276. Memorandum From the Secretary’s Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Intelligence Note: Unrest in Communist China
Since the end of June, the Peiping press and radio have reported that “counter-revolutionary” plots have been unearthed by state security organizations in the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Hupei, Chekiang, Shantung, Szechwan, and Tsinghai. The alleged plots were said to involve conspirators ranging from CIA and Kuomintang agents equipped with the latest scientific espionage equipment to leaders of superstitious secret sects possessing homemade firearms, magic spears, and miraculous talismans. According to the Communists, the conspirators exploited unrest caused by “certain inadequate measures of the government” (as in relocating peasants from a proposed damsite), dissatisfaction with the results of collectivization, and uncertainty caused by the criticism of the regime that arose after Mao’s February 27 call for wider “blooming and contending” in Communist China. The conspirators are being defined as persons who actually took up or plotted to take up arms against the regime, thus maintaining the distinction between “counter-revolutionaries” and the “rightists” who are being attacked for excessive criticism after Mao’s speech, but who nonetheless continue to collaborate with the regime in various bureaucratic, academic, and cultural functions.
The sum total of the reported incidents—less than two dozen small plots in eight of Communist China’s provinces and major regions—almost [Page 581] certainly does not give an accurate picture of the scope and seriousness of unrest in Communist China. In the present second successive year of agricultural disaster in Communist China dissidence and unrest are believed to be virtually nationwide. However, the Communist reports probably do accurately reflect the unorganized haphazard nature of the existing dissidence, which appears to be reflected primarily in spontaneous incidents and in the activities of the scattered semi-religious, semi-bandit secret sects that are endemic in China during periods of economic stress.
Peiping’s motive in publicizing the incidents is unclear. The Chinese Communists appear to view the propaganda on “counter-revolutionary” plots as an accompaniment to the concurrent and much more prominent propaganda drive against the “rightist” critics of the regime. The regime may be attempting to intimidate the “rightists,” many of whom have not made fully acceptable “confessions,” and other potential opponents of the regime. The uncertain and rather tentative propaganda approach to the subject and the absence so far of a People’s Daily editorial defining the “significance” of the publicized incidents may indicate that Peiping is seeking for a new balance between force and persuasion in the aftermath of the Hungarian rebellion, the repercussions of which continue to be evident in Communist China. It seems clear, however, that the present level of dissidence in mainland China represents no serious threat to the regime’s stability or program, particularly since the Chinese Communists have not yet brought their full capability for force and persuasion to bear on the problem.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–857. Confidential. Drafted by Peter W. Colm of OIR/DRF.↩