Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

44. Memorandum of Discussion at the 234th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 27, 1955¹

Washington, January 27, 1955

Present at the 234th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Washburn for the Director, U.S. Information Agency (for Item 4); the Special Representative in Vietnam (for Item 4); the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, an Mr. Douglas for Secretary of the Air Force (for Item 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, General White for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Item 4); the Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; the Counselor, Department of State (for Item 4); Assistant Secretary of State Robertson (for Item 4); the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge, and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follow brief comments concerning the functioning of the National Security Council]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows a summary of portions of the intelligence briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles concerning the Soviet Union and Iran.]

Mr. Dulles then said that he wished to comment on an item . . . . The Council, he said, might be aware of the fact that U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, had recently prepared a written proposal giving qualified support of President Eisenhower’s recently announced policy with respect to the Nationalist-held offshore islands. He had supported the idea of UN action in this area, but had qualified it by suggesting that the UN action be entrusted to Asian members of the UN. When it had been completed, U Nu’s proposal was sent both to Chou En-lai and to Nehru in order to solicit their views before the proposal was made public. The reaction of Chou En-lai, said Mr. Dulles, was by way of being a “stonecrusher.” Details were missing, but in effect Chou had told U Nu to mind his own business. U Nu had promptly withdrawn his proposal. All this was an interesting indication of the relationship between Burma and Communist China.

Mr. Dulles indicated that there had been little change in the situation respecting the offshore islands since the last meeting of the National Security Council. There had been indications of a certain amount of sea reconnaissance by the Chinese Communists in the Tachen area. This was reminiscent of Chinese Communist operations prior to their attack on Ichiang Island. On the other hand, there was no evidence of any new preparations by the Chinese Communists for an attack on the Quemoys. The situation regarding the Matsu group was different. These islands could be attacked at any time without any notable additional preparations by the Chinese Communists. Radio silence recently had made it more difficult for us to ascertain, for example, the concentrations of Chinese Communist aircraft in these areas. Such radio silence could be the prelude to further Chinese Communist attacks on the offshore islands, but this was not necessarily the case.

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’ intelligence briefing, Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Radford to indicate briefly to the Council significant U.S. military moves in the Formosa area in recent days. Admiral Radford replied that Admiral Pride, in the U.S.S. Helena, was still in Formosa making arrangements for the possible evacuation of the Nationalist garrison on the Tachen Islands. He had concentrated four aircraft carriers and twelve destroyers at a point approximately 100 miles north of Formosa and 125 miles south of the Tachens. The aircraft carrier Princeton was likely to join this concentration presently, to make a total of five aircraft carriers. An additional U.S. cruiser was also likely to join the task force. Logistic support vessels were standing by, and forty-five F–86’s had already landed on Formosa. Additional F–86’s expected at Formosa in the course of the present day would bring the total number of these aircraft to seventy-five.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to (1) recent developments within the Soviet Union, and (2) the situations with respect to Iran and to the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands.

b. Noted an oral report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on U.S. military dispositions in the Formosa area.²

2. Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities (NSC 5505;³ Annex to NSC 5505;⁴ NSC 5501, par. 26 c;⁵ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 26, 1955⁶)

[Here follows a summary of discussion of NSC 5505, especially paragraph 4–c, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete. The paragraph in question reads:

[“c. Thereby convincing the Communist rulers that aggression will not serve their interests, that it will not pay. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.”]

The President said that he shared much of Secretary Wilson’s view, which agreed with his that some one person must constantly follow and be responsible for the actions designed to carry out the strategy set down in the present report. The President then added that it was his view that paragraph 4–c should not be deleted. Admiral Radford repeated the view that he couldn’t see that inclusion or deletion of the paragraph made any significant difference. Governor Stassen complained that the last sentence of paragraph 4–c seemed to him a little overconfident in tone. Secretary Dulles agreed with Governor Stassen, and said he was particularly inclined to question the accuracy of the view that the Soviets would not initiate general war or actions risking general war, in view of the Chinese Communist reaction toward the President’s statement to the Congress respecting U.S. policy in the Formosa area.

The President said he believed that the Soviets were undoubtedly doing all they could to involve the United States in Asia and in a general war with Communist China. Secretary Dulles added that this was why he was so inclined to doubt the validity of the last sentence in paragraph 4–c.

With considerable emphasis, Admiral Radford said he wished to point out to the Council that he had been involved for many months in all the major studies and plans which had been formulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Never, however, in all this long time, had the Joint Chiefs of Staff planned a U.S. land offensive on the mainland of Communist China. For the life of him, he could not understand why, in the event of a general war between the United States and Communist China, all the worst difficulties would not be on the Chinese rather than on the U.S. side. The great problem of the Chinese in such a war was to “get at us if we don’t choose to be got at.” The only direction in which the Chinese Communists could mount an aggressive offensive on land would be toward the south or in Korea. Accordingly, the general theory that a war with Communist China would involve the United States militarily to very great depths, was simply incomprehensible to him.

Secretary Humphrey said that this was all very well, but would Admiral Radford explain to him how, if we got into a war with Communist China, you would end it. Admiral Radford replied that he failed to see how the Russians could be anything else but losers if the United States got into a general war with Communist China. The Chinese Communists would have very little offensive capability against us which we could not counter with the exercise of comparatively little military power. It would, accordingly, be a mistake, really, for the Russians to try to involve the U.S. in war with Communist China.

With regard to Admiral Radford’s view as to such a mistake by the Russians, Secretary Dulles said that the Admiral’s analysis did not take account adequately of the political advantages which the Soviets might well gain in Europe if we should get into a war with Communist China. Admiral Radford quickly admitted that he was speaking from a military point of view and had not taken these other factors into account. Secretary Dulles went on to enlarge on the very great difficulties that Sir Anthony Eden was facing in the British Parliament in his efforts to back up the new U.S. policy regarding the offshore islands, in the face of the combined opposition of Messrs. Attlee⁷ and Bevan.⁸ This showed, said Secretary Dulles, that the big danger resulting from a war between the U.S. and Communist China was not to be found in the realm of military action, where he agreed with Admiral Radford’s analysis. The great danger of such a war was the possibility that it would alienate the allies of the United States and might indeed block all our best-laid plans for Western Europe.

Admiral Radford went on to say that his own analysis of the situation induced him to believe that Russia and China were bluffing, and that we would succeed in calling their bluff if we proceeded along the lines of the recent decision respecting the defense of Formosa and certain of the offshore islands. The Russians are perfectly well aware that operations of the kind that could occur in carrying out this new policy might give rise to a situation in which the Russians themselves could become involved in a general war. Since he believed that the Russians did not wish to become so involved, he believed that they were bluffing.

Secretary Wilson said that he, on the other hand, was inclined to look at the situation much as Secretary Dulles did. While he approved the recent move by the President regarding Formosa and the offshore islands, we might presently find out in fact whether the Soviets and Chinese were really bluffing. On the other side of the picture, continued Secretary Wilson, if he had the job of killing a rattlesnake he would try to cut off his head rather than his rattles. There was another aspect of this cold war situation, said Secretary Wilson, that also continually bothered him. He believed that in many of the underdeveloped areas of the world the ordinary run of people were likely to make more progress under a communist regime than under the traditional types of dictatorships. This was a troublesome fact, but he nevertheless believed that the common people of China were getting along just as well under the present regime as ever they had under the war lords of the old days.

Apropos of the exchange between Admiral Radford and Secretary Dulles, the President said he himself doubted whether the Russians would permit themselves at this time to become involved in a general war. He also doubted if any such general war could be ended in a week or ten days. Perhaps the Russians felt the same way as he did. Nevertheless, if they continued apparently to egg on the Chinese Communists, there must be some good reason for it.

Governor Stassen said that his explanation as to why the Soviets were apparently egging on the Chinese Communists was as follows: The Soviets may fear that if the Chinese Communists permit themselves to be involved in friendlier relations with the Western world, the Soviets may not be able to control the Chinese so effectively. If this were so, the most desirable course of action for the United States was to try to separate the Chinese and the Russians.

Admiral Radford observed that while it was true that the Russians had had ups and downs in their policy toward Europe since 1945, they had made steady progress since that year in their program to subjugate the Far East. The only way to put an end to this steady progress and to secure peace and stability in Asia, was to carry out faithfully the policy which the President had announced to the Congress last week.

Governor Stassen expressed great skepticism as to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists would make serious attacks on Formosa or on the offshore islands which the United States would assist in defending. If this proved to be the case, and after a certain amount of noise the Chinese Communists subsided and took to peaceful ways, this was the moment for the United States to try to broaden our trade with Communist China and to explore other possibilities of opening up contact with them designed to wean them away from their alliance with the Soviets.

The Vice President, speaking of paragraph 4–c which had given rise to this discussion, said that perhaps the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with this paragraph was that it was too confident in its assumption that the Communist rulers would act like normal people. Communists simply do not react normally. Accordingly, said the Vice President, he was skeptical of the possibility of inducing evolutionary change in the Soviet Union or in the satellites if we believed that the strategy set forth in the present report would ever change the minds and the hearts of the Communist rulers.

Mr. Cutler suggested that paragraph 4–c be deleted as not being necessary to the sense of the paper as a whole.

[Here follow the text of NSC Action No. 1314, in which the National Security Council approved NSC 5505 as amended, and discussion of agenda items 3, “U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities,” and 4, “Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council.”]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 28.
2. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1313. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)
3. NSC 5505, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” January 18, was approved as amended by the National Security Council at this meeting and circulated as NSC 5505/1.
4. “Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities,” November 30, 1954.
5. Paragraph 26–c of NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy,” January 6, states that the United States should attempt to foster changes in the character and policies of Soviet-Communist bloc regimes by influencing them toward lines of action which did not conflict with U.S. security interests and by exploiting differences between them.
6. The reference memorandum enclosed a JCS memorandum of January 25 to the Secretary of Defense which states the JCS views on a draft of NSC 5505. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5505 Series)
7. Clement Attlee, Leader of the Opposition.
8. Aneurin Bevan, Member of Parliament and a prominent member of the Labour Party.