Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

82. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

London, February 4, 1955—5 p.m.

3458. Eyes only Acting Secretary and President.

At luncheon today with Eden and Prime Ministers of Australia² and Ceylon³ they asked me to convey to you both feeling which they said had developed at this morning’s meeting of Prime Ministers’ conference after consideration of character of ChiComs’ reply to United Nations’ invitation and Eden asked Menzies if he would prepare short note for me expressing these feelings. In accordance with Eden’s request Menzies wrote me letter which contains following paragraphs:

“1. I think that further resolutions or debates in the Security Council at present would do harm. The veto would be applied; feelings would be exacerbated; and in debate positions might be occupied from which later withdrawal might be difficult.

“2. Discussions should proceed privately between the British Commonwealth countries and the United States regarding ways and means (by withdrawal of troops or otherwise) of keeping the “offshore” islands out of the area of armed conflict (either major or local), while firmly preserving the independence of Formosa and the Pescadores. At the same time India, for example, could use influence privately upon Peiping.

“3. While Australian and other British opinion would be much opposed to accepting a risk of war over the “off-shore” islands, I feel strongly that the President should know how greatly we respect and rely upon his coolness, judgment and character at a time when the truculence of China’s reply must provoke hostile reactions and possibly some intemperate opinions. It is this feeling about the President which gives me encouragement and hope.”

As you will note this letter expresses opinions as coming from Menzies personally. In fact at luncheon they were expressed as consensus of opinion of ministers present at morning’s meeting. Eden stated specifically that all present had expressed themselves as relying absolutely upon coolness, character and judgment of President and encouragement and hope which this feeling gave to them all.⁴

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–455. Secret; Niact. Received at 1:57 p.m. A copy in the Whitman File bears the notation in Goodpaster’s handwriting that it was seen by the President at 6 p.m. that day. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Aldrich, Winthrop) This telegram was repeated to USUN for Lodge by the Department as telegram 401, February 4.
2. Robert Gordon Menzies.
3. Sir John Kotelawala.

4. A letter to President Eisenhower from British Ambassador Makins, dated February 4, states that he had been instructed to inform the President that the Commonwealth Conference had that day considered the Far Eastern situation; the letter reads in part as follows:

   “The view of all the Prime Ministers was that no precipitate decisions should be taken, nor positions publicly announced, which might make the situation more difficult. The Prime Ministers wanted at least forty-eight hours for further reflection, and this might also give time for public opinion to cool down.

   “There were many references by the Prime Ministers to the calm and restrained way in which you have been handling this question.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

   According to a February 4 memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Makins told Hoover that afternoon that the letter reported the consensus of the Prime Ministers views but that the other Conference members had not had the opportunity to approve its text. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–455)