76. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State1
3428. For Hoover. I had half-hour conversation with Nehru this morning. Madame Pandit2 also present. Atmosphere cordial and friendly but after conversation started intensely serious.
After recalling occasion when we had entertained Nehru and Madame Pandit in New York in 1949 and our talks at that time, I told Nehru that I was sure Washington would be interested in his reaction to present situation in Far East. He smiled and then said very seriously that question was enormously complicated but that fundamental difficulty was that Chiang Kai-shek, who was a man about whom he did not wish to say anything derogatory because he had been his guest and had no personal feelings against him, had been passed by, by history and that his aspirations were no longer attainable but that Mao Tse-tung was nevertheless in constant fear that Chiang Kai-shek might attempt to invade the mainland with the help of the United States. Besides this the air raids on mainland and against shipping constituted continuous pinpricks. This situation he characterized as a running sore. He said that as far as Formosa was concerned Chinese Communists believed that it belonged to China which had held it for 1000 years before it had been taken from them by Japan, and all through the last war China had claimed that Formosa should be restored to them by Japan at end of war. These facts created a most difficult situation for Mao Tse-tung. Moreover India had recognized Mao Tse-tung’s Government, which made it impossible for India to consider that Chiang Kai-shek had legitimate claim to occupy Formosa as part of Chinese territory.
At this point he reiterated statement that history had passed Chiang Kai-shek by and compared his position to Indian Princes who had been protected by Britain for so many years and who after the separation of India from empire, no longer had power to protect themselves. He said half facetiously, “we did not treat them badly. We have given them pensions and now, although they no longer have any power they are quite happy.” I replied that it did not seem to me that there was any parallel at all between what happened to the Indian Princes and what might happen to Chiang Kai-shek, but that in any event it had already been made entirely clear that the [Page 201] United States was not prepared to throw Chiang Kai-shek to the Communist wolves. He replied that he of course understood that.
Nehru said that in his own interviews with Mao Tse-tung he had not found him unreasonable. He referred specifically to a conversation he had had with Mao Tse-tung at request of Pope for release of a Catholic Bishop which had resulted in release of Bishop after two days consideration by Mao Tse-tung in what Nehru described as a casual manner. He said he felt certain that the American airmen held by Mao Tse-tung would have already been released if the request from the United Nations had not been coupled with a resolution condemning the action of the Chinese Reds in holding them.
Nehru felt that greatest difficulty in obtaining cease-fire would be to persuade Red Chinese Government to come to New York unless they were first admitted to United Nations. When I observed that it seemed to me that it was obvious that there wasn’t chance of that happening, he said that he realized that but that all that could be done was to wait and see what the result of the invitation would be.
I then asked him if anything had happened during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference so far which he thought might be helpful in bringing about a cease-fire. He replied that after the first discussions the conference had postponed further consideration of the situation until reaction of Chinese Communists to Security Council resolution had become apparent. I asked him how long Prime Ministers’ Conference would go on and he said until next Tuesday3 noon.
I told him that I personally felt that his wisdom and guidance should be most helpful in bringing about a cease-fire which was, after all, what everyone wants. He said in reply he was afraid that in present situation wisdom was not enough, but that I could be assured that he would do everything in his power to be helpful. He said “of course we leaders of the free world must carry our public opinion with us. We are not like the Communists who are able to make decisions without considering such opinion in our own country. This limits our power of action.”
I ended interview by saying I appreciated what he had said and told him that if there was anything I could do to be helpful to him I was completely at his disposal.
I believe the manner in which Nehru spoke, as well as what he said, evidenced the fact that his experiences in the past two days in [Page 202] the Prime Ministers’ Conference may have had a very sobering effect upon him.
Department repeat as desired.