Continued recognition and political support of the GRC as the only government of China and as the representative of China in the United Nations and other international bodies.

8. GRC adherence to the principle of increased orientation of overseas Chinese, especially in Southeast Asia, toward the host countries and integration into their local communities. In the case of those overseas Chinese who continue to regard China as their home and who look to it for inspiration and leadership, increased support of the GRC as the Government of China.

Courses of Action

9. Effectively implement the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, taking all necessary measures to defend Taiwan and the Penghus against armed attack.

10. Seek to preserve, through United Nations action if appropriate, the status quo of the GRC-held off-shore islands. Provide to the GRC forces, military equipment and training to assist them to defend such off-shore islands, using Taiwan as a base. U.S. forces will be used to assist the Chinese Nationalists to defend the GRC-held offshore islands from Chinese Communist attacks whenever the President judges such action to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus.³

11. a. Except under circumstances approved by the President, do not agree to GRC offensive actions against the mainland of Communist China.

b. Under circumstances approved by the President agree to GRC actions against Communist China which are a prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the risk of provoking heavy Chinese Communist reaction against Taiwan and the Pengus.

12. Continue covert operations ….

13. Continue military assistance and direct forces support for the GRC armed forces to enable them: (a) to assist in the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, (b) to take action in defense of the GRC-held off-shore islands, (c) to take such other action as may be mutually agreed upon under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and (d) to contribute to collective non-Communist strength in the Far East. Action with respect to (c) and (d) should be directed primarily toward, and limited by, what is deemed necessary to maintain the position and morale of the GRC.

14. Continue coordinated military planning with the GRC designed to achieve maximum cooperation from it in furtherance of over-all U.S. military strategy in the Far East.

15. Encourage and assist the GRC, through such means as offshore procurement and technical advice, to maintain on Taiwan selected arsenals and other military support industries.

16. Exercise the right, as appropriate, under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, to dispose such U.S. land, air and naval forces in and about Taiwan and the Penghus as may be required in U.S. interests.

17. Show continuing U.S. friendship for the GRC and the Chinese people, while avoiding any implication of an obligation to guarantee the former’s return to power on the mainland.

18. Encourage and assist the GRC to take steps leading toward more responsible representative government suited to the Chinese environment and having a constructive social and economic program, so as to deserve the support and allegiance of the people of Taiwan and to serve as the focal point of the free Chinese alternative to Communism. So far as feasible, employ U.S. assistance as a lever to this end.

19. Continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of China as the only government of China and to support its right to represent China in the United Nations. Seek to persuade other non-Communist countries to do likewise.

20. Encourage the GRC to influence the overseas Chinese, especially in Southeast Asia, to the end that they integrate fully and as rapidly as practicable into the national life of their host countries, becoming loyal citizens and identifying themselves with the interests of these countries so long as they are not Communist-oriented. Seek to ensure that overseas Chinese who continue to feel and act as Chinese rather than as citizens of their host countries look to the GRC as the custodian of Chinese social and cultural values and support it as the representative of the interests and aspirations of the Chinese people. In so far as feasible without jeopardizing our larger interests with respect to our relations with the host countries, assist the GRC in its efforts to influence China-oriented overseas Chinese to look to Taiwan rather than to the Communist mainland.

21. Maintain contact through U.S. officials with anti-Communist Chinese groups outside Taiwan which continue to reject cooperation with the GRC, and, without making commitments of U.S. support, encourage such groups actively to oppose Communism.

22. Encourage conditions which will make possible the inclusion of the GRC in a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement comprising the United States, the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, eventually to be linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS.

23. Continue to provide such technical and economic assistance to Taiwan as will promote U.S. objectives and will be consistent with other U.S. programs of economic and military aid for the Far East.

24. Encourage conditions which will make possible the eventual inclusion of the GRC in such economic grouping as may be organized among the free nations of Asia.

25. Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities for the GRC to develop a well-balanced trade with the non-Communist nations of Asia and with other Free World countries.

26. Continue to assist the GRC to plan the most productive use of Taiwan resources in their own best interests, so as to complement the economies of other free countries, particularly Japan and the Philippines.

27. Continue to work with the GRC toward better fiscal procedures and the revision of programs which run counter to prudent U.S. advice.

28. Encourage the GRC to adopt policies which will stimulate the investment of Chinese and other private capital and skills for the development of the Taiwan economy, under arrangements avoiding “exploitation” yet acceptable to private interests.

29. Consistent with the foregoing objectives and courses of action, continue programs in which Taiwan serves as a base for psychological operations against the mainland.

30. Continue U.S.-sponsored information, cultural, education, and exchange programs; expand the program for training Chinese and Taiwan leaders.

31. Seek to improve relations between the GRC and other non-Communist countries, and develop an appreciation on the part of these countries of the GRC and of the favorable conditions existing on Taiwan, by such means as encouraging official and non-official visits to Taiwan.

32. Attempt to convince other Free World countries of the soundness of U.S. policy toward the Republic of China and of the advisability of their adopting similar policies.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5723 Series. Top Secret.
2. Copies were also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. See the Annex hereto, which contains Public Law 4, 84th Congress, and extracts relative to the offshore islands from the President’s Message to Congress requesting legislation which resulted in Public Law 4. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is not printed.]