Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

159. Memorandum of a Conversation, Taipei, March 16, 1956, 9:30 p.m.¹

PST/MC/7/1

Taipei, March 16, 1956, 9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
• The Secretary of State
• Ambassador Karl L. Rankin
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson
• Mr. Carl W. McCardle
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
• Counselor of Embassy William P. Cochran, Jr.
• First Secretary of Embassy Paul W. Meyer (Reporter)
• Nationalist China
• President Chiang Kai-shek
• Madame Chiang Kai-shek
• Vice President Ch’en Ch’eng
• Minister of Foreign Affairs George Yeh (Interpreter)
• Secretary General of the Presidential Office, General Chang Ch’un
• Government Information Bureau Director Sampson Shen
• Prime Minister O.K. Yui

SUBJECT

• Chiang’s Views on U.S. and Soviet Policy

After dinner at the President’s residence the President stated that the memorandum he intended to present to the Secretary was unfortunately not yet completed but would be delivered through Ambassador Rankin.² The President said he agreed with the Secretary’s statement this afternoon about the new Soviet tactics which contain elements more dangerous than formerly. He said that the Soviets were trying to avoid war before the completion of their sixth five-year plan. He felt the present Soviet united front offensive was directed against the United States in order to discourage long-term preparedness and make the people feel that it was not necessary to continue arming. A great danger to the United States was the Russian propaganda campaign telling communists and others in Southeast Asia that if war comes Russia will win, the purpose of this campaign being to create a situation whereby Southeast Asia will be neutral or go communist. Their second propaganda theme is that Russia will win without war. The third propaganda line being spread in Southeast Asia is that in due course the United States will recognize Red China.

With regard to the Geneva talks the President shared the Secretary’s views that the Reds would not agree to a renunciation of force, but the effect on the Asian man in the street of the Geneva talks was bad. He said he had no right to interfere with our policy but wanted to point out the bad effect of the Geneva talks on the people.

The President said that the new Soviet policy was intended to push communism forward and to break the backbone of the free world by subversion and propaganda. He said he would like to be “chief of staff for a short time, to map out U.S. strategy to combat the new communist strategy.” He said he told publisher Hearst³ that Asia can be freed from communism without a world war but that countries occupied by communism can be freed by small local wars. War can be avoided by opposing communism in countries not yet occupied. He himself has been thinking since the recent Congress in Moscow and hopes to be able to produce some ideas not involving world war to counteract the present communist program. Roughly the first idea is to create confusion and trouble in communist territory to prevent them from consolidating their gains. We are now trying to contain communism by building dykes, but it is very easy for the communists to get over those dykes, with propaganda and subversion. We cannot treat communists as gentlemen, they are gangsters. Containment previously might have been OK, but now that Red policy has changed, new counter tactics are necessary such as creating confusion behind communist lines. The President said that it is vital for the United States to stay out of any war by national groups armed at bailing out their compatriots under communist rule.

The President said that measures taken by the free world in Western Europe had been in part successful. This was not the case in East Asia. The United States can strengthen its leadership in Asia by taking into account the pattern of the attitude of mind in Asia. People in Asia can be divided into two groups; those who have been ruled in the past by colonial powers and those who have lost territory to the communists and desire to be united again. It is important to raise the standard of living, but this will not take the place of a) the desire to avoid colonialism again or b) the desire to be reunited. It is necessary to satisfy their psychological needs. If aid is not directed in this direction it will not satisfy these desires. American influence over Asiatic affairs has been effective and instrumental in helping 500 million people obtain their independence, but the President doubts that present aid programs can achieve this same kind of effect. The United States aid in Asia should be given more study and be based on emotional appeal found among Asians who a) have been ruled by Western powers and desire to be freed of all vestiges of colonialism, and b) desire to free their country and compatriots from communism. He is inclined to believe that the United States policy lacks clarity, determination and decisiveness. The Soviets seem to offer a constant policy and therefore it is easy for them to win over the Asiatics.

President Chiang further stated that the core of the Asiatic problem is China, and there is doubt in many minds in Asia as to ultimate United States policy in regard to China. It is of vital importance that Asiatic countries should be turned away from neutralism. The only way this can be done is for the United States to have a firm policy towards China. One of the burdens in this regard for the United States is to have to play ball with Great Britain.

President Chiang said that the Secretary can assure President Eisenhower that he will always remain a friend even though the United States follows a policy detrimental to China. America has ideals to which China subscribes. He is aware that the American people will always support freedom and justice and will never forget the help China received in the war against Japan but feels that there is need for more study by the United States of conditions in the Far East and for a stronger policy.

Some Asiatics feel that the President (Chiang) will start a drive for the mainland in order to stir up trouble and involve the U.S. He wishes to give assurance that he will not do so and reiterated that Nationalist China will live up to the letter of its agreement with the U.S. He again reiterated the need for a stronger United States policy. He said he had almost guessed what happened in Washington between Eden and Eisenhower, but the people do not understand. He is personally confident that Red China will not be admitted to the United Nations, also that there will be no recognition by the United States of Red China, but Asians are confused by gentler talk and an expression of a strong policy is needed for the people.

President Chiang stated that he rejoiced over the recovery of President Eisenhower and his willingness to run again. The people hope that President Eisenhower will be able to carry out the “liberation policy he enunciated in the 1952 campaign”. There is nothing more forceful or appealing to Asiatic people than for the U.S. to act as sponsor for the self-effort of Asians to liberate their peoples and to recover their own territory. It is important that President Eisenhower understand what the people of Asia look to him for.

In conclusion the President stated there is no way in which Asia can be free of communism until mainland China is free. And until Asia is cleared of communism the rest of the world cannot be freed from it. The President said he had talked in general terms but it was time to work out the strategy for liberating Asia.

The Secretary welcomed the expression of views of President Chiang. It was the purpose of his trip to obtain those views. The problems which President Chiang had raised are complicated. The Secretary asked that President Chiang have faith that we are trying to solve these problems, bringing the same spirit to bear that he had mentioned. When we come up with different answers it is because we have more knowledge than he about certain aspects. President Chiang stated that he was in agreement. For that reason he hoped that they could get together oftener. If we could allow adequate time for consultation, misunderstandings could be avoided.

President Chiang stated that he thought efforts should be devoted to the forming of an alliance between Free China, Korea and Vietnam. Such an alliance would of course not be effective without the United States leadership. He asked the Secretary to give consideration to this question. These three countries, he stated, can bring concerted pressure against Communist China. The President said it was not necessary for the U.S. to become a member of such a three power group but hoped the U.S. might work toward this end. Mr. Robertson stated that there already exist defense treaties between the United States and Free China and Korea, but not with Vietnam. The President also suggested an alliance among Korea, Japan and Free China, but did not pursue that subject.

The Secretary said that he was very happy to consider the questions raised by President Chiang. He said that there was no inconsistency in our policy. He urged the President not to be concerned with impressions of vacillation in our policy created by the free press in our country and suggested the President pay as little attention as he did to what the press says.

The Secretary said that he could not agree that Soviet policy was constant, and gave as an example the visit of Soviet officials to Yugoslavia which was just as inconsistent with previous Soviet policy as if President Eisenhower, Mr. Dulles and Senator Knowland should go to Peiping on a similar pilgrimage to visit Chou En-lai. Also the writings of Stalin which had been taught as basic doctrine for 25 years were now being consigned to the ash can. This was hardly an example of consistency. The Secretary said that when you see extraordinary changes in a country like Russia both with respect to doctrine and personalities it means everything is not well. The Secretary quoted President Eisenhower as saying that if you only think of your own problems the enemy has you licked before you start. The difference between a free and despotic system is that in a free society all problems and difficulties are exposed by a free press whereas despotisms present a hard polished front which frequently hides a rotten interior. This was the case with Nazism. We should not be misled but should always remember that victory goes to him who can keep his nerve to the last fifteen minutes.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 62 D 181. Secret. Drafted by Meyer on March 18.
2. See Documents 166 and 169.
3. Randolph Hearst, publisher of a number of American newspapers.