Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

198. Memorandum of a Conversation, Presidential Residence, Yang Ming Shan, Taiwan, August 1, 1956, 10 a.m.¹

Colon, August 1, 1956, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Chiang Kai-shek
• Madame Chiang
• Vice President Chen Cheng
• Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh
• Colonel S. K. Hu
• Admiral Arthur W. Radford
• Ambassador Karl L. Rankin

INTERPRETED BY

Minister Yeh

RECORDED BY

Colonel Hu

President: Admiral, you used to visit the Far East at the end of every year. Is there any special mission which caused your visit at this time of the year?

Radford: I came over expressly for the inauguration ceremony of the Naval Air Station at Cubi Point, P.I. Since I am already in this part of the world, I feel that I should take advantage of this opportunity to visit also the other allies in the Far East. Apart from this, I have no other mission to perform.

President: What is the latest United States policy toward the communists?

Radford: The United States does not intend to initiate any military action against the communists. On the other hand, we will not permit the communists to start any aggression anywhere. For example, if the communists tried to invade Thailand, the United States, based on her commitments arising out of the South East Asia Treaty Organization, would offer armed support to Thailand.

President: I have recently dispatched a letter² to President Eisenhower, suggesting plans to puncture the iron curtain. I should like to hear your views, Admiral.

Radford: At the present, we cannot start a war. Even if there is necessity of war, we must make the communists bear the responsibility of starting the war.

President: My plan does not directly involve the United States. Its chief aim is to keep alive and strengthen the anti-communist movements on the mainland, so that they can be ready when the opportune moment comes.

Radford: In the eyes of the outside world, any military action conducted by the armed forces of the Republic of China will be regarded as having United States sponsorship. After all, the Chinese armed forces must rely on United States for equipment, ammunition and other supplies.

President: If the United States could encourage the peoples behind the iron curtain to rise up against their communist rulers, it will be something similar to the United States policy of liberating the captive nations. The communists have announced their “New Look” policy for the time being. Neither the Soviet Russians nor the Chinese Communists would want to appear to start any war within the next three to five years. We should pick on the enemy’s weak points and make use of this opportune moment to instigate and sustain anti-communist movements behind the iron curtain. The United States does not have to participate directly, but she should not hinder other nations in their actions to liberate their own peoples. Please tell President Eisenhower that if we do not make use of the chance this time, the chance may never come again. It is no use having a policy of liberation and taking no actions now. The real purpose of giving aid to other nations will also be lost.

Radford: The anti-communist front line of the United States is a huge link stretching from the North Pole to the Pacific. Along this front line, the United States maintains treaties of alliance with many allied nations. If action is intended anywhere along the line which needs American concurrence and support, the United States must consider the opinions of the other related allied nations. The United States maintains many military bases in various Asian and European countries. If she acted against the will of these allied nations, I am afraid it would affect the maintaining of American military bases in those countries. As to clandestine activities behind the enemy lines, the United States has supported The Republic of China in parachuting a small number of persons to the interior of the Chinese mainland for sabotage activities. Owing to the tight control of the Chinese Communists, such activities have not been successful.

President: I feel the attitude of the United States in extending aid to other countries tends to be rather subjective. I do not question for a minute the value and propriety of the United States aid, but I do feel the methods can be improved. United States aid might be used much more effectively if you could be more objective and listen more to the opinion of the local people.

Yeh: What the President means is that United States aid to China should be geared to our final objective of recovering the Chinese mainland.

President: If we do not have an objective and a plan for counterattack, there is no significance in our being here in Taiwan. We shall certainly ask for your concurrence when the moment comes for us to implement any plan, but you must first agree to the principle underlining any plan of counterattacking the mainland. Indefinite waiting with no plan will seriously affect the morale of our troops and people.

Radford: I completely understand and agree with the President’s ideas. But if you were in President Eisenhower’s position, Mr. President, you would perhaps agree to the two factors that must be considered: (1) Most of the American people are descendants from European countries, thus their sentiment is unavoidably pro-European. (2) From a military point of view, without the cooperation of her allies in Europe, United States cannot single-handedly start any war. At the present moment, simply by agreeing to your starting any military action will draw criticism, if not objection, from many other allies, both in Europe and Asia.

President: I do not think other allied nations can accuse you, as long as the United States does not directly participate in the actions.

Madame: At least we should let the people on the mainland know that the purpose of the United States aid to the Republic of China is not to defeat our final objective of liberating the mainland. In other words, the purpose of aiding Taiwan is not just to defend Taiwan.

Radford: This is exactly the United States policy toward China, only that we cannot express it in your way. Frankly speaking, there are still many countries in the world who are against your going back to the mainland. President Eisenhower often has to defend the action of the United States Government in continuing its aid to Taiwan. If President Eisenhower openly supports any plan for you to counterattack the mainland, I am afraid it will seriously affect his re-election. I would like to list two points for your attention, Mr. President: (1) If it is for the mere purpose of defending Taiwan only, the present strength and magnitude of the armed forces now on Taiwan already far exceed the needs. (2) Under the present world opinion, no United States President can afford to openly support your counterattacking the mainland. Even many of your good friends in the United States Congress would not advise the United States President to do so.

The purpose of giving aid to other countries is to produce enough strength with which they can resist aggression.

I have often traveled around the world, observing in first hand the political and military situations of different countries. I would be unfaithful to you, Mr. President, if I did not tell you the true facts and my honest opinion.

President: I do not ask for any commitments from the United States. What I hope for is that you do not object and hinder our final objective of counter-attacking the mainland. The current public opinion, particularly in Hongkong, feels that the United States is restricting our actions.

The report about the possible reduction of the United States armed forces will have a most unfortunate impact upon Asia. If you are to announce your reduction without offering instead some suitable guarantee of your liberation policy, the peoples in Asia, particularly the intellectuals, will tend to believe in the Chinese Communist propaganda line—that the United States is following the Soviet Union in disarming, and the next step will be the abandoning of the United States overseas bases.

Radford: In Asia, most of the United States Army units are stationed in Korea. There are no United States troops in Taiwan, neither is there any need for United States to station troops in Japan. Soviet Union was not the first one to reduce the number of ground troops. Three years ago, shortly after the Korean armistice, the United States reduced 700,000 men from its armed forces. We should never overlook the fact that our fire power has been on the increase. And, if countries like Japan and Germany, where United States troops are stationed, formally demand the withdrawal of the United States troops, we have no reason to refuse. The United States ground forces in Europe can be replaced by the ground forces of the European countries, while United States atomic weapon units will remain to support them. Some people have the wrong conception that the United States is going to reduce all of her overseas forces. As a matter of fact, the United States Government has not announced any plan to reduce her armed forces. Come what may, we will keep on strengthening our Air Force and Naval bases overseas, and our fire power will be even greater than ever. If the communists think we are reducing our strength and dare try to find out, they will be committing a serious mistake.

President: I would like to summarize our talk into the following three points:

(1) The Soviet “New Look” may expose her weak points and trap her in her own device. It is unlikely now that she will start a war within the next three to five years. This is a good chance for us to do something to make it impossible for the communists to start any major war in the future.

(2) Implementation of the armed forces reduction plan must be in keeping with the liberation policy. It will be very unwise to forget the latter.

(3) Our liberation plan does not need United States participation, but it is hoped that the United States will not object to the actions on the part of the aid receiving countries to liberate their own peoples. Best chance comes in the next three to five years. It may never come again.

The Asian problem boils down to the problem of the Chinese Communists on the mainland. If we can uproot the Chinese Communist regime within two to three years, the Soviet Russians will then be deprived of their biggest capital asset, consequently they cannot start any major war. To uproot the Chinese Communists, it is not necessary to increase United States aid, nor would the United States be involved in a war. We can devise some economical ways and means to achieve it. I do hope the United States aid will support a plan with the liberation of the Chinese mainland as its final objective. If it meets with your President’s approval, we can discuss the details. For example, two years ago we requested 30,000 parachutes. The request was subsequently reduced to 10,000 parachutes. The cost would not have been much, but they would be very useful in our counterattack action. Unfortunately, the United States Government did not agree to that request.

Radford: Airborne operation of such magnitude needs proper logistic support, as well as complete air superiority. The large amount of long-range air transports needed for such operation will be difficult to acquire. It will be very difficult to push such plans for the time being.

President: We shall drop the men at places where enemy’s strength is the weakest. They will subsist on the land, needing no outside supplies. About 100 men will be dropped everytime to occupy neighboring cities, and soon we shall be able to control vast areas.

My basic concept for counterattacking the Chinese mainland is as follows: (1) Uprising movements on the mainland must be instigated within the next three years. Otherwise, success will be even more difficult. (2) As soon as there are uprising movements on the mainland, help can be sent from the outside. I hope the United States would help to realize this plan. In its implementation the United States will not be involved.

Radford: If your plan does not include any direct landing operation on the mainland coast, the United States Government may be willing to study the plan.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HE/9–2557. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Hu. The source text is attached to a covering memorandum from Deputy Under Secretary Murphy to Under Secretary Herter, August 25, 1957. According to an August 24 letter from Ambassador Rankin to Admiral Radford, Colonel Hu took the only notes of the conversation taken at the time and prepared the memorandum of conversation from those notes. (Ibid., Rankin Files: Lot 66 D 84)
2. Document 169.
3. In an October 8 letter to Radford, Rankin reported that, during a recent visit to Taipei by Allen Dulles, President Chiang took up the idea of 30,000 parachutes with Dulles. Rankin noted that Dulles intended to discuss the matter with Radford on his return to Washington. (Department of State, Rankin Files: Lot 66 D 84) On November 21, Assistant Secretary Robertson wrote to Rankin about Chiang’s request for authority to proceed with his parachute proposal: “On basis of information available to us, we believe that the type of operation described by President Chiang would have very dubious prospects for success”. He noted, however, that CIA and Defense were in a better position to judge the practicability of the proposal, adding that the Department would consider any initiative that came from them. (Ibid., Central Files, 793.5/11–2156)