275. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State1

138. Two hour and five minute meeting this morning. I opened with long statement reviewing renunciation of force discussions closing this portion of statement with “I am prepared to discuss this vital issue as long as necessary to reach agreement, and when this has been accomplished we can go on to discuss other topics under Agenda Item Two.”2 I concluded statement with implementation strongly noting no prisoners released since Dec 1955 prior to completion of sentence and asking him “cite one single measure” taken to carry out Agreed Announcement with respect to remaining six.

His reply on renunciation added up to no further interest or intention on seriously discussing unless and until basic US policy of “hostility” toward PRC changed.3 “Futile wishful thinking to expect PRC will ever recognize under guise of right of self-defense US occupation Taiwan.” “If US not going give up policy of hostility and subversion and aggression against PRC and indulges in empty talk of renunciation of force this can only be termed as a deceiving tactic.” He repeated usual charges on implementation alleging Tseng Kuang-chih “always desired to return” and was thrown into mental hospital as “act of reprisal” and to frighten other Chinese students; briefly mentioned Hsiao Chi-mei as example of “detaining funds to discourage return; and Hu Teh-yun who deported from New York March this year and “nearly lost life because serious stomach ailment not properly cared for during his detention.”

During course give and take I returned hard to theme Americans had derived no benefit from Agreed Announcement and situation of [Page 580] imprisoned Americans remained same or even worse than situation prior to announcement. His refutation weak and consisted primarily of counter-attacking with respect Chinese in US. “Under circumstances in which Chinese residents in the US continue meet obstructions in departure one cannot demand anything extraordinary” with respect to Americans in China.

Next meeting Sept 12. Full record by pouch leaving Geneva August 10.

[Johnson]
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–857. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.
  2. Johnson was instructed in guidance telegram 148 to Geneva, August 5, to emphasize the renunciation of force issue. “Chinese Communists have been unwilling for over year discuss seriously renunciation of force, having instead shifted discussion to side issues. Renunciation force deserves more serious consideration”. (Ibid., 611.93/8–557)
  3. In letter No. 72 to Johnson, August 2, Clough indicated that the Department expected Wang to maintain a hard line in the talks:

    “We have just received a report from a highly sensitive source to the effect that Mao Tse-tung in his speech of February 27 stated that the most appropriate time to establish diplomatic relations with the United States would be during the third 5-year plan (1962–1967), since the disparity between the two countries in economic power would be considerably reduced by that time. However, he added that the Formosa problem would have to be resolved first. This confirms indications we have received from other sources that the Chinese Communists do not expect any early progress in the direction of formal relations with the United States and are willing to bide their time.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva, US–PRC Talks, Misc. Docs. 1956–1957)