67. Memorandum for the Record by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)1
I consider that there has been given the British a firm commitment that the United States will make no public statement concerning its intentions with respect to Quemoy and the Matsu Islands until the results of the action in the Security Council are known, and that it was upon the basis of receiving this commitment that the [Page 180] British agreed to support immediate action in the Security Council on Operation Oracle.
In Sir Roger Makins’ letter of January 21 on this subject addressed to the Secretary of State2 the commitment that they desired from us is stated somewhat differently. The second paragraph of the letter reads:
“The position of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom is that they are ready (subject to New Zealand agreement) to support immediate action in the Security Council on lines already agreed, if the United States Government is prepared to withhold any promise of help in the defense of Quemoy Until the results of the action in the Security Council are known.”
I believe that this formulation of the commitment was modified and implicitly accepted by the British Government in the modified form. On January 20 the Secretary had stated to Sir Roger3 that it might be possible to be less specific than then planned in our public statement but that it was necessary to make clear to the Nationalists our intentions regarding Quemoy. Our intentions were described by the Secretary in that conversation as being under present conditions to assist the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of Quemoy because it is important to the defense of Formosa and it remained the avowed purpose of the Communists to take Formosa.
Against the background of this statement, the Secretary said to Sir Roger on January 21 (at which meeting the Ambassador’s letter referred to above was discussed) that at the NSC meeting it was agreed that there would be no statement publicly made regarding the intentions of the United States with respect to Quemoy and the Matsu Islands, and, later in the conversation, that he hoped the British Government would consider that we had substantially met the points which they had raised and that it would thereby be enabled promptly to support Oracle. At the conclusion of this discussion the British Ambassador then said that in his personal opinion we had met in substance the British position and that he would recommend to his Government that we move ahead promptly on Oracle. It must be assumed that Sir Roger accurately and in detail reported this conversation to London. The following day the British did in fact move ahead in conjunction with us on Operation Oracle.
I should add as my own judgment that the British Government, in agreeing to move ahead on Oracle without acceptance by us of the commitment they sought in the terms they used, was relying on its understanding derived from the series of conversations that the purpose of the United States was to reduce the risk of war and to [Page 181] avoid involving itself in a situation in which it relinquished to the Chinese Nationalists or shared with them the power of grave decision.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–2958. Top Secret. Filed with Howe’s memorandum of August 29, 1958, to the Acting Secretary. A memorandum of February 1, 1955, from Merchant to Scott, attached to a copy of this memorandum, states that it had been prepared at the request of Acting Secretary Hoover. (ibid., 793.5/2–155)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 27.↩
- See Document 25.↩