37. Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)1
At my briefing conference this afternoon, I asked the President whether he had devised a mechanism to keep close watch on the implementation of the new Formosa policy (approved at Jan 21/55 NSC Meeting) in the event that there should ensue a deterioration into active hostilities.
I referred to past differences of views among the JCS as to our China policy; to the broad language of our new policy statement and his Message to Congress; to the possibility that in the heat of action and counteraction of hostilities there might arise a choice as to just what his real objective was: to end the current hostilities or to deal a decisive blow to Red China.
He seemed interested in the point which I made, and discussed it for 4 or 5 minutes. He indicated very clearly (1) that if the going got tough, he would expect daily reports from Radford or his representative, and (2) that he preferred to act through the Chairman of the JCS, rather than through the several Chiefs, in order to centralize authority.
(It might be a good idea, under existing circumstances, to ask Radford at each Council Meeting to give a short resume of what was going on militarily, similar to the intelligence estimate received from [Page 123] Allen Dulles. I did not mention this to the President, but will try it at the next NSC Meeting).
- Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Formosa. Top Secret. According to the President’s appointment dairy the meeting took place at 2:45 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments)↩