2. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State 1

243. Following some additional highlights gleaned from Menon’s remarks to me yesterday.2

1.
ChiComs expect US concretely respond to gesture of flyer release by relaxing trade embargo, that is bring US trade controls to UN level. (Impossible say what extent this is message from ChiComs or may only represent Menon’s opinion.) US goods going to Chinese through UK, many new US autos Peiping, self-denial on our part quixotic, etc.
2.
ChiComs had previously promised Menon to release 11 flyers and were all prepared to do so but handling release of four had irritated them in spite Menon’s warnings to us. What Secretary and [Page 4] President had said at time of release3 was good but what said subsequently by some had interfered. (I was not very clear to what he was referring by subsequent developments but there was some suggestion that giving public credit to UN 4 was involved.) Protestations ad nauseum by Menon he had carefully refrained from claiming any credit; important point was only how he and India could quietly help etc.
3.
GOI (Menon’s) work at Bandung etc. had made possible holding present talks.
4.
Cease fire agreement possible on basis evacuation Quemoy and Matsu.
5.
ChiComs anxious for agreement with US but also must consider Chinese “public opinion”.
6.
Not fair to say ChiCom position is they will fight obtain demands if not successful in obtaining them by negotiation. Also in Chinese eyes question guns 7th Fleet pointing at them. Important point (according Menon) is they willing negotiate and important get negotiations going. (In context he was obviously pointing to Foreign Minister meeting.)
7.

ChiCom revolutionary phase now finished and they are no longer “hanging people”.

ChiCom different from Soviet Union or satellites. Political parties with views different from Commies tolerated and are not just Commie stooges. Many former ChiNat officers successful in ChiCom army. ChiCom attitude toward Formosa “very liberal” and (according Menon) not many years until Chiang will be a “Governor General” of Formosa. Chiang entirely discredited on mainland and no serious opposition to Commies.

8.
Without directly referring travel relatives prisoners Menon raised desire ChiComs receive American visitors, cultural exchanges etc.

I made no response except where it was possible do so without giving away my hand as I was convinced he was going to run and tell Wang anything I said. However I bore down heavily on renunciation of force by ChiComs and gave him copy Secretary’s July 26 press conference statement with recommendation he carefully read it.

[Page 5]

Menon called again this morning to say goodbye. He had seen Wang last night and said Wang was anticipating these talks will not last more than one week if “Americans are sincere”. Wang will raise trade embargo and few other matters but does not intend get down much serious business on “other questions”. All this to be left for ForMin’s meeting. Chinese realize probably cannot take place for some time but want agreement in principle and definite settlement date. Will more fully report this morning’s talk in later telegram.5

[Johnson]
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–255. Secret. Received at 11:17 a.m.
  2. Johnson reported in telegram 232 from Geneva, August 1, that Krishna Menon had called on him at 2:30 p.m. to tell him that Prime Minister Nehru was informing Ambassador Cooper of the imminent release of the 11 fliers. Menon also told Johnson that he would be “readily able reach agreement with Wang on civilians on basis someone represent Chinese students in US.” (Ibid., 611.95A241/8–155) Cooper reported his conversation that morning with Nehru in telegrams 217 and 218 from New Delhi, August 1. (Both ibid., 611.93/8–155)
  3. A May 30 statement by a Department of State spokesman is summarized in vol. ii, Document 261, footnote 2. At President Eisenhower’s press conference of May 31, he stated in response to a question that the release of the fliers appeared to be a “token” on the part of the Chinese Communists “to do something in helping release tensions.” The transcript of the press conference is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 544–559.
  4. Text of a statement made by Ambassador Lodge on May 30 praising Secretary General Hammarskjöld’s efforts on behalf of the fliers is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1955, p. 953.
  5. Johnson reported the conversation in telegram 246 from Geneva, August 2, which reads in part as follows:

    “He again pushed question relaxation trade restrictions ‘or some other such gesture’ but I received impression this may be somewhat more his own idea than that of ChiComs and that he may also be pushing it with them. Talked about Wang and I arriving at agreement ‘in principle’ in this, details to be left to lower level officers—possibly Consuls Generals in Moscow, Delhi or London.…

    “Much talk about importance agreement on ForMin meeting, ChiCom desire eventual formal recognition as ‘this will add greatly to their prestige’, again talk about coastal islands ‘which are held by Nationalists only by virtue US support’, my information situation quiet not correct as Nationalists are carrying out raids most recently in July and this obviously difficult situation for ChiComs etc.

    ChiComs interested in internal development and do not want war. Are making great strides, while still behind India work together much better and with more enthusiasm than Indians and before long will pass India. ChiComs do not like present great dependence on Soviets and want diversify trade to West including US.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–255)