32. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1
476. Embassy telegram 474.2 President Chiang invited Chase and me to his house last night and discussed current developments for nearly 2 hours. Madame Chiang and Acting Foreign Minister also present. President asked me transmit his views to Department.
Telegram accepting Tachen evacuation has gone forward but Chiang remains adamant against cease-fire. He would like to see US protection extended to Matsu as well as Kinmen since he regards retention of former closely related to (his expression was interpreted “inseparable from”) defense of latter.
Chiang’s opposition to cease-fire apparently even stronger than 3 months ago, under influence of inpending Tachen evacuation and recent visit of Hammarskjold to Peiping. He explained at length grave effect on troops and civilian morale of giving up without a fight a strong position like Tachen which his men are ready defend to the last. Following this with cease-fire, which carries definite connotation of defeat from experience [garble] Marshall Mission3 period in particular, would compound bad effect and raise question in every mind whether Free China would ever fight again. All effects of recent years to build fighting spirit would be undermined. Heroic sacrifice of guerrillas on Ichiang who refused President’s offer to withdraw them after first heavy air attacks would have been in vain. Effect of cease-fire proposal would be even more serious if it should precede exchange of ratification of mutual defense pact.
President dwelt at length on Hammarskjold trip to which he attaches much significance. He cannot understand how US could [Page 113] regard this pilgrimage as other than failure. Certainly it was failure in terms of ostensible purpose for freeing American prisoners. But he seems convinced that fate of these Americans is only incidental to larger purposes of “reducing tension” in general and ameliorating “relations between US and Red China.” To Chiang all this simply means appeasement and the eventual entry of Communist China into UNO. In such terms he fears Hammarskjold trip was not failure from Red viewpoint.
Chiang does not suggest that in his own opinion there was any direct connection between Hammarskjold Odyssey and proposed Tachen evacuation but he was certain Communists and most others would think so. Timing and sequence such as following would be all but disastrous: (1) Hammarskjold trip; (2) Red capture of Ichiang; (3) evacuation of Tachen at US behest; (4) cease-fire proposal in UNO; (5) arrival of new batch of Red Chinese delegates in New York to discuss matters; (6) inevitable broadening of discussions (during which cease-fire as such might well pass into limbo along with US airmen); (7) meanwhile Chinese-American Security Pact still not in effect.
President seems convinced Reds would not simply reject ceasefire proposal out of hand but exploit it to utmost. He believes as matter of principle Free China must oppose it firmly.
When Red China finally enters UNO, which Chiang regards as inevitable result of present trend, US will find that in world organization it has “lost a friend and gained an enemy.”
In conclusion Chiang said Free China owed much to US and was ready to make contribution toward obtaining release of airmen from Peiping besides being helpful in other ways, even against its own interest, so long as principles not sacrificed. For example, Tachen was given up to satisfy US. He would be glad to release Soviet tanker Tuapse and non-defecting members of crew if this would obtain freedom of US prisoners. (At this point Madame Chiang remarked such an offer would put Reds on spot.)
Chiang noted with wry smile January 20 press despatches from London quoting Foreign Office spokesman as stating cease-fire was “one of a number of possible courses of action which we have discussed with US and New Zealand—over recent months.” This appeared to confirm all his suspicions. He evidently thinks US also has been less than frank with Free China about Hammarskjold.
At several points during conversation President and Madame emphasized tragic fate of Tachen inhabitants. She is sending ship next week to evacuate guerilla orphans in whom she has taken special interest. When I got up to leave she repeated hope that US would not overlook humanitarian aspects.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2355. Secret; Niact. Passed to CINCPAC by the Department at Rankin’s request.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 27.↩
- For documentation concerning General George C. Marshall’s mission to China, December 1945–January 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 745–828; ibid., 1946, vol. ix, and ibid., vol. x, pp. 1–723.↩