147. Editorial Note
At a meeting of the National Security Council on February 9, during discussion of Korea, there were several comments and exchanges relating to China:
“The President replied [to a question concerning the cost of continuing cost of support for South Korea] that the crux of the problem was Communist China. After referring to the problem of having had to fight an ‘unwinnable’ war in Korea, he added that to retreat from Korea now would cost the United States its entire position in the Far East. He desperately wished, nonetheless, that there were some way for the United States to extricate itself from this swamp of spending. If Red China, speculated the President, should finally get out of North Korea, release our prisoners, and act decently, how in the world could the United States continue to avoid recognizing Communist China? It was a real problem, and the President repeated his belief that all our Far Eastern problems focussed up in Korea.”
After comments by Secretary Dulles concerning Korea,
“Secretary Humphrey said that he was somewhat reluctant to raise so explosive a matter, but it was part of the same general problem. Now that we are under less terrific pressure from Communist China, was any thought being given to the problem of what we will do about Quemoy and the Matsus?
“Secretary Dulles indicated that Secretary Humphrey was quite mistaken in his assumption that we were under less pressure at the moment from Communist China with respect to the offshore islands and Taiwan. In point of fact, the pressure was so severe that the talks which were going on in Geneva at the Ambassadorial level might well be broken off this very day. The Chinese Communists were insisting on their right to take Taiwan, and proposed to take it by force if necessary. We have tried desperately to get them to change this position, but we had failed. Accordingly, this was far from a quiescent period with respect to the problem.”
The memorandum records further discussion concerning Korea and continues:
“Dr. Flemming said he wished to put a question to the Secretary of State. If the negotiations at Geneva with the Chinese Communists were in fact broken off, was it likely that the Chinese Communists would move promptly against Quemoy and the Matsus?
“Secretary Dulles replied that available intelligence indicated no immediate likelihood of such a Chinese Communist move. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists were continuing to develop their capabilities for such an operation, and Secretary Dulles believed that they could amass sufficient forces in a matter of a couple of weeks to seize these offshore islands if they decided to do so. He did not think, however, that they would resort to force in the near future, even if the negotiations were broken off. It was more likely that they would continue to go on as they have been, although with more threatening noises.
[Page 306]“The President observed that in a couple of private conversations with Sir Anthony Eden during the latter’s recent visit, the Prime Minister had said in effect that he lived in terror that a situation might arise in which the United States found itself obliged to go to war and that he, Eden, would be unable to come to the support of the United States because of British public opinion. The President wondered whether these remarks were a backhanded reference to Quemoy and the Matsus.
“Secretary Dulles thought that the President’s surmise was quite likely to have been correct. He pointed out, however, that in their propaganda the Chinese Communists persistently and carefully avoided any suggestion of taking Quemoy and the Matsus except within the total picture of their determination to take Taiwan by force if necessary.
“Secretary Humphrey said that he nevertheless believed it likely that if the Chinese Communists finally decided to try to seize Taiwan, they were quite likely to move against Quemoy and the Matsus first. If they stopped there for a while they would certainly put the United States on the spot.
“Governor Stassen wondered whether the Chinese Communists might not seek a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Chou En-lai during the course of the Secretary’s forthcoming visit to the Far East.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, February 10; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)